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INTRODUCTION
This appeal arises out of a contempt proceeding in a divorce case. Following
entry of a stipulated decree of divorce (“Decree”), the parties filed cross-motions
for orders to show cause. The petitioner, Holly Rosser, argued that her former
husband, Ronald Rosser, failed to pay tax liabilities to the IRS for 2015, and Ron
contended that Holly failed to pay him royalties from a business. While Ron based
his argument on the language of the Decree, Holly based her position primarily
on a fraud-based theory and the mediation agreement, which predated the Decree.
After a brief evidentiary hearing, the trial court held Ron in contempt and
entered judgment against him in the amount of $15,074.98, plus attorney fees, even
though the Decree provided that Holly “shall also be responsible to pay any tax
liabilities resulting to any of the Parties for the year 2015.” Compare, R.1135, with
R.491-92. In reaching this result, the trial court found that Ron had defrauded
Holly by failing to inform her that he had not paid a portion of the tax liability.
R.1133. Nowhere does the ruling reference deceit or fraud directed at the court.
At the same time, the trial court declined to hold Holly in contempt, even
though it remained undisputed that she had failed to make the royalty payments
required by the plain language of the Decree. R.1134-35.
Ron appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked a basis for holding him in
contempt for the alleged fraud, because the order to show cause procedure should
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have been limited to enforcement of an existing order. See R.1152-53. Because the
Decree required Holly to bear the entire tax obligation, Ron contended that there
was neither a legal nor a factual basis for the trial court’s order.1
The court of appeals reversed. Rosser v. Rosser, 2019 UT App 25, ¶ 21, 438
P.3d 1047. In doing so, the court addressed Holly’s argument that the trial court
possessed statutory authority to hold a party in contempt for “deceit, or abuse of
the process or proceedings of the court[.]” Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B6-301(4)). Rejecting Holly’s argument, the court of appeals interpreted the statute
to be limited to “deceit committed on the court.” Id. ¶ 13. Because Ron’s “actions
were all undertaken towards Holly, and not toward the court,” the court held that
the trial court could not have held Ron in contempt on that basis. See id. ¶¶ 14, 21.
Holly petitioned for certiorari and raised two arguments.

First, Holly

challenged the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statute. In her view, the
statute allows a contempt order for any “fraud directed toward the opposing party
that prevents or hinders that party from presenting its claim or defense.” Pet’r’s
Opening Br. at 14-15. Second, Holly contends that the court of appeals erred in
interpreting the statute, because the question was not properly before it. Id. at 25.

Brief of Appellant at 16-19, Rosser v. Rosser, No. 20170736-CA (Feb. 8, 2018) (hereinafter, “Ron’s COA Br.”) Ron will refer to Holly’s responsive brief and his reply
brief to the court of appeals as “Holly’s COA Br.” and “Ron’s COA Reply.”
1
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Ron asks this Court to reject both arguments for the reasons below.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue No. 1:

Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that Subsection

78B-6-304(4) of the Utah Code provides a basis for an order of contempt only in
those instances where a party commits deceit on the court?
Standard of Review:

This issue turns on a question of statutory

interpretation, which is typically reviewed for correctness.
Preservation: The parties dispute the degree to which the underlying
issue was preserved. The statutory provision was not raised by Holly in the
course of the district court proceedings, nor was it identified by the trial
court in its ruling. As discussed at greater length below, Ron contends that
the interpretation of a controlling statute—first raised by Holly as an
alternative basis for the contempt order for the first time in her responsive
brief to the court of appeals—was preserved insofar as he repeatedly
challenged the trial court’s authority to issue a contempt order or, in the
alternative, could be reached as controlling authority under Patterson v.
Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 828, or State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416
P.3d 443. Infra § II; see also Brief of Appellee at 20-22; R. 500-04, 1550-51; see
also R.1544-50.
Issue No. 2: Did the court of appeals correctly reach the interpretation of
Subsection 78B-6-304(b) of the Utah Code, where the appellee argued that the
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statute provided an alternative basis for the court’s authority, and her argument
presented a question of law and implicated controlling authority?
Standard of Review: This Court reviews “the court of appeals’
application of the preservation rule for correctness[,]” which allows the
court to consider the appellate doctrines as if it “were the first appellate
court to consider them.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 6, 416 P.3d 443
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Preservation: Holly challenged the court of appeals’ authority in her
Petition for Writ for Writ of Certiorari. R.1550-51.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

The Parties Stipulated and Agreed to Paragraph 9r of the Decree.
After over twenty-five years of marriage, Holly petitioned for a divorce in

June 2015.

R.1-7.

Litigation proved contentious.

Holly filed a temporary

restraining order and request for a preliminary injunction at the outset of the case,
seeking operational control of the parties’ businesses and denying Ron access to
accounts. R.40-42. Shortly thereafter, Ron filed a motion for temporary orders,
seeking access to business-related information and temporary alimony, based on
his concern that Holly controlled business activities and revenue. R.93-110.
The court entered temporary orders on January 7, 2016. R.261-65. Holly
retained temporary control of the parties’ restaurant businesses, but was directed
to provide business receipts, reports, and passwords for bank accounts, franchises,
and other accounts to Ron. R.261-63. Ron was enjoined from interfering with
Holly’s operation of the business. R.264. The temporary orders required Holly to
continue to pay debts and obligations routinely paid from the restaurant
businesses, and it placed limitations on the parties’ access to assets. See id.
Six months later, the parties participated in mediation on June 16, 2016. See
R.395-96. Mediation proved successful, and both parties signed an agreement
memorializing the basic terms of the divorce. R.596-98.
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The mediation agreement resolved key issues.

At the same time, the

roughly hewn language of the mediation agreement suggested that both parties
contemplated that it would be formalized at a later date. See R.596-98. For
example, the mediation agreement’s reference to the 2015 tax obligation was
limited to a single, cursory sentence: “IRS debt from 2015, 50% Ron and 50%
Holly.” R.597.
After mediation, Ron received access to business records, including the
parties’ original tax returns. See R.1363. Upon close examination of the records,
Ron identified additional depreciation deductions which he believed could reduce
or eliminate the parties’ 2015 tax liability. R.1363. In July 2016, Ron consulted with
the parties’ accountant, Derrick Clark, to assess the issue. R.1342.
On July 16, 2016, approximately a month after mediation, Clark prepared
amended tax returns for the parties’ business (Eagle Solutions, Inc.) and Ron and
Holly individually. R.1351. This included preparing amended tax returns for the
federal government, State of Utah, and State of Arizona. See R.1342-43, 1361-62.
Clark emailed the returns to both Ron and Holly through a secure file exchange.
R.1348-49.
In the amended federal return prepared by Clark, Line 11 showed that the
parties’ tax liability for 2015 should be reduced from $54,917 to $47,017. R.1294;
see also R.939-40. Line 17 indicated that the parties had previously paid $54,917 to
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the IRS, and Line 22 contemplated a refund of $7,900. R.1292-1293. Clark believed
that the $54,917 had been paid based upon the fact that he had provided Holly
with the original tax returns and the payment coupons, and he assumed that she
paid the amounts owed to the IRS by the April tax filing deadline. R1343-35. Clark
did not ask Ron if the full amount had been paid prior to the date of the amended
return, nor did Ron tell Clark that such amount had, in fact, been paid. R.1345; see
also R.935.
Unfortunately, Clark’s assumption was not accurate because Holly had not
paid the amount by the April filing deadline, which meant that instead of a $7,900
refund, there would be outstanding liability of $7,174.98 to the IRS. R.1288-89.
As early as July 20, 2016, Holly retained her own, independent accountant
to review the amended returns prepared by Clark. R.1312-13. On that date, Holly
forwarded the file share exchange email received from Clark to the accounting
firm of Kohler & Eyre. R.1312-13. In doing so, Holly wrote: “I don’t understand
how we can go from oweing [sic] 60 to getting another refund . [sic] And was my
45k that I paid in used towards these taxes ? [sic]” R.1620, Resp. Ex. 9; see also
R.1313. Holly’s email to her accountant appeared to include the link to the
amended tax documents. See id.
On July 29, 2016, Ron received a text message from Holly about the returns:
Send me an email on what taxes come back to me and
where the refund will go. I want the refund to go back
-8-

to eagle solutions az and Utah. And how will you be
paying me the difference. Out of the ipc.check works
for. Me. Stop pressuring me til I know all the facts. And
I have from you in writing . I am working and can’t get
upset every day with u .
R.1315-17 (emphasis added); see also R.1620, Resp. Ex. 3. Ron was shocked by
Holly’s text, and he wondered why Holly had asked him to pay any difference.
R.1367; see also R.1362-63 (explaining Holly’s control of the business). Facially, the
amended return indicated that there would be a federal refund. Because Holly
had suggested that the Arizona and Utah refunds were to be returned to Eagle
Solutions,2 Ron began to suspect that Holly’s reference to a difference meant that
there was still liability owed to the IRS. See R.1366-67. Ron called Clark, who then
called the IRS. R.1367. Clark reported that there was liability owed to the IRS.
R.1367; see R.1620, Resp. Ex. 10. 3
Holly later testified that she had her accountant independently review the
amended returns to ensure that Ron was not “tricking” her. R.1336-38 (“I said I
didn’t trust him.”). Holly admitted that Ron never told her that he had paid any
portion of the IRS tax liability. R.1338-39 (“The only way that I know that he did

The returns prepared for the State of Arizona and State of Utah showed refunds
in the approximate amounts of $200 and $700, respectively. R.1362.
2

During the evidentiary hearing, Holly claimed that she could not access the
amended return. R.1299, 1313. Clark, however, testified that his electronic records
showed that Holly previewed and downloaded the amended tax returns on July
26, 2016, some three days before Holly’s text was sent to Ron. R.1348-49.
3
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is that—when I look at—when I finally got to look at the taxes, they said they had
been paid[.]”). With respect to specific communications by Ron, Holly could only
claim that, two days after the mediation, Ron said that he understood that it
needed to be paid. R.1295-96.
As the parties conducted their independent investigations of the tax issues,
they worked on the language of the formal stipulation and a proposed decree,
which were filed on August 5, 2016. See R.403-26, 444-60. Holly testified that she
reviewed and signed the Stipulation, and that she had authorized her counsel to
approve the language of the Decree. R.1308, 1327; see also R.426, 499. Based on the
stipulation, the trial court entered the Decree on August 8, 2016. R.481-99.
Paragraph 9r of the Decree ordered the parties to sign and file amended tax
returns for Eagle Solutions, Inc. and themselves, individually. R.491. Crucially,
both the Stipulation and Decree provided that Holly would be solely responsible
for any tax liabilities for 2015: “[Holly] shall be solely entitled to receive any refund
resulting from the amended returns, and shall also be responsible to pay any tax
liabilities resulting to any of the Parties for the year 2015.” See R.416, 491-92.
II.

The Procedural History of the Order to Show Cause Proceedings
Underscores the Extent to Which Ron Contested the Basis for a Contempt
Order.
On November 21, 2019, one-hundred-and-five days after entry of the

Decree, Holly filed a verified motion for an order to show cause (hereinafter,
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“Holly’s OSC”). R.500-04. Holly argued Paragraph 9r of the Decree “was based
upon the material representation that [Ron] had theretofore paid his $14,951.11
share of the tax debt under . . . the Mediation Settlement Agreement.” R.501.
Holly’s OSC did not reference a statutory basis for contempt. Id. 500-10.
On November 29, 2016, the trial court issued an order to show cause, even
though Holly had not clearly articulated a specific violation of the Decree. Compare
R.511, with R.500-04. On January 4, 2017, the trial court also issued an order to
show cause on Ron’s motion for an order to show cause (hereinafter “Ron’s OSC”),
which sought an order enforcing the terms of Paragraph 12 of the Decree, which
required Holly to pay him rebate funds for 2015. R.538-40, 549-50.
On February 8, 2017, the trial court held a short hearing, which Ron assumed
would be an initial appearance.

R.551-52, 544, 604.

Instead of an initial

appearance, as would be typical under local rules, the trial court cross-examined
Ron, who had appeared pro se, on a range of factual issues. See, e.g., R.814-34, 84344; see Utah R. Jud. Admin. 10-1-602(5) (“The opposing party’s first appearance on
the order to show cause . . . shall not be the evidentiary hearing.”). At the
conclusion of the initial appearance, notwithstanding the local rule, the trial court
entered a judgment against Ron, which was memorialized in a written Order and
Judgment dated March 7, 2017. R.604, 836-37, 705-12.
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After the hearing, Ron filed a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and a
motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). 4 R.733-91; see also R.623-51
(requesting reconsideration and objecting to language of order). In the Rule 59
motion, Ron argued that the trial court’s order violated Utah Rule of Judicial
Administration 10-1-602, because it was entered even after Ron contested the
allegations made by Holly’s OSC and in violation of Ron’s due process rights.
R.733-34. Ron also argued that the order to show cause should be limited to
enforcement of an existing order, and insisted that he had not violated any term
or condition of the Decree. R.741-45. The court ultimately concluded that an
evidentiary hearing was appropriate, granted the motion for a new trial, and set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing on August 17, 2017. R.1113, 1118-19, 1261.
At the evidentiary hearing, Ron’s counsel argued that there was no basis for
an order to show cause, because the parties stipulated to the language of the
Decree, which plainly provided that Holly was responsible for the tax obligation.
See R.1273-74, 1276. Counsel pointed to the fact that there had been several
proposals on the language of the final documents, and that Holly ultimately
signed the Stipulation. R.1274-1277; see also R.1397-1403.

Ron also filed a motion for reconsideration, in which he maintained that Holly
had agreed to the language of Paragraph 9r and argued that a contempt order was
inappropriate, because the court could only enforce the actual terms of the Decree.
R.623, 636.
4
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III.

The District Court Entered an Order of Contempt Without Clearly
Articulating the Precise Basis for Its Decision.
After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court found Ron in

contempt, awarded judgment against Ron in the amount of $15,074.98, and
awarded attorney fees to Holly. R.1136. A subsequent order awarded fees in the
amount of $18,218.10, making the total judgment $33,293.08. R.1210.
In its order, the district court made the following findings: (1) the parties
intended on June 16, 2016, to file an amended 2015 tax return which would result
in Holly receiving a $7,900 refund, R.1132; (2) the parties agreed to pay 50% of their
2015 IRS tax liability, or $14,951.11 each, R.1132; (3) Holly assumed she would
receive a $7,900 refund from the amended returns, R.1133; (4) at no point did Ron
tell Holly that he had failed to pay his $14,951.11 tax obligation, R.1134; and (7)
Holly had to pay the IRS an additional $7,174.98, because Holly signed the
Stipulation requiring her to pay any tax liability for 2015, R.1133.
In doing so, the trial court never identified a specific violation of the Decree,
or a statutory basis for the contempt order. R.1134-35. The net effect, in Ron’s
view, was to amend the Decree in the context of an order to show cause
proceedings on the basis of fraud, without regard for the timing requirements of
Rule 60(b)(3) or limitations of the local rule. Compare R.1135, with R.491-92; see also
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3); Utah R. Jud. Admin. 10-1-602(7) (“An order to show cause
may not be requested in order to obtain an original order or judgment[.]”).
-13-

Ron timely appealed. See R.1152-53.
IV.

The Parties Addressed the Bases (or Lack Thereof) on Appeal.
On appeal, Ron attacked Holly’s fraud-based theory of contempt with

several arguments. Ron’s COA Br. at 11-16. First, Ron maintained that the
appropriate procedural mechanism for modifying, amending, or setting aside a
judgment or decree on the basis of fraud would have been a motion under Rule
60(b). Id. at 16-17. Because Holly neither sought relief under Rule 60(b), nor
otherwise sought relief within the ninety days permitted by the rule, Ron
contended that the trial court erred in holding him in contempt, in part because it
assumed and imposed a financial obligation on Ron that found no basis in the
Decree.
Second, Ron maintained that the trial court’s decision violated Utah Rule of
Judicial Administration 10-1-602, which contains language limiting an order to
show cause proceeding in the Sixth District to the enforcement of an existing order.
Id. at 17-18; see Utah R. Jud. Admin. 10-1-602(7) (“An order to show cause may not
be requested in order to obtain an original order or judgment[s.]”). In Ron’s view,
if Holly sought to modify the terms of the Decree, an order to show cause was not
the appropriate procedure. Id. at 18-19.
In addition, Ron maintained that the trial court’s ruling on fraud was against
the clear weight of the evidence. Id. at 19-28. Addressing three of the necessary
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elements of a civil fraud claim, Ron contended that (1) Holly had not shown that
Ron made a false representation about the tax liability having been paid, (2) the
substantial weight of the evidence demonstrated that Holly understood that the
amended return would result in tax liability—not a refund, and (3) Holly’s
contention that she reasonably relied on her belief about Ron’s prior payment
found little support in the record, in part because Holly hired her own accountant
and testified that she believed Ron was trying to trick her. Id. at 19-26. In the
alternative, Ron asked the court of appeals to remand, because the factual findings
on the issue of fraud were inadequate. Id. at 26-27.5
In her responsive brief, Holly argued that the trial court could grant her
relief by virtue of the general contempt statute (Utah Code § 78B-6-301) or its
enforcement powers (Utah Code § 30-3-3(2)). See Holly’s COA Br. at 20. In doing
so, Holly specifically cited and quoted the statutory language at issue in this
appeal. Id. at 21. To Ron’s knowledge, this was the first time Holly had ever relied
on the contempt statute as a basis for relief. Compare id. at 21-22 (“The relief
granted by the District Court and the grounds for such relief are expressly

Additionally, Ron argued that the parol evidence rule barred admission of the
mediation agreement, id. at 27-32, and that the trial court erred in refusing to hold
Holly liable for refusing to pay rebate funds owed under the Decree, given her
admission that she had failed to make those payments, id. at 32-33. Ron asked the
Court of Appeals to award fees. Id. at 33-34.
5
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authorized under Utah Code [sic] 78B-6-301 & Utah Code [sic] 78B-6-311 as
outlined above”), with R.500-04.
Along a similar vein, Holly argued a Rule 60(b) motion was unnecessary or
improper, because she “was not asking the District Court to set the Decree aside
or to modify it.” Holly’s COA Br. at 22-23. She simply “sought enforcement of the
decree, not modification of it.” Id. at 25. Finally, Holly argued that the trial court’s
findings were sufficient. Id. at 26-35.6
In his reply, Ron urged the court to reject Holly’s statutory argument for
three reasons: (1) there was no indication that the trial court relied on the statutory
provision; (2) Holly’s theory of contempt relied exclusively on facts occurring
outside of the court or the proceedings; and (3) the statute applied only “in respect
to a court or its proceedings.” Ron’s COA Reply, at 9-11; Utah Code § 78B-6-301(4).
V.

Holly Addressed the Scope of the Contempt Statute at Oral Argument.
During oral argument, the court of appeals invited the parties to address the

reach of the statute. The panel asked Holly’s counsel the following questions:


“[H]elp me understand what he’s being found in
contempt of. . . . There are 12 different reasons that a
court is authorized to find somebody in contempt. . . .
[M]y question to you is, which one of those 12 is the court
referencing here?” Tr. 15:11-24 (Judge Harris).

Holly also argued that the district court properly considered the mediation
agreement as parol evidence of the final stipulation. Id. at 35-39.
6
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“And then your argument with regard to . . . subsection
(4) has to do with this deceit argument?” Tr. 17:18-20
(Judge Harris).



“And I guess my question to you is, doesn’t that have to
be -- as Judge Mortensen, I think, alluded to a moment
ago – doesn’t that have to be deceit on the court as
opposed to deceit on your client?” Tr. 17:22-25 (Judge
Harris).



“Just as a matter of statutory interpretation, then, your
position is that that subsection can encompass deceit on
a third party. . . . So help us understand, then . . . how
that couldn’t result in every single breach of contract
action mushrooming into contempt of court; right? I’m
a party to – to an action, you lie to me; therefore, I can
come in and – and accuse you of contempt of court, even
though you didn’t do anything in front of the court that
would constitute deceit. Do you follow what I’m
asking?” Tr. 18:3-20 (Judge Harris).7

Consistent with her briefing, Holly’s counsel continued to rely on the statute
as a basis for court’s contempt authority. Tr. 15:25-16:4. In doing so, Holly argued
that the statutory provision reached both deceit on the court and a party. Tr. 17:2218:2. Holly also suggested that the statute should be applied broadly: “I think that
it can be a – a deceit that involves litigation.” Tr. 18:21-25.
Holly did not seek leave to submit supplemental briefing.

Similar questions were asked to Ron’s counsel.
Mortensen); Tr. 32:2-16 (Judge Hagen).
7
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See Tr. 10:16-23 (Judge

VI.

The Court of Appeals Addressed Both of Holly’s Arguments.
The court of appeals reversed. It observed that Ron had challenged the basis

for the contempt order, that the trial court had not identified the statutory grounds
on which it had relied, and that Holly argued that two provisions of the statute
applied, including the one at issue in the instant appeal. Rosser v. Rosser, 2019 UT
App 25, ¶¶ 10-12 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(4)-(5)).
The court of appeals held that the statutory ground for contempt based on
“deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court,” Utah Code Ann. §
78B-6-301(4), should be “interpreted to include only deceit committed on the
court,” Rosser, 2019 UT App 25, ¶ 13. Because there were no allegations, let alone
findings, that Ron committed deceit on the court, the trial court lacked a statutory
basis for holding Ron in contempt for the alleged deceit. See id. ¶¶ 13-16, 21.
Turning to Holly’s alternative argument—that Ron’s conduct constituted
“disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court,” Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-301(5), the court of appeals concluded that the “plain terms of the
Decree (as opposed to the Mediation Agreement) obligate Holly to pay the entirety
of the parties’ 2015 tax obligation, whatever that obligation might be,” Rosser, 2019
UT App 25, ¶¶ 17-18. The court held that the statutory grounds were not met
because, even assuming that there was a failure to comply with the Mediation
Agreement, “such failure clearly does not violate the terms of the Decree, because
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the Decree imposed upon Ronald no obligation to pay any of the parties’ 2015 tax
obligation.” Id. ¶ 18; see also id. ¶¶ 19-20 (addressing Holly’s argument that parol
evidence should be considered in light of a latent ambiguity in the Decree).
In light of its holding, the court of appeals declined to reach Ron’s remaining
arguments, “including whether the district court clearly erred in any of its factual
determinations.” Rosser, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 9 n.3.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301 provides a statutory basis for a district court to
enter an order of contempt when a party engages in “deceit” but only when the
act or omission relates “to a court or its proceedings.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6301(6). The court of appeals correctly interpreted the statute to require that the
deceit is “committed on the court.” Rosser, 2019 UT App 25, ¶ 25. Such a reading
is supported by the plain language and structure of the statute, and also finds
support in canons of statutory interpretation, adheres to the few cases applying
the statutory provision, and avoids a result that would greatly expand the scope
of contempt proceedings and implicate constitutional concerns.
The court should reject Holly’s novel invitation to import the doctrine of
frauds into the statutory provision.

Although Holly cites cases from other

jurisdictions in support of her position, all of her cases are readily distinguishable
and none provide a basis for a significant expansion of the doctrine. In fact, case
law in Utah and elsewhere supports the proposition that the doctrine of frauds
should remain confined to a specific context and directed at the traditional
remedy—setting aside or modifying a judgment within the time constraints of
Rule 60—rather than a sweeping basis for contempt proceedings. And even if the
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Court adopts the doctrine for the purposes of statutory contempt proceedings, the
trial court never adopted or applied the standard to the facts of this case.
II.
The Court should reject Holly’s contention that the court of appeals erred in
interpreting the proper scope of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301. As a practical
matter, Holly raised the statute as an independent basis for affirming the trial
court’s decision. As such, this case does not implicate the jurisprudential concerns
at the heart of State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 416 P.3d 443.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court should conclude that Ron
adequately preserved the central issue, or that the court of appeals did not err in
addressing a controlling statute directly implicated by Holly’s argument.
Alternatively, the Court may determine that the exceptional circumstances
doctrine or a Johnson exception justified reaching the issue presented.
III.
Even if the Court adopts Holly’s interpretation, the case should be
remanded for consideration of Ron’s challenge to the sufficiency and adequacy of
the trial court’s findings. The court of appeals never reached those issues, because
Holly failed to identify a statutory basis for the trial court’s ruling. Remand would
be appropriate to have the issues addressed in the first instance.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Interpreted the Scope of Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-6-301(4).
A.

The language and structure of Subsection (4) support an
interpretation that limits its application to deceit directed
towards a court.

When interpreting a statute, a court’s primary goal is to give effect to the
legislative intent in light of the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.
Monarrez v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶11, 368 P.3d 846.
The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is “the plain language of the
statute itself” by reading the plain language of the statute as a whole. Id. (citing
State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ¶18, 193 P.3d 92).

This Court has adopted a

“commonsense approach” to statutory interpretation in which “a word is given
more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.”
Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist., 2012 UT 31, ¶15, 285 P.3d 1142.
This does not present a novel or difficult question; it should be a
straightforward application of statutory language. The relevant provision reads:
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its
proceedings are contempts of the authority of the court: . .
.
(4) deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the
court, by a party to an action or special proceeding;
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(4) (emphasis added). To give meaning to the plain
language and structure of the statute, the Court should decline to adopt Holly’s
broad interpretation of Subsection (4) for at least three reasons.
First, the court of appeals’ interpretation gave effect to each of the material
terms of the statute. See Monarrez v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11, 368
P.3d 846 (recognizing principle that courts avoid an “‘interpretation which renders
parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to
every word of a statute’”). Here, the first clause suggests that the specific acts or
omissions identified in the statute must be “in respect to a court or its proceedings”
in order to qualify as contempt. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301. Insofar as Holly’s
interpretation permits a finding of contempt based on a deceitful act, regardless of
whether the representation was with respect to the court or involved its
proceedings, it renders the operative language of the statute superfluous, fails to
harmonize all terms of the statute, and should be rejected.
Second, the court of appeals’ finds support in the cannon of noscitur a sociis.
GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Utah State Univ. Research Found., 2018 UT 50, ¶ 26, 428 P.3d
1064 (presuming that words “grouped in a list should be given related meaning”).
Here, the first clause refers to “acts or omissions in respect to a court or its
proceedings” that are “contempts of the authority of the court” and identifies
twelve specific examples, all of which directly involve the court, judicial
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proceedings, or the court’s authority. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301. By way of
example, the acts or omissions identified in the statute include insolent behavior
towards the judge, a disturbance that interrupts the judicial proceedings,
detaining witnesses, refusing to be sworn during a proceeding, or unlawful
interference with the proceedings. Id. § 78B-6-301(1), (2), (4), (8)-(10).
And while various subsections of the statute include conduct that could
conceivably occur outside of the court’s immediate presence, those provisions
often either directly involve a judicial order or implicate the “authority of the
court.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301. Examples include provisions that allow
contempt for misbehavior as officers of the court, acting as a court officer without
authority, disobedience with a court judgment, order, or process, or direct
interference with a court directive or process. See, e.g., § 78B-6-301(3), (5), (6), (7),
(10)-(12).
In light of prefatory language and various subdivisions—nearly all of which
relate to the court’s authority, a judicial process, an order, or a proceeding—a
reasonable interpretation would be that the Utah Legislature intended for “deceit”
to mean representations directed toward the court or made during an actual trial
or hearing, none of which occurred here. See Rosser, 2019 UT App 25, ¶¶ 12-15.
Third and finally, Holly’s proposed interpretation is much more likely to
offend the substantive terms cannon. See Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT
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52, ¶ 21, 428 P.3d 1096 (“‘We will not infer substantive terms into the text that are
not already there. Rather the interpretation must be based on the language used,
and [we have] no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not
expressed.’”). Unlike Ron’s interpretation, which seeks to give meaning to the
prefatory

language

and

neighboring

subdivisions,

Holly’s

proposed

interpretation requires incorporating additional language to render it reasonable.
See Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 14-15 (arguing that “contemptible deceit under
Subsection (4) includes fraud directed toward the opposing party that prevents or
hinders that party from presenting its claims or defenses”). If the Utah Legislature
had intended the deceit provision to sweep so broadly as to include any instance
where an out-of-court statement during an ongoing case could be a basis for
contempt, it could have easily included such language in Subsection (4).
For the foregoing reasons, Holly’s argument that deceit is contemptible
simply because it is made by a party to a proceeding, see Pet’r’s Br. at 16, fails.
Instead, the Court should interpret Subsection (4)’s language and structure to
require that contemptible deceit be directed towards the court or its proceedings.
B.

Although legislative history is scarce, the court of appeals’
interpretation finds some support in prior cases.

Even if the plain language and structure of Subsection (4) does not resolve
the issue, the history of the statute and sound policy weigh in favor of rejecting
Holly’s interpretation. Belnap v. Howard, 2019 UT 9, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d 355, 358 (“‘Only
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when we find ambiguity in the statute’s plain language need we seek guidance
from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.’”).
As a preliminary matter, detailed legislative history for Subsection (4)
appears to have been lost to the passage of time. A nearly identical provision has
been law since before statehood. Utah Comp. Laws, § 3821(4) (1888). Indeed, the
nineteenth-century terms remained substantively unchanged for over a century.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(4); Utah Code Ann. § 104-45-1 (1953); Utah Comp.
Laws § 3358(4) (1907); Utah Rev. Stat. § 3358 (1898).
Past decision, however, may suggest that the statute was understood to be
directed towards protecting judicial authority, as opposed to private interests. As
early as 1894, courts discussed the statute in terms of vindicating public interests
and appeared to assume, albeit indirectly, that the contempt at issue would be
directed at a court. See In re Whitmore, 9 Utah 441, 35 P. 524, 529 (1894) (“It is an
offense public in its nature, which tends to cast discredit upon the administration
of public justice.”); see also Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (concluding trial court did not err in applying Subsection (4) where
party attempted to deceive the court); cf. PacifiCorp v. Cardon, 2016 UT App 20, ¶
3, 366 P.3d 1226 (noting that district court held party in contempt for filing false
documents); Bhongir v. Mantha, 2016 UT App 99, ¶¶ 15-19, 374 P.3d 33 (recognizing
district court held party in contempt for committing perjury).
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While none of these decisions are directly on point with the facts presented
in this case, they nonetheless underscore the novelty of Holly’s interpretation.
Even though the provision has been the law in Utah since at least 1888, Utah’s
appellate courts have never held that a deceitful statement not directed at the court
or during a judicial proceeding qualifies as a basis for contempt under Subsection
(4) or its predecessors.
C.

The court of appeals’ interpretation avoids an absurd result
and finds support in principles of due process.

Additional considerations—particularly with respect to due process and
avoiding an unintended result—also weigh against Holly’s expansive approach to
Subsection (4). See Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27, 387 P.3d 1000 (discussing
absurd consequences cannon); cf. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶ 23,
332 P.3d 900 (discussing canon of constitutional avoidance and noting legislature
was assumed to “legislate[] in light of constitutional limitations”).
Due process turns on notice and the opportunity to be heard. See Worrall v.
Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) (“Due process is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is
flexible and requires such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.”). Holly’s approach implicates due process in at least two respects.
The first problem is notice. In effect, Holly’s approach would allow a party
to initiate a civil or criminal contempt proceeding whenever an out-of-court
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statement (or, in this case, the absence of a statement) bears some relationship to
vague notions of the administration of justice. The problem is that litigation
necessarily involves disputed issues of fact and competing representations of
events. Given the amorphous standard proposed by Holly, litigants would likely
lack fair notice when their conduct may lead to criminal or civil sanctions, and her
approach would likely lead to arbitrary enforcement. Johnson v. United States, 135
S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (holding federal statute was unconstitutionally vague
where it left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime”
and its indeterminacy “invites arbitrary enforcement”).8
The second problem relates to the opportunity to present a defense. Unlike
a separate fraud proceeding, where parties may avail themselves of discovery, the
expedited nature of a contempt procedure may prevent a party from obtaining the
documents or discovery necessary to defend against the allegations, especially if
the specific theory of “deceit” or factual allegations are unclear. See, e.g., R.500-04.
Indeed, this case illustrates some of the challenges for parties directed to
appear and answer for out-of-court conduct. The evidentiary hearing lasted a few
hours and involved only three witnesses. See R.1129-30. During the hearing,

In contrast, when a party presents an affidavit, declaration, or sworn testimony,
the party receives fair notice of the possibility of perjury. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-18a-106.
8
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Holly’s counsel appeared with a stack of messages that Ron’s counsel had not had
an opportunity to review prior to the hearing. R.1296-97.
The resolution of Holly’s OSC turned on a critical issue—whether she
understood that the tax obligation remained outstanding when she signed the
Stipulation. Ron believed that a text message demonstrated that she understood
amounts were owed, and that Holly agreed to assume the outstanding liability.
R.1367, 1369-70, 1387-88. Although Holly admitted that she signed the final
Stipulation, which obligated her to assume the tax liability, R.1326-27, Holly
claimed that she did not know about the outstanding liability, and she denied
meeting with Ron. See, e.g., R.1391-92.
At the hearing, however, Holly initially could not recall what she meant in
the critical text message, R.1305, and she could not recall receiving an email that
would have strongly indicated that she fully understood that the obligation
remained outstanding, see R.1325-26. Holly also denied having access to the tax
return prior to the Stipulation, R.1317, and claimed that, even though she retained
independent accountants, her accountants never informed her that the tax
obligation was outstanding. See R.1322.
If Holly had filed an independent fraud action, Ron would have had a fairer
opportunity to be heard under the Rules of Civil Procedure. In a civil action, Ron
would have an opportunity to answer the complaint, identifying affirmative
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defenses, prior to fact discovery. Utah R. Civ. P. 8, 12. Holly would be required
to identify any documents on which she intended to rely long before trial. Utah
R. Civ. P. 26(a). Ron would have an opportunity to depose Holly, which would
have revealed that she intended to deny having received access to the amended
tax return and that the meeting occurred. Utah R. Civ. P. 30. After receiving notice
of her contentions through the deposition, Ron could then propound
interrogatories, requests for production, and non-party subpoenas to investigate
her claim that she lacked knowledge, as well as lay the groundwork for
impeachment. Utah R. Civ. P. 33, 45.9
These examples are intended to illustrate the fundamental problem with
Holly’s interpretation. By advancing an expansive interpretation of Subsection (4),
Holly seeks to create an alternative avenue for seeking a judgment between two
parties that circumvents the standard procedural rules governing civil cases. This
could potentially lead to absurd consequences, such as the one presented here,

Here, for example, emails to and from Holly’s independent accountant may be
fatal to her claim that did not understand that tax liability remained outstanding.
Similarly, a privilege log of communications between herself and counsel would
have undermined her claim that she could not recall being privy to the
negotiations over the language of the parties’ final Stipulation.
9
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where a party essentially attempts to modify the terms of a judgment on vague
allegations of deceit, even though time for doing so under Rule 60 has passed. 10
The better approach, more consistent with due process, would be to
interpret Subsection (4) narrowly, so that parties seeking a judgment on the basis
of fraud assert such claims in an independent action, which in turn would be
governed by the appropriate statute of limitations and Rules of Civil Procedure.
D.

Holly’s reliance on authorities from other jurisdictions
remains unpersuasive.

When arguing the Court should “import[] the jurisprudence from the
related doctrine of Fraud on the Court,” Holly relies on cases from other
jurisdictions, none of which support adopting a new interpretation of Subsection
(4). See Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 20-23.
The principal distinguishing fact is that each of the cases relied upon by
Holly turned in part on a representation to the court or directly implicate the
court’s authority. For example, Holly suggests that Fass & Wolper, Inc. v. Burns,
177 Misc. 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) stands for the proposition that fraudulently
transferring assets constitutes contempt. Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 23-24.

Prior decisions reinforce the extent to which a party should assert fraud on the
court within the time limitations of Rule 60(b). See In Matter of Estate of Willey, 2016
UT 53, ¶¶ 9-13, 391 P.3d 171 (rejecting argument that challenge to judgment could
be asserted under the residual clause).
10
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A careful reading, however, suggests that while the deceitful conduct was
relevant, the contempt analysis primarily turned on the extent to which there had
been an abuse of process and a “flagrant violation of the terms of [a court] order
granting the stay.” Fass & Wolper, Inc., 177 Misc. 430 at 430-32 (“Accordingly, when
a stay is granted, especially at the defendant's request, he impliedly agrees, in
consideration of the favor so extended to him, that he will not, during the
pendency of the stay, transfer or dispose of his assets or otherwise disturb the
status quo.”).
Similarly, in In re Contempt of Black, 2009 WL 3014938 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009),
the defendant “was convicted for ‘deliberately lying’ to the trial court and for
making ‘false representation[s]’ to opposing counsel.” Id. at *1-2. But the analysis
turned on clearly distinguishable facts and legal grounds. Specifically, the trial
court concluded that deliberately lying to the court constituted a violation of the
attorney’s “obligation and duty as an officer of the court,” and that making a false
representation constituted a violation of the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct. Id. at *2; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(3) (separately addressing
attorney misconduct). Nowhere in its decision did the Michigan Court of Appeals
rely on the statutory contempt provision.
Interestingly, Holly cites a series of cases from other jurisdictions, but none
support her contention that fraud on the court should be a basis for statutory
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contempt. In Cobell v. Norton, for example, the court discussed its inherent powers
in the context of a separate proceeding, cautioned that the severity of sanctions
often required “a showing that one has acted with an intent to deceive or defraud
the court,” and observed that the remedy, following judgment, was most often to
set aside or vacate the judgment. 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing
party misconduct separately), vacated, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (expressing
caution about the reach of “inherent power” and concluding that it should “either
be documented by historical practice . . . or supported by an irrefutable showing
that the exercise of an undoubted authority would otherwise be set to naught.”).
The remaining cases are factually distinguishable, involved a court’s
inherent authority, or resulted in a different remedy than the one sought below.
See, e.g., Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming
dismissal as sanction, based on inherent authority, where phony contract formed
“centerpiece” of complaint and litigation); Rockdale Mgmt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank,
N.A., 638 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Mass. 1994) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss,
pursuant to inherent authority, where party proffered a forged document,
provided misleading interrogatory answers, and gave false deposition testimony);
State v. Moquin, 105 N.H. 9, 11, 191 A.2d 541, 543 (1963) (affirming “fraud on the
court, an obstruction of justice and contempt” where parties conspired to mislead
the court in a criminal case, in part by making representations in open court). In
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short, many of the cases cited by Holly involved instances where the nexus
between the representation and the court was clear, and none involved an instance
where the court entered a monetary judgment against the offending party.
For the foregoing reasons, none of Holly’s cases stand for the proposition
that importing the concept of fraud on the court would be necessary or appropriate
under Subsection (4). To the contrary, they suggest that there are other statutory
bases for vindicating the court’s authority. And the fact that Holly has been unable
to find a single case on all fours interpreting a similar statute cautions against
Holly’s proposed expansion of statutory contempt proceedings.
E.

Invocation of the doctrine of fraud on the court should
remain confined to a limited class of cases.

Fraud on the court is typically invoked in the context of Rule 60(b) within
ninety days of the judgment. See, e.g., In Matter of Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53, ¶¶
8-10, 391 P.3d 171 (discussing time limitation and rejecting argument that
residuary clause could be used to circumvent claim of fraud); McBroom v. Child,
2016 UT 38, ¶ 26, 392 P.3d 835 (noting party could not challenge judiciallyapproved agreement “unless he pleads an independent action for fraud on the
court seeking to set aside the court orders or files a rule 60(b) motion); cf. Utah v.

-34-

Boyden, 2019 UT 11, ¶ 37 n.8, 441 P.3d 737 (discussing inherent authority in the
specific context of setting aside an order or judgment).11
The doctrine allows a party to seek relief from an existing judgment, but
only where there is “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to
improperly influence the court in its decision.” Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ¶ 40,
123 P.3d 416 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing example of
“suborning perjury or obstructing justice”); cf. Kartchner v. Kartchner, 2014 UT App
195, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 1 (discussing doctrine in context of a motion to obtain relief
from judgment); Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “fraud on the
court” as: “In a judicial proceeding, a lawyer’s or party’s misconduct so serious
that it undermines or is intended to undermine the integrity of the proceeding. •
Examples are bribery of a juror and introduction of fabricated evidence.”).
Utah courts have observed that the term should be “narrowly construed to
embrace only that type of conduct which defiles the court itself, or fraud which is
perpetuated by officers of the court so as to prevent the judicial system from
functioning in the customary manner of deciding the cases presented in an
impartial matter.” Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, ¶ 28 n.10, 9 P.3d 171 (internal

As the court of appeals correctly recognized, Holly never raised the issue of a
court’s inherent powers in the underlying contempt proceeding or on appeal.
Rosser v. Rosser, 2019 UT App 25, ¶ 10 n.4, 438 P.3d 1047; see Utah R. App. P. 24(a).
11
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quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Wright v. W.E. Callahan Const. Co.,
156 P.2d 710, 711 (Utah 1945) (expressing concern that broader approach to fraud
on the court doctrine would “make for endless litigation”).
Similarly, in the federal system, commentators have noted that fraud on the
court should apply “to very unusual cases involving ‘far more than an injury to a
single litigant.’” Charles A. Wright et al., 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2870 (3d ed.
2019) (“Thus, the courts have refused to invoke this concept in cases in which the
wrong, if wrong there was, was only between the parties in the case and involved
no direct assault on the integrity of the judicial process.”). “Nondisclosure by a
party or the party’s attorney has not been enough.” Id. & n.34.
Classic examples are bribery, direct submission of “bogus” documents, or
perjury, although not all cases involving even perjured testimony have been
sufficient. Id.; Kennedy v. Schneider Elec., 893 F.3d 414, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (defining
rule narrowly “lest it become an open sesame to collateral attacks”); United States
v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing breadth of fraud
on the court and observing “[m]ere nondisclosure of evidence is typically not
enough to constitute fraud on the court”).12

Holly briefly raises a policy argument—that the submission of proposed orders
presents a situation ripe for fraud, because the district court may not carefully review a party’s submission. Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 18-19. Other rules or standards
operate as deterrents to this concern. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (setting standard
for signature); Utah R. Civ. P. 7(j)(4) (allowing objections to proposed order); Utah
12
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In summary, Holly’s invitation to import the doctrine into the contempt
statute suffers in three respects. First, the doctrine often serves a very specific
remedy—setting aside or modifying an existing judgment or order in order to
vindicate the court’s authority—rather than a basis for an independent judgment
for monetary damages for the benefit of a private party. Second, the doctrine
applies in a narrow set of circumstances, which are not implicated here. Third and
finally, the doctrine typically applies in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion, which
would be subject to time constraints, or an independent action, during which a
party could avail herself of discovery. Supra Argument, § I.C.
For all these reasons, the court should conclude that the doctrine is a poor
fit for statutory contempt proceedings.
F.

Holly’s application of the fraud on the court doctrine
inaccurately presumes that the district court made adequate
findings.

Finally, in a single paragraph, Holly argues that the facts of this case
demonstrate a deception “that interferes with the administration of justice and that
fits nicely into Utah’s Fraud on the Court doctrine.” Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 25.

R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing court to set aside or modify final order upon a timely
challenge). More importantly, as a factual matter, these concerns are not implicated here; the parties negotiated the terms of the stipulation, Holly reviewed and
signed the Stipulation, and her counsel approved the language of the Decree.
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The problem is that Holly never presented the lower courts with the issue
of whether Ron engaged “in a deliberate course of deception to obtain a court
order” or otherwise interfered with the administration of justice, as typically
required by the fraud of the court doctrine.

See R.500-04. Instead, without

invoking the statute, she only argued that Ron misrepresented that he “had
theretofore paid his $14,951.11 share of the tax debt under . . . the Mediation
Settlement Agreement.” R.501-10. Likewise, the district court did not make
specific findings that would support such a conclusion. See R.1131-35.
For these reasons, if the Court adopts Holly’s interpretation of Subsection
(4), it should decline Holly’s cursory invitation to apply the fraud on the court
doctrine at this stage of the case. Infra Argument, § III (addressing appropriateness
of remand).13

As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how these facts satisfy the demands of
the fraud on the court doctrine, which typically requires conduct so serious that it
undermines the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Although courts have
recognized that a decree induced by fraud may constitute fraud on the court in
some circumstances, see Kartchner v. Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195, ¶ 26, 334 P.3d 1
(discussing cases), here, it is undisputed that Holly signed the stipulation that
formed the basis of the Decree. R.1308, 1327; see Soltanieh v. King, 826 P.2d 1076,
1078 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that party failed to demonstrate fraud on
the court, where he signed the stipulation containing the property distribution
provisions contained in the decree).
13
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II.

The Legal Issue of the Proper Scope of Section 78B-6-301(4) Was
Squarely Before the Court of Appeals.
Holly contends the court of appeals should not have considered whether

Subsection (4) provided a basis for contempt, because Ron did not raise the statute
in the district court proceedings or his opening brief. See Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 2531. Holly’s argument is unpersuasive for two principal reasons, as discussed
below.
A.

This appeal does not implicate the jurisprudential concerns
at the heart of the Johnson decision or its holding.

State v. Johnson involved a defendant’s appeal of his murder conviction.
2017 UT 76, ¶¶ 1-5, 416 P.3d 443. To the court of appeals, the defendant argued
that his conviction should not stand, because the verdict form failed to include an
option to find him guilty of a lesser offense (homicide by assault) and errors in the
jury instruction on causation required reversal. Id. ¶ 3.
Sua sponte, the court of appeals asked the parties to submit supplemental
briefing on an issue never raised by the defendant: “whether the homicide by
assault jury instruction was erroneous.” Id. ¶ 4. In doing so, the court recognized
that the defendant never objected to that instruction, and he “likely invited the
error by submitting the instruction to the court.” Id. The court nevertheless
concluded that “the exceptional circumstances exception to the preservation rule
permitted the court to examine the unpreserved and likely invited error.” Id.
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This Court granted certiorari to resolve “whether the court of appeals
correctly concluded that exceptional circumstances merit review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court and not argued on appeal.” Id. ¶ 1. In doing so, the
Court addressed the historical and analytical underpinnings of preservation in our
appellate system and explained that policy considerations, such as judicial
economy, fairness, preservation of the adversarial model, and providing clear
guidelines for parties, weighed in favor of creating exceptions to the general
preservation rule. Id. ¶¶ 8-13; but see id. ¶¶ 67-79 (Lee, J., concurring in judgment)
(discussing importance of adversarial model in the context of appellate practice).
In its analysis, the Court clarified the standards governing the three
exceptions to preservation: plain error; ineffective assistance of counsel; and
exceptional circumstances.

Id. ¶¶ 18-39.

With respect to the exceptional

circumstances doctrine, the Court emphasized that it should be applied
“sparingly” in cases of rare procedural anomalies which “either prevented an
appellant from preserving an issue or excuses a failure to do so.” Id. ¶ 29.
Because the defendant invited the error in the jury instruction, failed to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel, and identified a failure to object at trial as the only
procedural anomaly, the Johnson Court concluded that no exception to the
preservation doctrine applied. Id. ¶¶ 57-62. Because the issue was unpreserved
and none of the exceptions for sua sponte consideration applied, the court of
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appeals “erred in overruling the trial court sua sponte on an issue that was neither
preserved in the trial court nor argued on appeal.” Id. ¶¶ 54-63.
While Johnson clarifies the analytical framework for sua sponte consideration
of issues, its holding is inapposite to the facts of this case for two reasons.
1.

Ron preserved the central issue by challenging the
district court’s authority to enter the contempt order,
and the court of appeals did not err in considering a
controlling statute implicated by the arguments.

As this Court has recognized, “semantics alone cannot be our guide in
applying our preservation rule.” Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 15, 266 P.3d
828. Preservation turns, in part, on the underlying policies, principally “judicial
economy and fairness.” See id. ¶¶ 15-16. For these reasons, courts may address
arguments that raise newly discovered authority or controlling legislation, insofar
as it “directly bears upon a properly preserved issue.” Id. ¶ 18.
Unlike in Johnson, where neither party raised a challenge to a specific jury
instruction, Ron consistently challenged the trial court’s authority to hold him in
contempt or grant the specific relief sought by Holly. In his view, the trial court’s
contempt authority was limited to compelling compliance with an existing order.
Because the Decree required Holly to assume the tax liability for 2015, Ron
repeatedly argued that Holly was not entitled to relief. See, e.g., R.741-45, R.12741275, 1398. Ron did not waive these arguments in his opening brief.
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It is true that neither party specifically referenced Subsection (4) in the trial
court proceedings.

However, Ron raised the issue of whether it would be

procedurally proper to grant Holly’s requested relief in several different motions.
In his view, because Holly asked the trial court to compel him to pay a portion of
the tax obligation, contrary to the language of the Decree, the appropriate
procedure was not an order to show cause. See, e.g., R.741-45. This argument
necessarily implicated the court’s contempt authority.
In point of fact, it was Holly who raised Subsection (4) as an alternative basis
for affirming the trial court. Holly argued the trial court had the authority to enter
an order of contempt and grant her relief by virtue of the statute. Holly’s COA Br.
at 20-22.

In doing so, Holly appeared to tacitly acknowledge that Ron had

challenged the district court’s authority. And because Holly invoked the statute,
Ron addressed its applicability in his reply brief. Ron’s COA Reply at 9-11.
In this respect, this case is more similar to Patterson than Johnson.

In

Patterson, the Court analyzed and applied provisions of the Utah Uniform Trust
Code, even though the appellee never raised the statute below, because it was
central to the argument at hand. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 20 (“As the state’s highest
court, we have a responsibility to maintain a sound and uniform body of precedent
and must apply the statutes duly enacted into law.”); see also Johnson, 2017 UT 76,
¶ 14 n.2 (“Patterson confirms that we view issues narrowly, but also made it clear
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that new arguments, when brought upon a properly preserved issue or theory, do
not require an exception to preservation. Such arguments include citing new
authority or cases supporting an issue that was properly preserved.”).
In summary, Ron preserved his challenge to the trial court’s contempt
authority, albeit by invoking a local rule, rather than the statute. And even if the
trial court failed to address the statute, the court of appeals acted within its
authority when it analyzed the applicability of a controlling statute directed at the
same issue, consistently raised by Ron, under Patterson.14
2.

Alternatively, the exceptional circumstances doctrine
permits consideration of the issue.

While the exceptional circumstances doctrine “has been anchored in the
idea of rare procedural anomalies . . . its precise contours require case-by-case
assessment.” Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 38. Examples of the doctrine include instances
where a statute “opened the door to the possibility of two separate appeals, on the
same issue,” “when controlling precedent is issued that abolishes the offense for
which the defendant was convicted,” when a new constitutional argument became

To avoid a Johnson problem, Ron must also demonstrate that the issue was not
waived. For the same reasons identified above, the Court should conclude that
Ron did not waive the central issue in his opening brief. Alternatively, no waiver
occurred on appeal, insofar as Ron simply responded to an issue raised in Holly’s
brief. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 24, 16 P.3d 540 (“[I]f an appellant responds
in the reply brief to a new issue raised by the appellee in its opening brief, the issue
is not waived.”) (citing cases).
14
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available to a defendant after the State raised a contrary position on appeal, and
“when the alleged error first arises in the lower court’s final order or judgment.”
Id. ¶¶ 29-36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
For example, in State v. Lopez, this Court considered the applicability of the
exceptional circumstances doctrine for an issue that evolved in the course of
appeal. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1994). The defendant made
passing allusions to a state constitutional provision in his motion to suppress, but
instead focused on the pretext doctrine under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1134
n.2. The court of appeals held that the pretext doctrine applied, and the State
appealed, challenging its adoption. Id. at 1130, 1134.
After the defendant cross-appealed, arguing that the doctrine could also be
adopted under the state constitution, the State argued that the Court should
decline to reach the issue, because it had been waived. Id. at 1134 n.2. This Court
disagreed and held that the exceptional circumstances doctrine applied because
(a) the defendant “had no reason to argue that the doctrine be adopted under
article I, section 14 until the State challenged the doctrine on appeal[,]” and (b) the
state constitutional arguments “did not appear applicable until the court of
appeals ruled that ‘equal protection policies constrain us to uphold the pretext
doctrine.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
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Similar considerations apply in this case. In the trial court proceedings, Ron
invoked the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the plain language of the Decree, and he argued that the district court could
not enter a contempt order on Holly’s fraud-based theory. Ron had little reason
to analyze the applicability of the statute, especially when Holly had not raised it
as a basis for relief. See R.500-04. Similar to Lopez, the interpretation of the statute
did not appear to be applicable until Holly raised it as a substantive basis for the
trial court’s contempt order in her responsive brief to the court of appeals. Given
this context, it is unsurprising that Ron addressed its applicability in his reply
brief, or that the court of appeals analyzed Holly’s argument in its decision.
It is the rare case where a party invokes a statute as an alternative basis for
affirming a trial court order, but then argues that the court of appeals erred in
interpreting the same statute. Similar to Lopez, the exceptional circumstances
doctrine should operate to permit consideration of an issue that Ron had no reason
to address until Holly raised it in the course of the appeal. Id.
B.

Even applying Johnson, the court of appeals had discretion to
reach the proper scope of Subsection (4).

Even if the issue was unpreserved and waived, as Holly contends, the court
of appeals could nevertheless reach the issue under the Johnson test:15

In Johnson, the Court disavowed dicta from Robison and concluded “that any
distinction between this court’s authority and that of the court of appeals’ to
15
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[A]n appellate court may reach a waived and
unpreserved issue when it is 1) a purely legal issue, 2)
that is almost certain to arise and assist in the analysis in
other cases, 3) is necessary to correctly determine an
issue that was properly raised, and 4) neither party is
unfairly prejudiced by raising the issue at that point or
neither party argues that they are unfairly prejudiced.
2017 UT 76, ¶ 51 (citations omitted).16 Examples included “whether to overrule
precedent on which the parties rely,” “interpreting the law that the parties rely on,”
“determining that a law is inapplicable,” “determining if a statute relied upon is
still effective”, and “considering controlling authority that was not raised by either
party.” Id. ¶ 51 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Each of these elements has been met in this case. First, the applicability of a
statute and matters of statutory interpretation both present questions of law. See
Hertzske v. Snyder, 2017 UT 4, ¶¶ 5-6, 390 P.3d 307. This is especially true here,
where the court of appeals analyzed the applicability and scope of Subsection (4)
as a pure legal question. See Rosser, 2019 UT App 25, ¶¶ 9-16.
Second, the appropriate scope and applicability of Subsection (2) is “almost
certain to arise and assist in the analysis in other cases.” Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 51.

address unpreserved issues, or raise issues sua sponte, is unwarranted and should
not be the rule.” Id. ¶ 43.
The Court cautioned its standards were “intended to provide a baseline
assessment of where the proper balance between procedural regularity and
adjudicative fairness lies.” Id. ¶ 53.
16
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Indeed, while there are few reported cases involving Subsection (4), the statute
may be applied to a range of civil and criminal matters, and clarifying its scope
will provide guidance to both parties and courts about the appropriate basis for
seeking a contempt order (or relief through an alternative procedural mechanism,
such as Rule 60(b) or an independent action) in other cases. Supra Argument, § I.
Third, the court of appeals’ statutory analysis was “necessary to correctly
determine an issue properly raised.” Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 51. As discussed, it
was Holly who raised the issue of whether the district court possessed statutory
authority to enter an order of contempt pursuant to Utah Code § 78B-6-301.
Holly’s COA Br. at 20-22. Holly raised these arguments, because Ron argued at
both the trial court and on appeal that her arguments regarding deceit were flawed
and that an order to show cause was not the proper mechanism for granting the
relief sought. See, e.g., Ron’s COA Br. at 16-19.
Given this context, it is difficult to see how the court of appeals could have
addressed Ron’s challenge to the contempt order or Holly’s substantive reliance
on the statute without addressing the threshold issue of the statute’s applicability.
In this respect, the court of appeals’ approach is little different than prior cases,
where courts “interpret[] the law that the parties rely on” or consider threshold
statutory issues. Johnson, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 51; see, e.g., Arnold v. Grigsby, 2009 UT 88,
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¶¶ 4-5, 22-23, 225 P.3d 192 (considering purely legal question presented by
interplay of two statutes implicated by the parties’ arguments on appeal).17
Fourth and finally, there is little indication that Holly would be unfairly
prejudiced by the court of appeals’ decision to consider the applicability of a
statute that she raised in her briefing.18 In fact, this context is akin to a motion for
summary judgment, where a party argues in the opening brief the non-movant
lacks sufficient proof to support the elements of the claim. The opponent responds
by raising a legal argument in support of the claim, and the movant has an
opportunity to address whether the opposing party’s position passes muster. In
such cases, it is incumbent upon the non-movant to adequately brief the
substantive basis for her argument and to prepare to address any issues raised in
reply through supplemental briefing or by addressing the issue at argument.
Holly nevertheless argues that she should have been given an opportunity
to provide supplemental briefing. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 28 & n.10 (discussing
fairness considerations). The difficulty with this argument is two-fold. First, as a

If the court of appeals had declined to consider her argument that the statute
provided a basis for the contempt order, Holly would likely be arguing that
certiorari was necessary to correct its failure to address controlling statutory
authority governing contempt proceedings.
17

While Holly appears to fault Ron for the court of appeals’ consideration of the
statute, this Court has observed “the failure to raise the controlling statute in the
district court is a failure that can be appropriately assigned to counsel for both
parties.” Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 828.
18

-48-

practical matter, Holly raised the statute as an alternative basis for contempt,
which gave her an adequate opportunity to address its applicability. Cf. Brown v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 24, 16 P.3d 540 (“[F]airiness to the respondent is not a concern
if it is the respondent who first raises an issue in the opening brief.”).
Second, while supplemental briefing may be appropriate in some cases, it is
not a hard-and-fast rule. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 45 (contemplating flexibility and
possibility of oral argument on simple issues). Here, Holly had an opportunity to
review Ron’s reply, which would have provided ample opportunity to research
the issue, develop a response, and address the issue during oral argument. In fact,
the panel invited her to offer her interpretation and reasoning during oral
argument, and the statute formed a central part of the argument. Supra Statement
of Case, §§ V-VI. And even if Holly had requested leave to submit supplemental
briefing prior to or during oral argument, it should not have affected the court of
appeals’ analysis. Supra Argument, § I.
In summary, Holly raised the issue of the statute, and the court of appeals
appropriately exercised its discretion in considering whether controlling authority
provided a legal basis for the contempt order. For all the foregoing reasons, the
Court should reject her argument that an exercise of supervisory power is
necessary to correct the alleged departure from judicial norms.
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III.

If the Court Adopts Holly’s Interpretation, the Case Should Be
Remanded for Consideration of Ron’s Other Arguments.
Even though Holly questions whether the statutory issues were adequately

preserved, she continues to maintain that the statute provides a basis for the trial
court’s contempt order. Pet’r’s Br. at 14-20.19 The difficulty with this argument is
that it continues to presume that the trial court made adequate fraud findings,
even though trial court never applied the test that Holly now urges on appeal.
Below, Ron challenged the factual basis for the fraud findings and the
sufficiency of the trial court’s rulings. Ron’s COA Br. at 19-27. For example, Ron
maintained that the record did not demonstrate that Ron made an affirmative
representation regarding payment of the tax liability. Id. at 19-20. Ron argued that
the trial court failed to address the substantial weight of the evidence that Holly
understood the amended return would result in liability, which undercuts the
fraud finding. Id. at 22-23. Furthermore, Ron pointed to the fact that the trial court
never concluded that Holly reasonably relied on the alleged representations. Id.
at 24-25. In the absence of specific factual findings on the necessary elements, Ron
urged the court of appeals to reverse or remand. Id. at 26-27.

Holly has not appealed the court of appeals’ conclusion that the district court
lacked a basis for imposing contempt for a violation of the Decree. Compare Rosser,
2019 UT App 25, ¶¶ 17-20, with Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 13-14.
19
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The court of appeals declined to reach these issues in light of its conclusion
that Holly failed to demonstrate a statutory basis for the contempt order. Rosser,
2019 UT 25, ¶ 9 n.3. For that reason, if the Court adopts Holly’s interpretation of
Subsection (4), Ron respectfully asks that the case be remanded to the court of
appeals to consider his other arguments under the revised standard.
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES
In the event that this Court affirms, Ron respectfully asks that the Court
remand for an assessment of the reasonable fees incurred in the trial court and on
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1062
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Thayer v. Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 41, 378 P.3d 1232. On
remand, this Court should mandate that the trial court consider whether Ron
should be awarded his fees associated with defending against Holly’s OSC,
prosecuting Ron’s OSC, and those incurred during both appeals. Cf. Rosser, 2019
UT App 25, ¶ 21 n.9 (vacating fee award against Ron and remanding to consider
the issue of attorneys’ fees).
CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, Ron respectfully asks the Court to affirm. If,
however, the Court adopts Holly’s interpretation of Subsection (4), the case should
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be remanded to the court of appeals to consider Ron’s other arguments, including
his challenge to the sufficiency and adequacy of the trial court’s factual findings.
DATED: October 28, 2019.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Steven W. Beckstrom
Attorney for Respondent
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ORAL ARGUMENTS - NOVEMBER 28, 2018

2
3

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers may
not be accurate with audio recordings.)

4

(TIME 10:32:27)

5

JUDGE HAGEN:

Hello.

We are back on the record.

6

are going to hear our last case on the argument calendar

7

today.

8

Is it Rosser v. Rosser?

9

MR. BECKSTROM:

We

Is --

Yes, Your Honor.

10

JUDGE HAGEN:

11

I don't know if you were here earlier when I was

All right.

Great.

12

explaining the clock and other procedures.

13

podium, please make sure that you speak directly into the

14

microphone because we are recording and live streaming these

15

proceedings.

16

When you take the

Also, please state your name both times you approach.

17

If you're going to do a rebuttal, please identify yourself

18

before you begin speaking.

19
20

The clock counts down from 15 minutes.
15 minutes.

21
22

Have you reserved five minutes for rebuttal?

Is that

correct?

23

MR. BECKSTROM:

24

JUDGE HAGEN:

25

Each side has

Yes, Your Honor.
All right.

start to count down from 10.

Great.

So your clock will

If you decide that you want to

3
LAURIE

SHINGLE,

OFFICIAL

COURT

CSR,

RPR,

CMRS

TRANSCRIBER

801-391-8292

1

go into your rebuttal time, you can certainly indicate that

2

you would like to do that and we will allow you to do that.

3

Also, if we're continuing to ask questions, we won't count

4

that against your rebuttal time.

5
6
7

So if there are no questions, then we will proceed
with Rosser v. Rosser.
MR. BECKSTROM:

Good morning.

If it may please the

8

Court, Steven Beckstrom on behalf of Ron Rosser, the

9

appellant.

10
11

Mr. Rosser is here present with me in the

courtroom here today.
This is an appeal following the entry of a stipulated

12

divorce decree that was entered in August of 2016.

13

the entry of the decree, Appellee Holly -- as I'll refer to

14

her throughout the argument here today -- brought an order to

15

show cause alleging that -- that Mr. Rosser misrepresented

16

certain facts regarding a tax liability resulting from an

17

amended return that induced her to enter into the stipulated

18

decree of divorce.

19

Following

Even though the trial court had already entered a

20

final decree in the case, they elected to file the -- the

21

issue as an order to show cause, asking the court to,

22

essentially, undo the stipulation, which required that Holly

23

pay all of the -- any of the tax liability for the parties for

24

the year of 2015, and, instead, revert back to an agreement

25

that was entered several months prior that was superceded by

4
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1

the stipulation, which required the parties to each pay

2

one-half of the IRS tax liability for -- roughly for -- the

3

number was $14,951.11.

4

The court ultimately, after a lot of motion practice

5

and -- and granting of a new trial, held an evidentiary

6

hearing in August of 2016 -- excuse me, 2017, and as a result

7

of that evidentiary hearing, issued a ruling that -- that

8

Mr. Rosser had engaged in deceit, and found Mr. Rosser in

9

consent -- in contempt for deceit and for failure to follow

10

the June 16th mediation agreement.

11

Additionally, Mr. Rosser --

12

JUDGE HARRIS:

And the context of that evidentiary

13

hearing was based on the order to show cause.

14

on a 60(b) motion or a petition to modify or anything else.

15

It was an order to show cause hearing asking the court to hold

16

your client in contempt of court.

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

It wasn't based

That's correct, Your Honor.

And keep

18

in mind that -- as was briefed thoroughly at the district

19

court and as contained in the briefs on appeal, there is a

20

local rule that applies in the Sixth District Court where this

21

case took place.

22

Judicial Administration that dictates how courts in the

23

Sixth District deal with orders to show cause.

24
25

And it's Rule 10-1-602 of the Utah Rules of

And orders to show cause in the Sixth District, there
can only -- they may only be used to enforce existing orders
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1

or judgments of the court.

2

limited to say, you cannot use an order to show cause to enter

3

a new judgment or order through an order to show cause.

4

Okay?

They're specifically

And, essentially, what happened here, Your Honor, is

5

that the trial court essentially, in essence, modified the

6

decree to say, instead of Holly having to pay any of the tax

7

liability of the parties for 2015 -- which is what paragraph

8

9(r) of the decree indicated -- instead, the court reverted

9

back to the mediation proposal, which was, each party pay

10

one-half of that tax obligation.

11

immediately found my client in contempt for failure to meet

12

that obligation.

13

JUDGE HARRIS:

14

MR. BECKSTROM:

15

to pay as promised, essentially.

16

And in doing so, then

In contempt of what?

JUDGE HARRIS:

In -- in contempt for failure to --

Well, I mean, that's -- I guess this

17

is maybe a question for the other side, but I'd like your

18

views on it first.

19

was -- I was a little unclear as to what your client was found

20

in contempt of.

21

But in reading through the briefs, I

MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, I mean, the -- the ruling says

22

that he was found in contempt for knowingly and intentionally

23

misrepresenting the status of the tax return.

24

says, for deceit and for failure to comply with the terms of

25

the decree.

And then it
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JUDGE HARRIS:

1

Well, what it says -- what it says is,

2

the court concludes that the respondent is in contempt due to

3

his deliberate deceit and failure to act as agreed between the

4

parties on June 16th.

5
6

That's a little cryptic.

And I guess I'm asking for

your interpretation of that.
MR. BECKSTROM:

7

Well, I mean, it's a hard one to

8

answer because I think the record's not clear.

I mean, we've

9

heard -- we've seen arguments of latent ambiguity.

The court

10

didn't make a finding of latent ambiguity, but, certainly,

11

that's what's been argued by appellee in this case.

12

And there -- there also is not clear what exactly

13

Mr. Fro -- Mr. Rosser did that was deceitful.

14

there's some findings of fact in there, but nothing that would

15

rise to the level of a misrepresentation that happened on

16

the -- the part of -- of Mr. Rosser.
JUDGE HAGEN:

17

Yes, there's --

And I understand your argument that a

18

motion for an order to show cause was not the appropriate

19

vehicle.

20

have used to challenge his failure to -- presumed failure to

21

abide by the mediation agreement?

22

Were there other avenues that -- that the wife could

MR. BECKSTROM:

Yes, Your Honor.

There's -- through

23

caselaw and statutory authority, there's essentially three

24

ways in a normal divorce case where a party could seek relief

25

from a decree of divorce.

The first one would be to -- under
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1

30-3-5, you could ask the decree to be modified for a material

2

change of circumstances.
JUDGE MORTENSEN:

3
4

So that's number one.
But you'd be hard pressed if all

the events happened prior to the entry of the decree; right?
MR. BECKSTROM:

5

That -- that's correct.

And -- and

6

the Bayliss case -- this court's opinion in the Bayliss case,

7

basically shuts the door on that when you're talking about

8

fraud which induces someone to enter a decree.

9

that option one that would normally be available is out the

10

So that --

door because we're talking about fraud here.

11

But option number two is that you file a motion under

12

Rule 60(b), which would allow you to seek relief on various

13

grounds, including fraud, which is 60(b)3.

14

factor under that -- that second option is that you must do so

15

within 90 days of the entry of the decree.

16

happen here because the -- the decree was entered on

17

August 8th, 2016, and the order to show cause -- the ex parte

18

motion for order to show cause was not filed until

19

November 21st, which is 105 days.

20

But the limiting

That did not

So even if -- there's no indication that the court

21

can -- treated this as a Rule 60(b) motion, but even if it

22

would have, it would have been untimely.
JUDGE HARRIS:

23

Well, and that's not really before us.

24

We're just sort of discussing what the other options might be;

25

right?

8
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1

MR. BECKSTROM:

2

JUDGE HARRIS:

3

MR. BECKSTROM:

4

JUDGE HARRIS:

5

MR. BECKSTROM:

6
7
8
9

action.

That -- that's correct.

And --

And there is a third; right?

There --

There is a third, absolutely.
Which is what?
Which is to file an independent

There's lots of caselaw that -JUDGE HARRIS:

For -- for a breach of contract or

fraud or something else?
JUDGE MORTENSEN:

10

MR. BECKSTROM:

11

relevant here is fraud.

12

JUDGE HARRIS:

13

JUDGE HAGEN:

14

MR. BECKSTROM:

For fraud, yes.
For fraud.

For fraud.

That's what's

Yeah.
Uh-huh.
If -- if Ms. Rosser believed that she

15

was defrauded in entering the decree, she could file an

16

independent lawsuit and -- and pursue it in a different forum.

17

JUDGE HARRIS:

18

MR. BECKSTROM:

19
20

She can still do that.
She still could, assuming she

satisfies the statute of limitations.
JUDGE HARRIS:

So -- so your argument, basically,

21

is -- is, you know, these other avenues may or may not be

22

pursuable.

We're not here to decide that.

23

MR. BECKSTROM:

24

JUDGE HARRIS:

25

Right.
Your argument is the avenue that was

pursued, shouldn't have been.

9
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1

MR. BECKSTROM:

Absolutely, Your Honor.

And -- but

2

10-1-602 is very clear that you may not enter a new order or

3

judgment as a result of -- of an order to show cause.

4

And that's exactly what happened here.

You can slice

5

and dice the -- the judgment and order however you want, but

6

at the end of the day, the judge ignored paragraph 9(r) of the

7

decree which says Holly is responsible for "all" -- or I

8

shouldn't say all; it says "any," which is essentially all --

9

of the tax re -- tax liabilities for the parties for 2015.

10

And instead, essentially said, well, Mr.

Rosser, you

11

have to pay one-half of that.

12

imposing that order on you, and because you didn't pay it, I'm

13

finding you in contempt.

14

question as to why he found him in contempt.

15

contempt for violating something that was never even ordered.

16

And because you didn't -- I'm

So that circles back to your

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

He found him in

Now, if he -- I think you'd

17

concede, not that this is supported by the record, but as a

18

legal premise, if, for example, you entered a decree based

19

upon affidavit or in-court testimony, and Mr. Rosser, in fact,

20

lied to the court either in the affidavit or in open court,

21

that would leave open the possibility for the court to find

22

him in direct contempt; correct?

23

MR. BECKSTROM:

24

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

25

That's correct.
And -- and the parameters and

discretion of the court to address direct contempt are quite
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1

broad; right?
MR. BECKSTROM:

2

Correct.

There's no indication that

3

that happened here.

4

Your Honor.

5

that are alleged to have been made, being did we misrepresent

6

in the tax return?

7

that the initial tax liability had been paid?

8

represent that there would be a refund?

9

That's the -- that's the issue,

And -- and, in fact, all of the representations

Did we tell Ms. Rosser that -- that the -Did we

Those are the three main representations that are at

10

issue in this case.

11

all out-of-court statements.

12

contempt does not come into play here.

13

None of those happened in court.

They're

And so that's why direct

And so, you know, Your Honor, there's really good

14

reasons why this kind of a matter should really be left for an

15

independent action.

16

filing an independent action, you have a right to a jury

17

trial.

I mean, keep in mind that if you're

18

In -- in an order to show cause, it's -- it's the

19

judge -- you show up, you have a little mini trial, if you

20

will, and it's determined one way or the other.

21

the benefit of full discovery.

22

huge issues as to venue and forum because while the case was

23

properly filed in Garfield County, none of these

24

representations happened in Garfield County.

25

were alleged to have happened either in Las Vegas, where

You don't get

And in this case, there'd be

Most of them

11
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1

Mr. Rosser moved after the divorce was filed, or in Page

2

where -- where the businesses were operated and where

3

Ms. Rosser resided.

4

I see my time's up.

5

MR. SPENCER:

Thank you.

May it please the Panel of the Court,

6

Counsel, I'm Stephen Spencer.

7

petitioner and appellee, Holly Rosser, who is -- is present

8

today.

9

I am the attorney for the

I'd like to begin my remarks by saying that the basic

10

problem with the appellant's approach is that they read

11

this -- the decree -- or they're interpreting the decree for

12

the Panel of the Court as containing a covenant when, in fact,

13

it contains a condition.

14

The relevant portion of the decree talks about Holly

15

Rosser receiving a tax refund, or paying any liability.

16

in fact --

17

JUDGE HARRIS:

18

MR. SPENCER:

And,

How's that conditional?
It is -- it is conditional because

19

there is a latent ambiguity and a -- a collateral matter which

20

the fact is outside the four corners of -- of the decree,

21

resolves the condition.

22

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

It seems to me that you're -- and

23

please correct me if I'm wrong -- that your argument is, with

24

that latent ambiguity, that what was promised and -- and the

25

representation was that there was going to be a refund.

12
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1

Correct?

2

MR. SPENCER:

3

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

That's correct.
And -- and that that provision of

4

the decree must be read to encompass that understanding that

5

there was going to be a refund; is that right?

6

MR. SPENCER:

7

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

That's -- that's -- yes.
How can we do that?

How -- how can

8

you find a latent ambiguity that results in something that

9

goes against the express language of the provision, i.e., that

10

there might be a liability and she would be responsible for

11

the liability.

12

mean only a refund, why would it mention a liability that she

13

has to pay?

If truly the -- the latent ambiguity could

14

MR. SPENCER:

15

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

16

MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

Well --

Do you understand my question?

I -- I think so.

And if -- I'll --

17

I'll say this.

If we had a decree that said she'll pay any

18

liability -- okay? -- we'd have a different problem here.

19

Okay?

And --

20

JUDGE HARRIS:

21

MR. SPENCER:

22

JUDGE HARRIS:

23

MR. SPENCER:

24
25

receive any refund.

Well, that's what it says.
Pardon?
That is what it says.
Well, and it also says that she'll

And so what the court did --

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

Says either/or.

But you're asking
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1

us to read that provision as being only a refund.
MR. SPENCER:

2

Well, I -- I'm asking you to read it

3

as -- it could be -- there could be a liability or there could

4

be a refund, and in order to -- to understand that problem --

5

okay? -- the court appropriately looked at extrinsic evidence

6

to see the existence of the latent ambiguity.

7

outside the corners -- the four corners of the document.

8
9

It looked

Latent ambiguity arises from a collateral matter when
contract terms are applied or executed, which is exactly what

10

happened here.

We had a course of conduct.

11

representation is made --

12

JUDGE HARRIS:

13

MR. SPENCER:

Now a

Well --- that we can't really determine why

14

the court found Mr. Rosser in contempt.

15

we can.

16

court -- about -- about a meeting in which there was a

17

discussion in which he informed my client that there wouldn't

18

be a tax refund.

19

And there was a --

21

He lied to the court -- according to the trial

Judge Lyman said, no, that never happened.

JUDGE HARRIS:

20

Well, you know, yes,

Right.

paragraph 18 of the findings?

22

MR. SPENCER:

23

JUDGE HARRIS:

So you're referring to
The petitioner --

I'd have to -The petitioner denies this claimed

24

meeting.

The court, having heard the evidence, finds the

25

respondent is not telling the truth and that no such meeting
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1
2
3
4

occurred.
MR. SPENCER:

Yes.

That -- that is one reason.

That

is -- that is one instance of a contempt.
JUDGE HARRIS:

But the court didn't reference that in

5

its conclusions of law when it proclaimed the reason why it

6

was finding Mr. Rosser in contempt.

7

there is the June 16th mediation agreement.

8

So my question --

9

MR. SPENCER:

10

The only thing referenced
Conclusion two.

No, that -- that's --

JUDGE HARRIS:

-- my question to your -- your worthy

11

opponent was, help me understand what he's being found in

12

contempt of.

13

MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

He is being -- he is being found

14

in contempt under the court's enforcement powers, and also

15

under the court's contempt powers for engaging --

16

JUDGE HARRIS:

Well, I realize -- I realize he's

17

being found in contempt under the contempt powers, but under

18

Section 301, there are 12 different reasons why a court --

19

78(B)-6-301, acts and omissions constituting contempt.

20

are 12 different reasons that a court is authorized to find

21

somebody in contempt.

22

MR. SPENCER:

23

JUDGE HARRIS:

24
25

There

Okay.
And I guess my question to you is,

which one of those 12 is the court referencing here?
MR. SPENCER:

Deceit, or abuse of the process or

15
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1

proceedings of the court, by a party to an action or special

2

proceeding.

3

JUDGE HARRIS:

4

MR. SPENCER:

5

JUDGE HARRIS:

All right.

Number (4).

Yes.
And you're not -- I didn't see you in

6

the -- in the briefs, making any argument that number (5) --

7

which is the most common one that I used to see downstairs --

8

disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the

9

court.

10

You're -- you didn't make any argument in your brief,

11

that I could divine, that that -- that section (5) was in

12

play; is that right?
MR. SPENCER:

13
14

I -- I can't -- I can't -JUDGE HARRIS:

15
16

I'd have to go back and read my brief.

Well, standing here today, are you

make --

17

MR. SPENCER:

18

JUDGE HARRIS:

-- I can't tell you.
-- are you making the argument that

19

Mr. Rosser should be held in contempt for disobedience of any

20

lawful order of the court?

21

MR. SPENCER:

22

JUDGE HARRIS:

23

MR. SPENCER:

24

JUDGE HARRIS:

25

Yes.
Okay.
Yes.
Which provision -- which provision of

which order did he violate?

16
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MR. SPENCER:

1

Okay.

The divorce decree in -- in

2

paragraph 9(r), it says that she should be entitled to any

3

refund.

4

trick her into showing that there would be a refund.

5

procured her cooperation in preparing and filing this amended

6

tax return on the premise that there would be a refund.

7

amended tax return that was prepared showed that there would

8

be a refund.

And Mr. Rosser engaged in a course of conduct to

The

It all showed --

JUDGE HARRIS:

9

And he

10

MR. SPENCER:

11

JUDGE HARRIS:

Okay.

So --

-- also showed that --- just make sure I have your argument

12

in mind.

Your -- your argument with regard to subsection (5)

13

is that the order violated is paragraph 9(r) of -- of the

14

divorce decree.

15

MR. SPENCER:

16

JUDGE HARRIS:

17

MR. SPENCER:

18

JUDGE HARRIS:

That's correct.
Any other -- any other order?
No.
Okay.

And then your argument with

19

regard to 301 sub (4) -- subsection (4) has to do with this

20

deceit argument?

21

MR. SPENCER:

22

JUDGE HARRIS:

Yes.
And I guess my question to you is,

23

doesn't that have to be -- as Judge Mortensen, I think,

24

alluded to a moment ago -- doesn't that have to be deceit on

25

the court as opposed to deceit on your client?
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1
2
3

MR. SPENCER:

Well, it can be -- it can be either one

or both, and the court found that there was both.
JUDGE HARRIS:

Well, okay.

Just as a matter of

4

statutory interpretation, then, your position is that that

5

subsection can encompass deceit on a third party.

6

MR. SPENCER:

7

JUDGE HARRIS:

8

MR. SPENCER:

9

JUDGE HARRIS:

10

MR. SPENCER:

11

JUDGE HARRIS:

On -As opposed to on the court.
To a party to the action, yes.
Okay.

So help us understand, then --

And to the court.
-- how that couldn't result in every

12

single breach of contract action mushrooming into contempt of

13

court; right?

14

therefore, I can come in and -- and accuse you of contempt of

15

court, even though you didn't do anything in front of the

16

court that would constitute deceit.

I'm a party to -- to an action, you lie to me;

17

Do you follow what I'm asking?

18

MR. SPENCER:

19

JUDGE HARRIS:

20
21

I do.
I mean, doesn't that have to mean

deceit on the court?
MR. SPENCER:

I don't think that it does.

No.

I

22

think that it can be a -- a deceit that involves litigation.

23

If someone lied in a deposition, that's not -- that's not

24

before the court.

25

made, it pertains, but like a deliberate lie told in a

It's -- it's not evidence, a record is
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1

deposition could be contempt of court.
JUDGE HARRIS:

2
3

All right.

Perhaps.

But we don't

have anything like that here.
MR. SPENCER:

4

No, but what we do have is that we have

5

Mr. -- Mr. Rosser, okay, signing a tax return under penalty of

6

perjury at a time where he already knows that the refund

7

that's shown on the face of the tax return will not happen.

8

Also, that the prepayments that are shown on the face of the

9

amended tax return haven't been paid.

10

Rosser doesn't know that.

11

JUDGE HARRIS:

12

MR. SPENCER:

13
14

file it.

He knows that Ms.

Okay?

Well, okay, so -He signs it, he has her sign it, they

Okay?
JUDGE HARRIS:

I also had a hard time -- from reading

15

the order of the court -- ascertaining exactly what the

16

material misrepresentation was that you think Mr. Rosser made

17

to your client.

18

Can you help me out there?

MR. SPENCER:

Yes.

Okay.

There's two things.

Okay?

19

That he had paid -- okay -- his share of the prepayments under

20

the mediation agreement, and also that there would be a refund

21

coming to her if she cooperated in preparing and filing the

22

amended tax return.

23

JUDGE HARRIS:

And -- okay.

I understand that that's

24

what you think was communicated, but I'm -- I'm asking for

25

sort of a record cite to an email or a phone call or a -- the

19
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1

manner in which this was communicated to your client, that he

2

had paid his half and that there would be a refund.

3

the misrepresentation made to your client of those things?
MR. SPENCER:

4

Okay.

Where was

The misrepresentation was

5

made -- there was evidence of a verbal conversation in which

6

he said to her, yes, that -- that he realized that he needed

7

to take care of his prepayment.

8

Also -JUDGE HARRIS:

9
10

MR. SPENCER:

11

JUDGE HARRIS:

12

MR. SPENCER:

13

That was part of the record.

A verbal conversation?
Yes.
And do you recall the date of that?
It was shortly after the medi -- time

of the mediation in June of 2016.
JUDGE HARRIS:

14

And -- and to go -- to find the facts

15

of that, would I go to your client's testimony at the -- at

16

the evidentiary hearing to -- to find out the description of

17

that?

18

MR. SPENCER:

19

JUDGE HARRIS:

20
21

Yes.
Okay.

What was the other one?

You

said there were two?
MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

There was -- there was also

22

evidence that he had a conversation with his accountant

23

shortly after the amended return was prepared, several weeks

24

before it was signed, in which he and the accountant discussed

25

the fact that the refund shown on the face of the return and

20
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1

also the prepayment shown on the face of the amended return

2

were not accurate, that was information.

3

JUDGE HARRIS:

4

MR. SPENCER:

All right.
Yes.

Okay.

But is there a third one?

And he signed the return.

Okay?

5

He signed the return -- on the face of the return when it's

6

signed, a person signs that under penalty of perjury, and the

7

language -- that signature intent that's manifested in signing

8

is also in the record in my examination of Mr. Rosser.

9

signing that, inducing my client to signing that, he also made

10

a misrepresentation.

And I believe that --

JUDGE HARRIS:

11

And in

Okay.

Well, let me explore those with

12

you, if I could, for a moment.

13

MR. SPENCER:

14

JUDGE HARRIS:

Sure.
The second one, this conversation with

15

the accountant, can you help me understand how that's a

16

misrepresentation to your client?

17

your client, or, I mean --

Was that passed along to

18

MR. SPENCER:

19

misrepresentation of omission.

20

Okay?

21

material to him; it's clear that he knew.

22

found it's clear that he did not disclose that to Ms. Rosser,

23

although he claimed to, and the court determined that he -- he

24

was not telling the truth about that.

25

Well, I believe it's a
It's a material omission.

And information that was withheld that's obviously

JUDGE HARRIS:

All right.

The court also

And then with regard to
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1

the third one, that he signed the return, my understanding of

2

the record is that he signed the return on the 22nd-ish or so

3

of August?

4

MR. SPENCER:

5

JUDGE HARRIS:

They both did.
But the stipulation and the decree

6

were signed -- that was signed by your client on the 5th of

7

August?
MR. SPENCER:

8
9

I believe the stipulation was signed on

the 4th and the court entered the decree on the 8th.
JUDGE HARRIS:

10

So how -- how can your client rely on

11

a representation made some 14 days after she signed the

12

decree, the stipulation?
MR. SPENCER:

13

Okay.

Because she was aware -- she was

14

aware that the term -- return was prepared and it showed a

15

refund.

16

JUDGE HARRIS:

17

MR. SPENCER:

So -She was aware -- it was not signed

18

until that time.

19

July, I believe is what the record says.

20

JUDGE HARRIS:

21

signature?

22

the signature.

23

It was actually prepared by the 28th of

So the misrepresentation wasn't the

I thought you told me the misrepresentation was

MR. SPENCER:

That was a misrepresentation.

It was

24

part of the continuing -- a continuing scheme where she was

25

told all along, if you cooperate in signing this, a refund
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1

will be coming to you.

2

that return was available weeks before the return was signed,

3

was available weeks before the stipulation was signed.

4

JUDGE HARRIS:

5

MR. SPENCER:

6

JUDGE HARRIS:

7

And it was also predicated upon -- so

But he didn't prepare it; right?
He did not prepare it.

No.

So the -- the fact that the return was

available, do you think that was also a misrepresentation?

8

MR. SPENCER:

9

JUDGE HARRIS:

You mean when it was prepared?
Yeah.

I'm trying to understand how --

10

just the fact that an amended return was available and ready

11

for them to look at constituted a misrepresentation by Mr.

12

Rosser to your client.
MR. SPENCER:

13

Okay.

Without reviewing the whole

14

record, Mr. Rosser knew that he had -- the prepayments that

15

were shown on the face of it had not been made because he was

16

supposed to make some of them.

17

that he did not make some of them.

18

disclose that fact.

19

Ms. Rosser would have known, you know, the accountant would

20

have known, which -- you know, that there could be no refund

21

because the prepayments had not been made.

22

knew from the time of mediation on June 16th at the time the

23

return was prepared, and he saw the return before he signed

24

it --

25

And he was the one who knew
Okay?

And that he didn't

If he had disclosed that fact -- okay? --

JUDGE HARRIS:

And Mr. Rosser

So -- so you --
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MR. SPENCER:

1
2

-- that those prepayments had not been

made.
JUDGE HARRIS:

3

You seem to have glided from fraud to

4

fraudulent nondisclosure, which is a slightly different tort.

5

Am I misperceiving that?
MR. SPENCER:

6
7
8
9
10

Okay?

Well, both things are operating here.

He -- he -JUDGE HARRIS:

Fraud -- fraud requires an actual

affirmative misrepresentation.

You don't have that.

You're

not going to --

11

MR. SPENCER:

12

JUDGE HARRIS:

13

MR. SPENCER:

14

JUDGE HARRIS:

Well, we do have that.
Right.

And that's --

Is it in the record --- what I'm asking you.

But now

15

you -- and you told me what you think the three of them are,

16

and then you -- now you're saying, well, it was a -- he had a

17

duty to disclose and didn't, and there was some sort of fraud

18

by omission?

19

that starts ringing bells to me about fraudulent nondisclosure

20

as opposed to affirmative fraud.

21

It's what I hear you arguing now.

MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

And that --

Well, I think one of the

22

findings of the trial court is that he knew this.

He knew

23

there wouldn't be a refund and he didn't disclose that to the

24

appellee at a relevant time, although he knew that at a

25

relevant time.

That was a finding of the district court.
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JUDGE HARRIS:

1
2

MR. SPENCER:

4

JUDGE HARRIS:

5

MR. SPENCER:

JUDGE HARRIS:

8

JUDGE HAGEN:

12

I'm sure you have some more to say.
-- I've got 30 seconds left and I

I'm sure Judge Hagen will -If -- if you need a little extra time

to -- to make your points, please take it.
MR. SPENCER:

10
11

Yeah, I got --

haven't said what -- anything I've come to say, really.

7

9

I've taken up a lot of your

time with questions.

3

6

Okay.

Yes.

I'll -- and I'll -- I'll be

quick.
Acts and omissions constituting contempt includes in

13

its definition deceit or abuse of process or proceedings of

14

the court by a party to an action or special proceeding.

15

trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the status of

16

his or her cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and

17

credibility of the parties.

18

discretion if there is no reasonable basis for a decision.

19

The

A trial court abuses its

The parol evidence rule operates in the absence of

20

fraud or other invalidating causes to exclude evidence of

21

contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements

22

offered for the purpose of varying or adding the terms of an

23

integrated contract.

24

show the circumstances under which the contract was made, or

25

the purpose for which the writing was executed.

However, parol evidence is admissible to

Evidence may
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1

be admissible within the discretion granted to the trial

2

court, even in the face of a clear integration clause.

3

Parol evidence is admissible where a contract is

4

alleged to be a forgery, a joke, a sham, lacking in

5

consideration, or where a contract is viable for fraud,

6

duress, mistake, or illegality.

7

such circumstances avoids the judicial enforcement of a

8

writing that appears to be a binding integration, but, in

9

fact, is not.

10

Admitting parol evidence in

When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any

11

relevant evidence must be considered, and a better-reasoned

12

approach is to consider the writing in light of the

13

surrounding circumstances.

14

a contract and any potential ambiguity in light of the

15

parties' intentions.

16

This way, the court can interpret

Latent ambiguity arises from a collateral matter when

17

the contract terms are applied or executed.

18

consider any relevant evidence to determine whether a latent

19

ambiguity exists in the contract terms that otherwise appear

20

to be facially unambiguous.

21

JUDGE HARRIS:

Courts may

In the -- in the contempt context,

22

doesn't ambiguity kind of cut the other way?

23

order have to be clear before we're going to hold somebody in

24

contempt of it?

25

MR. SPENCER:

Doesn't the

Well, I think an element of contempt is
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1

a person knew the order and had ability to comply, so if they

2

don't -- I suppose if they don't know or understand the order,

3

there may be a defense to contempt that they just -- they

4

didn't know what was ordered.
JUDGE MORTENSEN:

5

Doesn't -- if it's direct

6

contempt -- and you cited it, I believe, in your brief -- that

7

the court is empowered to fashion additional remedies beyond

8

imprisonment.

9

reasonable doubt since prison is in play?

Doesn't the standard have to be beyond a

MR. SPENCER:

10

I think the standard for contempt -- if

11

I understand the question correctly -- is clear and convincing

12

evidence, but I don't -JUDGE MORTENSEN:

13
14

might go to jail?
MR. SPENCER:

15
16

For direct contempt, where you

that.

Well, you know, I -- I can't answer

I just know there was no jail here.
JUDGE MORTENSEN:

17

Well, it's not about what jail's

18

imposed, it's whether jail might be imposed.

19

I think that's the law.
MR. SPENCER:

20
21
22

Right?

I mean,

Maybe I'm mistaken.
Yeah.

I -- I can't help you.

I'm

sorry.
You know, basically -- I mean, the argument that's

23

made is that they've come up with a scheme for great

24

gamesmanship here, and that gamesmanship ought to -- ought to

25

prevail here.

That -- you know, if -- if the decree would

27
LAURIE

SHINGLE,

OFFICIAL

COURT

CSR,

RPR,

CMRS

TRANSCRIBER

801-391-8292

1

have said that she'll pay all the liability, we have a

2

different problem.

3

said that she'll get the refund and then it turned out to be a

4

liability -- okay -- for the same reasons that we have under

5

these facts, it would be a different problem.

6

It said that she'll get the refund.

If it

Okay.

I would concede that in that case it would be a

7

situation where a 60(b) motion or a different -- a separate

8

action may be appropriate.

9

okay -- where clearly there was an agreement, clearly there

But here we have a situation --

10

was a course of conduct and other representations, and -- in

11

writing, representations and agreements in writing.

12

And, you know, this language, you know, she'll pay

13

any refund or receive or -- or incur any liability, well, you

14

know, her impression was that she would get a -- a refund.

15

And -- and why?

16

then the argument is made -- okay-- because she discovered it

17

a little more than 90 days after the decree was entered, like,

18

too bad -- too bad, time is up.

19

Because of misrepresentations.

Okay.

That's -- that's not the correct analysis.

And

The

20

correct analysis here is in looking at -- at the latent

21

ambiguity, considering evidence outside the four corners of

22

the decree, it was clear that Ms. Rosser anticipated getting a

23

refund -- okay -- which is why she cooperated in filing the

24

amended return, but that was based on deception.

25

the court considered that to be contemptuous as well as

Okay?

And
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1

untruths that the court believed that Mr. Rosser told the

2

court under oath in the proceedings, and -- and used its

3

contempt powers to -- to make her whole under the

4

circumstances.

5

This sort of gamesmanship is not appropriate.

I know

6

that no one on the Panel of the Court is probably saying that

7

it is.

You're concerned about other technicalities.
JUDGE HAGEN:

8
9
10

But --

And if we find that contempt was not

the proper avenue, she still would have the potential option
of filing a separate action in this case; is that right?
MR. SPENCER:

11

I suppose.

But one point that I made

12

in my brief, there's no argument by the appellant why the

13

order to show cause could not be treated as that action.
JUDGE HARRIS:

14
15

be treated as the independent action?
MR. SPENCER:

16
17

an independent action.

18

JUDGE HARRIS:

19

Why the order to show cause couldn't

Could -- why it could not be treated as

Do you have any caselaw that says it

can?

20

MR. SPENCER:

I do not.

21

JUDGE HAGEN:

Okay.

22

JUDGE HARRIS:

I mean, the question before the

23

district court was whether Mr. Rosser should be held in

24

contempt.

25

ruling was proper.

And the question in front of us is whether that
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1

So I guess help me understand how you think we have

2

the authority to -- or even the district court had the

3

authority to turn that into something else.

4

MR. SPENCER:

5

JUDGE HARRIS:

6

MR. SPENCER:

7

JUDGE HARRIS:

8

To turn it into?
An independent action.
An independent action.
I mean, you've heard -- you've heard

already your opponent talk about the lack of discovery -MR. SPENCER:

9

Yeah.

JUDGE HARRIS:

10

-- venue issues, those kinds of things

11

that, in an independent action, you would -- you would have to

12

worry about, and you don't worry about those things in an

13

order to show cause.

14

heads here -- things that would be different.

15

-- aren't those things significant enough to require that

16

procedures be followed?

I mean, those are -- off the top of our

MR. SPENCER:

17

Wouldn't that

Well, I mean, I -- I don't see that

18

briefed in the opening brief, and I know that we're

19

considering it for different reasons.

20

record of the proceedings, you -- I think that you'll see --

21

my recollection of this is general -- but that issue is raised

22

before the court, closing ar -- and Judge Lyman commented

23

about it.

24

effect that nobody asked me for anything like that and you had

25

opportunity to do that.

If you review the

And I believe his comment was something to the

You didn't involve me in that.
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1
2
3

JUDGE HARRIS:

Nobody asked him for -- for what?

Discovery?
MR. SPENCER:

Like, discovery, schedule, orders,

4

anything to that -- opportunity for depositions, anything to

5

that effect.

6

have to go back and review to tell you exactly where, but I

7

believe it's Judge Lyman's comments near the -- near the end

8

of the proceeding.

I believe that's -- that's in the record.

I'd

9

JUDGE HAGEN:

Okay.

10

MR. SPENCER:

And I've used more than my time, but

11

thank you for allowing me additional time.

12

JUDGE HAGEN:

13

JUDGE HARRIS:

14

JUDGE HAGEN:

15

Rebuttal?

16

MR. BECKSTROM:

17

Let me just touch briefly on a few issues raised by

Certainly.
Thank you.

Thank you.
Pardon the interruptions.

Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.

18

the appellee, first of all, with respect to the

19

misrepresentation.

20

First of all, I think it's very important to

21

understand that you only get to the discussion of

22

misrepresentation and what was or was not said if we're

23

procedurally correct in the case.

24

the threshold hurdle of -- which I will tell you we can't,

25

then -- then there's no discuss -- discussion needed on the

And if we can't get over
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1

fraud.
JUDGE HAGEN:

2

But what about the idea that this could

3

be contempt under subsection (4), based on deceit to the

4

court?
MR. BECKSTROM:

5

Well, that section, Your Honor -- and

6

I'm paraphrasing here -- is deceit or abuse of the process of

7

the court.

8

is the Environtech case, which is a case that, essentially --

9

it's a Utah case.

Okay?

Which I did research on that point.

It essentially is where they use that to

10

find someone who testified falsely about his income at a

11

trial.

12

There

And they said, okay, that -- that provision applies.
But I couldn't find any cases anywhere else that said

13

that you could use the -- that provision to find contempt in

14

the circumstances of this case.

15

representations that were made outside of court to induce

16

someone to enter into a stipulation.

17

JUDGE HAGEN:

Again, we're talking about

I purviewed --

But when the court -- I'm sorry.

On

18

finding 18 when the court says:

19

claimed meeting and agreement, and the court finds that

20

respondent is not -- that respondent is not telling the truth

21

and that no such meeting or agreement occurred.

22
23
24
25

The petitioner denies this

Telling the truth in court, in testimony?

I -- I'm

not sure what that refers to.
MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, there was discussion at trial

about whether a meeting happened in Page where they -- they
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1

finally agree that, oh, yeah, everybody knows the true state

2

of returns.

3

The court -- the court found that my client was not

4

being truthful on that point, but when he gets to the

5

conclusions of law, he doesn't -- he doesn't say that's why

6

he's finding my client in contempt.

7

doing it for deceit and for failure to follow the agreement

8

that was reached on June 16th, which is the mediation

9

agreement, Your Honor.

10

Instead, he says he's

And so, you know, all the cases -- I -- I found a few

11

cases that are cited in my reply brief that -- that reference

12

a subsection that's similar to 78B-6-301(4), and they all seem

13

to indicate that the purview of finding someone in contempt is

14

for either making false statements in court or in filings made

15

to the court.

16

that -- that subsection just simply does not apply.

17

And so when you're outside of that purview,

JUDGE HARRIS:

So if the court hadn't made it clear

18

in its conclusion of law that it was holding your client in

19

contempt for that perceived lie under oath in front of him, we

20

may be in a different position?

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, then you're going to a whole

22

other subset of issues.

I just don't think it's clear from

23

the record that you can even go there, first of all.

24

you run into a whole other subset of issues which is under

25

section 311 of -- of the contempt statute.

But then

It says you can
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1

award -- and I'm paraphrasing again here -- injury -- you can

2

award damages for injury suffered as a result of the

3

misrepresentation or the -- the deceit.

4

the deceit here?

5

discussion in trial, which had a very small purview --

Well, what's

You're talking about a one- to three-minute

6

JUDGE HARRIS:

7

didn't believe anyway?

Which the court -- which the court

8

MR. BECKSTROM:

9

JUDGE HARRIS:

10

Okay?

Right.
Yeah.

MR. BECKSTROM:

Right.
So if you're talking about --

Which was disregarded and it had

11

nothing to do with the court's ultimate finding, you know.

12

And so there's just real issues there that -- I mean, the

13

judge found us liable for essentially the entire $7,900 refund

14

plus the $7,100 and change that -- that Ms. Rosser had to pay

15

as a result of Mr. Rosser not paying the 14,9- after the

16

mediation.

17

result of that very small issue at trial?

18

And so how could all of those be damages as a

So to address the three representations that were

19

raised by appellee, first of all, Ms. Rosser did not testify

20

that Ron told her that he had paid his tax following the

21

mediation.

22

cross-examination -- initially she said:

23

that he paid.

In fact, there's testimony in the record on
Oh, yeah, he told me

24

But then I said:

Are you sure he told you he paid?

25

And -- and she walked that back and said:

No.

He
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1

told me that he knew that they needed to be paid.

2
3

That's a far cry from a misrepresentation.

And so

that can't be the basis of doing it.

4

And, lastly, Your Honor, since I see I'm running out

5

of time, I also want to raise to the court's attention, there

6

was also an order to show cause brought by Ron on the issue of

7

rebate checks.

8

Ms. Rosser was not in compliance with the decree with respect

9

to paying rebate checks.

It's pretty clear that the court found that

He allowed Ms. Rosser to offset that

10

against the judgment that was entered, but in doing so, he

11

never found Holly in contempt, he never found -- he never even

12

made the offset.

13

was $12,835.36 in rebate checks that were received.

It's pretty clear in the record that there

14

JUDGE HARRIS:

15

MR. BECKSTROM:

16

JUDGE HARRIS:

17
18
19

So what --

But you don't have a cross-appeal.

Right?
JUDGE HAGEN:

Or you haven't raised that issue in

your appeal.

20

MR. BECKSTROM:

21

JUDGE HARRIS:

22
23
24
25

He never even applied the offset.

Yes, we did.
Okay.

So what would you like us to do

with regard to that?
MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, let me just get -- wrap up with

my conclusion, Your Honor, first of all.
Number one, with respect to the -- with respect to

35
LAURIE

SHINGLE,

OFFICIAL

COURT

CSR,

RPR,

CMRS

TRANSCRIBER

801-391-8292

1

the rebate issue, our appeal -- one of the issues was,

2

specifically, whether that was the correct decision.

3

because, number one, we're procedurally not properly in front

4

of the trial court, no judgment should have been awarded

5

against Holly -- in Holly's favor to begin with, and,

6

therefore, that should be reversed.

7

there is no offset.

And

And because of that,

So --

8

JUDGE HARRIS:

9

MR. BECKSTROM:

So the court --- our -- our order to show cause

10

should be granted.

11

should be awarded his attorney's fees, along with the damages

12

for failure to pay the rebate checks.
JUDGE HAGEN:

13
14

Holly should be found in contempt, and Ron

And, I'm sorry, I do see that's your

issue 4.

15

MR. BECKSTROM:

16

JUDGE HARRIS:

17
18

Yes.
Yeah.

Thank you, Your Honor.
And so you want us to -- to not

remand for further proceedings on that, but rather just -MR. BECKSTROM:

The court made a finding already that

19

Holly received the checks, and she didn't pay within the 10

20

days required under the -- under the decree.

21
22
23

JUDGE MORTENSEN:

Did it make a finding that she knew

she had to pay?
MR. BECKSTROM:

I don't recall exactly.

I think -- I

24

think -- I think what he did find is that even though she

25

didn't pay, she didn't do so because of the deceit she felt

36
LAURIE

SHINGLE,

OFFICIAL

COURT

CSR,

RPR,

CMRS

TRANSCRIBER

801-391-8292

1

like she -- was being applied to her by Mr. Rosser.

2

the finding.
JUDGE MORTENSEN:

3
4

That was

Is that sufficient for us to

reverse and to order judgment to be entered?
MR. BECKSTROM:

5

I believe so, Your Honor.

I think --

6

I think, at a minimum, you can award -- under 10-1-602 of the

7

local rule, you could -- you can award a judgment in favor.

8

The question would be if -- if you could hold it in contempt.
JUDGE MORTENSEN:

9

I'm just saying, if the finding --

10

if the findings aren't complete as to her contempt, should we

11

enter judgment or should we remand for more complete findings?

12

If we agree with your position.
MR. BECKSTROM:

13

Sure.

A remand is certainly a

14

possibility, but I would suggest that -- that a reversal and

15

awarding a judgment would be the proper tactic.

16
17
18

Thank you.

If there's no other questions, I will

rest.
JUDGE HAGEN:

Thank you, Counsel.

19

arguments today.

20

issue a written opinion as soon as possible.

We appreciate your

We'll take this matter under advisement,

21

And that will conclude our calendar for today.

22

(Proceedings conclude at 11:14:16.)
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 17, 2017)

3
4

THE COURT:

Rosser.

Let’s have both sides identify

themselves for the record.

5

MR. SPENCER:

Stephen Spencer for the petitioner, Holly

6

Rosser, who is present.

7

MR. BECKSTROM:

Good afternoon, your Honor.

Steven

8

Beckstrom on behalf of the respondent with my client, Ron Rosser,

9

who is present.

10
11

THE COURT:

Okay.

opposing order to show -- orders to show cause; is that correct?

12

MR. BECKSTROM:

13

THE COURT:

14
15
16

All right.

Who filed it first?

Was

it you?
MR. BECKSTROM:

No, your Honor, I believe the petitioner

filed the order to show cause first.
THE COURT:

18

MR. BECKSTROM:

20

Correct.

Okay.

17

19

I think we’re here to address

All right.
And then my client pro se filed his own

order to show cause.
THE COURT:

He did his.

All right.

That’s -- okay.

21

That’s why I’m finding what I’m finding.

22

Mr. Spencer -- oh, first of all, is the matter resolved?

23

MR. SPENCER:

24

MR. BECKSTROM:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Then

No, sir.
No, your Honor.

Okay.

Is there any value in me sending you
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1

two out for 10 minutes to try to get it resolved so that we’re

2

done with these matters at all?

3

MR. SPENCER:

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

5

THE COURT:

I don’t believe so.
No, your Honor.

Okay.

Mr. Spencer, I’m -- I’m inclined just

6

to do them together.

7

introduce yours and tell me what you think I should do, and then

8

I’ll let you go ahead and introduce yours and you -- and you tell

9

me what you think I ought to do, and then take testimony.

That is we’ll let you go ahead and

10

start with Mr. Spencer first.

11

make an opening statement?

12

MR. SPENCER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SPENCER:

We’ll

So Mr. Spencer, do you want to

Tell me what’s going on.

Yes.
Please.
Your Honor, my client, the petitioner, has

15

brought a claim for the tax refund under an amended tax return

16

for the year 2015 under which she anticipated getting a refund of

17

$7900, and instead received a tax bill from the IRS of $7,174 and

18

some change.

19

the belief, the understanding that the respondent’s obligation to

20

pay half the outstanding tax bill under the mediation agreement

21

that was signed by the respondent on June 16 th, 2016, that he had

22

paid half of the outstanding IRS debt, and because -- because

23

that didn’t happen, she got a bill.

24

of 15 to $16,000, her principal damages.

25

Her argument is that the refund was predicated on

Her damages are in the range

When the parties -- when the divorce was filed late in
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1

2015, there was still an outstanding tax debt of some $54,000, as

2

stated in the counter petition.

3

the divorce was filed and the time of the mediation and

4

settlement agreement on June 16 th, 2016, some seven, seven-and-a-

5

half months later, the petitioner, my client, paid down that

6

obligation so that $29,902 and change was owed.

7

At the time -- between the time

Paragraph 15 of the mediation settlement agreement

8

provided that the parties should pay the outstanding IRS debt

9

without specifying an amount in equal shares.

So on June 24 th,

10

2016, eight days following the mediation and pursuant to the

11

written settlement agreement, my client made a payment to the IRS

12

in the amount of $14,951.11 for her share of the outstanding IRS

13

obligation for the year 2015.

14

Following the time of the mediation and my client’s

15

payment for her one half share of the IRS debt, respondent

16

through his attorney and otherwise insisted that there had been a

17

mistake on the 2015 tax return, and insisted that an amended

18

return would result in substantial income tax savings, and

19

proposed the parties file an amended return.

20

So my response -- my client’s response, well, we’ll

21

cooperate in seeing that that’s true, but let’s prepare the

22

amended return so that we can see it before we agree to do

23

anything else.

24

and it was prepared by Mr. Derrick Clark, who I understand is

25

present and may testify today -- showed that on line 22 that the

So an amended return was prepared, and on line --
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1

parties would receive a refund of $7900.

2

settlement negotiations, it was proposed that my client pay the

3

cost of that tax preparation, and that she also receive that

4

refund.

5

Of course, in

Now my client will also testify that following the time

6

of the mediation and settlement agreement, and the time of the

7

divorce decree being entered, that the respondent expressed to

8

her his intention to fulfill his obligation under paragraph 15 of

9

the mediation agreement to pay half of the outstanding IRS bill,

10

but he never told her that he did not or that he would not.

11

our case is that we have definite and good evidence of a written

12

agreement that the parties should share this obligation equally,

13

the outstanding obligation.

14

So

We have very good written evidence that everyone

15

involved anticipated that there would be a refund and that refund

16

was predicated on the belief that respondent had paid his

17

obligation under the mediation agreement, but we have no evidence

18

of a subsequent agreement, whether written or otherwise, that

19

operates as an accord and satisfaction that would supercede the

20

mediation agreement, and we have no evidence of any new value

21

that may have been given by the respondent to obtain such an

22

agreement anyway.

23

So there is a latent ambiguity.

The circumstances, if

24

known to the Court, would show that my client operated under the

25

belief, and reasonably so, that the respondent had paid his share

-6-

001272

1

of the outstanding obligation, and because that was not true, she

2

was in the worst case scenario tricked, in the best case scenario

3

took action based upon misinformation.

4

entitled to the relief she seeks.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BECKSTROM:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BECKSTROM:

9

Okay.

Therefore, she should be

Do you want to make a statement?

Yes, your Honor.

Go ahead.
Your Honor, this really is a simple

issue for the Court to decide.

On August 4 th and August 5 th,

10

notwithstanding Counsel’s assertion that there wasn’t a

11

subsequent agreement that was entered, the parties entered into a

12

final stipulation for the entry of findings of fact and

13

conclusions as well as the final decree of divorce.

14

stipulation was filed with the Court on August 5 th, along with the

15

proposed findings and decree of divorce, which was subsequently

16

signed by this Court on August 8 th of 2016.

17

That

Under paragraph 49 of -- excuse me, paragraph 32 of the

18

stipulation, it reads as follows:

19

obligation owed by petitioner and respondent, the parties shall

20

sign and file the amended tax returns for Eagle Solutions and

21

themselves individually that were prepared by Derrick Clark on or

22

about July 16 th.

23

Derrick Clark in connection with the preparation and filing of

24

the amended tax return.

25

entitled to receive any refund resulting from the amended

“With respect to the 2015 tax

The petitioner shall pay all fees charged by

Thereafter, petitioner shall be solely
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1

returns, and shall also be responsible to pay any tax liability

2

resulting to any of the parties for the year 2015.”

3

Your Honor, based on that express language, their order

4

to show cause has no basis whatsoever.

5

back and talk about this June 16 th mediation agreement, we don’t

6

dispute the fact that -- that we attended mediation, and that

7

coming out of that mediation there was an agreement for each side

8

to pay one half of the roughly 29,000, roughly 30,000 in tax that

9

was owed.

10

Now if they want to step

Subsequent to the mediation, Ron learned of

11

depreciations that could be taken that would limit the parties’

12

tax liability for the year 2015.

13

back and forth with respect to this amended return, Holly would

14

not accept any proposal until the amended return was prepared.

15

Okay.

16

So after many proposals going

In that period of time between -- and that would be late

17

June through July 16 th, 2016, there were several proposals that

18

were passed back and forth between the parties as to how this

19

amended return will go down.

20

beginning of the negotiations was that there would be an

21

amended -- that the amended return would be filed subsequent to

22

the finalization of the divorce decree, and you know, the

23

finalization of the divorce, the reason being is that the

24

mediation agreement required Ron to take on certain liabilities

25

as of July 1, and so there was a need to get the divorce

Essentially the concept at the
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1

finalized, and to finalize that arrangement, okay.

2

During that process, the evidence that will be presented

3

here today makes absolutely clear that Holly was well aware that

4

Ron did not -- had not paid any portion of the IRS tax liability

5

for 2015 after the mediation, okay.

6

evidence presented here today that on about July 14 th a proposal

7

was sent to Holly through her Counsel where it was proposed that

8

we pay her an equalization payment.

9

was required because Holly had already paid her $14,951.11 to the

10

In fact, there will be

That equalization was pay --

IRS after the mediation.

11

All parties were presuming that this depreciation would

12

lower the tax liability, and under the theory that each side

13

would only pay one half of the tax because Holly had already

14

paid -- and by way of example, it’s better to explain it.

15

have a $30,000 tax liability, and we get to depreciation, that

16

lowers the tax bill to $20,000, well, Holly’s already paid

17

roughly 15 to the IRS.

18

then have the IRS refund, the concept was equalization.

19

would pay 5 to the IRS to satisfy the tax obligation, and he

20

would pay Holly 5 to satisfy -- to make sure she had only paid

21

half.

22

If we

So rather than Ron pay 15 to the IRS and
Ron

Now at that point in time we were talking about still

23

sharing the taxes, but there were several subsequent events that

24

happened why that changed and why the stipulation was proposed

25

and specifically accepted and signed to by Holly.

There are
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1

several of those.

2

that Holly was operating, and they’re in Page, Arizona.

3

that time frame, the June, July, August time frame is peak

4

season.

5

that this divorce was going to be finalized so she was going to

6

carry on in the businesses, and we were going to get assets,

7

essentially.

8

under the strong belief that he should share in the profits from

9

the businesses from that interim period between June 16 th and when

10

Number 1, these parties own Subway restaurants
During

Con -- what was contemplated under the mediation was

When that didn’t happen in a timely manner, Ron was

Holly finally signed the divorce stipulation.

11

Second, after the mediation, Ron learned about some --

12

one of the assets he was awarded at mediation was some raw land

13

in Page, Arizona.

14

outstanding property taxes that were owed on the property.

15

After the mediation he learned that there were
Okay.

Keep in mind, this Court previously entered a temporary

16

order instructing Holly to pay all business debts -- all the

17

parties’ debts when they were due, yet this debt was left

18

outstanding.

19

me, 2015 Ron submitted a proposal to Holly with the stipulation

20

and proposed findings and conclusions asking Holly to pay this

21

liability that she knew existed from the amended return, and she

22

signed it.

23

So because of that, on August 1 st, 2001 -- or excuse

Now taking it a step further, on July 29 th the evidence

24

will be presented that Holly sends Ron a text saying, “What taxes

25

are coming back to me, and where will the refund go?”

So No. 1,
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1

she’s talking -- the evidence will show that she’s talking about

2

taxes, what am I going to have to pay, and secondly, what refund

3

am I going to get.

4

was -- there’s no dispute between any of the parties here today

5

that there would -- was a refund in the states of Arizona and

6

Utah by virtue of the amended returns that were being filed.

7

Really on -- the only thing we’re questioning is the federal

8

return.

9

See, as part of this amended return there

In this text message that will be introduced as

10

evidence, she specifically says, “And how are you going to pay me

11

the difference?”

12

for the fact that she was very aware of the fact that she knew,

13

notwithstanding the face of the amended federal IRS return, that

14

there was still a liability owed.

15

first became aware that this was not a true refund, and he

16

inquired of Derrick Clark.

17

that, and learned in that yes, in fact notwithstanding the way

18

the tax return was prepared, there is still liability owed to the

19

IRS.

What difference could she be talking about but

Once Ron learned that, he

He’s here today.

He’ll testify to

20

Then three days later with all parties having knowledge

21

of the facts, we submit the final stipulation that Holly signed.

22

That’s the end of the case, your Honor.

23

discuss.

24

this discussion, but we’ll get to that when evidentiary issues

25

come up.

There’s nothing left to

Frankly, I don’t know that we even need to get into all
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1

What is crystal clear is No. 1, both paragraph 9-R of

2

the final decree of divorce and 31-R of the stipulation place the

3

sole obligation to pay 2015 taxes on Holly.

4

come here and tell the Court that it’s only half.

5

doesn’t work.

6

That’s our case, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

8

She bargained to pay it all, she’s stuck with it.

THE COURT:

11

MR. SPENCER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SPENCER:

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.
Yeah, I assumed Mr. Beckstrom -Go ahead, Mr. --- but I’m fine either way, and so I’m

Go ahead, Mr. Spencer.

Call your first

witness.

17

MR. SPENCER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. ROSSER:

20

THE COURT:

22

I assume everybody wants to take

prepared to --

15

21

Okay.

MR. BECKSTROM:

10

16

It just

testimony and not do proffers; is that correct?

9

14

Now they want to

We call Holly Rosser, the petitioner.
Okay.
Where do -What you do is you come right in front of

her, raise your right hand and be sworn.
COURT CLERK:

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you

23

are prepared to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

24

but the truth, so help you God?

25

THE WITNESS:

Yes.
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1

THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

(Counsel confers with court clerk)

4

THE COURT:

Then you come have a seat right over here.
Okay.

We just do a straight list.

Whether you

5

introduce or he introduces the numbers, we just do the numbers

6

straight through.

7

MR. SPENCER:

Your Honor, I want to make sure that I

8

follow proper decorum being here because it’s my witness, I may

9

not need to ask permission to approach, but I’ll --

10
11

THE COURT:

Neither one of you need to ask permission to

approach, both sides.

12

MR. BECKSTROM:

13

MR. SPENCER:

14

THE COURT:

15

Thank you.
Okay.

That’s just fine.

If you get out of hand,

Art here will arrest you.

16

HOLLY ROSSER

17

having been first duly sworn,

18

testifies as follows:

19

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21
22

BY MR. SPENCER:
Q.

Would you state your full legal name for the record,

please?

23

A.

Holly Rebecca Rosser.

24

Q.

Holly, you are the petitioner in this divorce action; is

25

that correct?
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

I’ve shown you what has been marked as Petitioner’s

3

Exhibit 1.

4

A.

I do.

5

Q.

What is that document?

6

A.

This is from the IRS, unpaid taxes for 2015.

7

Q.

Would that be for your individual return?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Would that be for an individual return that you would

10

Do you recognize that document?

file with Ron Rosser?

11

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

The date that is shown on the upper right hand portion,

13

June 6, 2016, is that within a limited time frame from the date

14

that you first saw it or received it?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

The amount that is shown there is amount due,

17

$29,902.21.

18

that’s the amount that was owed at that time -- the date that’s

19

shown on the notice?

Is that the amount -- is it your understanding that

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

At the time you received that, at the present

22

time you believed that to be a fact, that amount was in fact

23

owed; is that correct?

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

Okay.

This is what was owed.

At the time this divorce was filed late in 2015,
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1

is that also the amount that was owed at that time?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Or was it a different amount that was owed at that time?

4

A.

Say that again.

5

Q.

At the time that the divorce was filed late in 2015, is

6

this the amount that was owed for taxes at that time, or was a

7

different amount owed?

8

A.

A different amount was owed.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

It was almost 15,000 less.

11

Q.

What’s 15,000 less?

12

A.

This 29,000.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

Because I had paid in half of this amount.

15

Q.

Okay.

Do you know what that amount was?

Is almost 15,000 less?

Between the time the divorce was filed and the

16

time of this notice?

17

need to rephrase the question?

Do you understand what I’m saying?

Do I

18

A.

Yeah, rephrase.

19

Q.

At the time the divorce was filed, more money was owed

20
21
22

than this; is that correct, at the time the divorce was filed?
A.
interest?

More money was owed from this because of penalties and
I guess I don’t understand what you’re --

23

Q.

No.

24

A.

Okay.

25

Q.

Okay, in November or December of 2015.

Back up to the date that we filed the divorce.
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1

A.

Okay.

2

Q.

Was more money than what’s shown on this bill owed at

3

that time?

4

A.

Oh, yes.

5

Q.

How much was owed?

6

A.

$54,917 was still owed.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

So did that get paid between that time and the

time of this notice shown in Exhibit 1?

9

MR. BECKSTROM:

10

THE COURT:

Objection, vague.

What got paid?

So I guess it’s a foundational question.

11

Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

-- for this -- for the 2015 taxes after the divorce was

14

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

$26,035.21.

18

Q.

Okay.

You -- how much did you pay?

So after you paid that amount, the amount that’s

shown in Exhibit 1 is what was left owing; is that correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

Did you pay money --

filed but before the mediation?

15

19

Okay.

Okay.

Holly, I’m showing you what has been

marked Petitioner’s Exhibit 2.

Do you recognize this document?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

How is it that you recognize this document?

25

A.

It’s the mediation agreement between Ron and I.
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1
2

Q.

Okay.

On the top of that document, the title appears to

be settlement agreement of Rosser v. Rosser.

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Is that what you see?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

So was it your intention that this be a memorandum of an

7

agreement?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

It bears your signature; is that correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

You’re familiar with the signature of Ron Rosser, your

12

former husband?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Does it bear the signature of Ron Rosser, if you know?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

With regard to the outstanding tax obligation that was

17

shown in Exhibit 1, is there -- is there a reference in Exhibit 2

18

as to how that should be addressed?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Where do you see that specifically?

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

Objection, your Honor.

I think the

22

parol evidence rule prohibits them from introducing this

23

document.

24

on record of the Court as of August 5 th.

25

agreement.

Going back to the stipulation, it was signed and it’s
That is the final

This Court has already entered a finding as part of

-17-

001283

1

the decree.

2

Paragraph 2 of the decree specifically says that the parties have

3

entered into a stipulation.

4

Let me get that for you, the paragraph number.

The stipulation constitutes the entire agreement with

5

respective -- with their respective rights and obligations, and

6

the property, the debts of the marital estate, the custody or

7

other issues arising out of the divorce.

8

Court has already made the finding that this is the -- the

9

stipulation is the final document.

So your Honor, the

The parol evidence rule

10

prohibits her from introducing testimony that would vary or

11

contradict the terms of the stipulation, and that’s the basis of

12

the objection, your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SPENCER:

Mr. Spencer, do you want to respond?
I believe it’s an accurate statement of

15

the law that the Court may consider extrinsic evidence of a

16

latent ambiguity in the sense that is a claim.

17

for the Court to receive and consider that evidence before

18

determining whether in fact a latent ambiguity exists, and that

19

an integration clause parol evidence rule does not prohibit the

20

Court from considering evidence of a latent ambiguity.

21
22

THE COURT:

25

I’m going to allow the document in.

It’s

admitted.

23
24

It is appropriate

(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence)
Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

I’ll come back -- try to come

back where I was -- my memory, that would be perfect.

I believe
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1

my question was --

2
3

THE COURT:

Before you go back, you didn’t object to the

IRS thing, the first exhibit, did you?

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BECKSTROM:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BECKSTROM:

9

You didn’t, okay.
Yeah, it --

I was going to make on the -- that

wasn’t offered.
THE COURT:

11

MR. BECKSTROM:

12

THE COURT:

I have to make -It was offered but not admitted.

All right.

That’s why I’m trying to clean

it up right now.

14

MR. BECKSTROM:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SPENCER:

17

All right.

It doesn’t show --

10

13

No objection, your Honor.

Yeah.

It was admitted -- or it is admitted.
Yeah, I hadn’t move to admit it yet, but

I’ll do so at this time.

18

THE COURT:

19

(Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence)

20

MR. SPENCER:

21

THE COURT:

22
23

Q.

All right.

It’s admitted.

And Plaintiff’s 2 is also admitted?
Yes, sir.

BY MR. SPENCER:

In paragraph 15, do you see a provision

that relates to the obligations shown in Exhibit 1?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

So was it your understanding that the obligations shown
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1

in Exhibit 1 should be paid by equal shares by yourself and Ron?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

So following -- oh, also, on the top of Exhibit 2

4

there’s a date shown, June 16 th, 2016.

5

was the time of the mediation agreement?

Do you recall whether that

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Do you believe that’s the correct date?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

I’m showing you now what has been marked Petitioner’s 3.

10

Do you recognize that document?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

What is it?

13

A.

It’s a letter from the IRS.

Let me read it real quick.

14

It’s a letter from the IRS saying that they have received our

15

amended returns.

16
17

Q.

Okay.

The date that appears to be shown here, September

27 th, 2016 --

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

-- do you have any reason to believe that that is not

20

the date that that notice was prepared?

21

A.

No, I believe this was the date it was prepared.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

It’s your understanding that it was sent to you in

25

It was sent to you?

response to the IRS having received an amended return from you
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1

and Ron Rosser?

2

A.

Correct.

3

MR. SPENCER:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BECKSTROM:

Move to admit Petitioner’s 3.
Any objection?
Your Honor, the only concern I have here

6

is that this has an unredacted copy of my client’s Social

7

Security number on it.

8

think it should be redacted in the Court’s file.

9

this is a protected case, and so -- but just to protect the

10

THE COURT:
crossing it off?
MR. SPENCER:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BECKSTROM:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

18

THE COURT:

19

(Exhibit No. 3 received into evidence)

20

(Court confers with court clerk)

21

THE COURT:

23
24
25

I know that

You don’t have any problem with me just

13

22

I mean I

record, I think we ought to --

11
12

That gives me grave concern.

No, sir.
Blacken it out, whatever?
Yeah.

Okay.

We’ll do that.

Just so it’s not visible to the public.

Okay.

It’s admitted.

Is it only one -- in one case -- one spot or

not?
MR. BECKSTROM:

It’s on the second page and the third

page in the kind of header there.
THE COURT:

All right.

Where it says Social Security
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1

number right at the top?

2

MR. BECKSTROM:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.
Actually, and it’s also up in the right

5

hand -- top right hand corner that’s on page 2 that says in reply

6

refer to, and on page 2 and 3 it’s there.

7

anywhere else, your Honor.

8
9

THE COURT:

All right.

I don’t see it

If you find it again, tell me.

I’ll just cross it off, because I think that’s appropriate.

10

MR. BECKSTROM:

We’re going to have to same issue on

11

Exhibit 4 that was just passed to me, even though it’s not

12

admitted yet.

13
14

THE COURT:
Q.

We’ll do the same.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

Holly, I’m showing you what has

15

been marked Petitioner’s Exhibit 4.

16

document?

Do you recognize that

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Have you seen it before coming today?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What is this document?

21

A.

This is from the IRS saying that I still owe them

22
23
24
25

money -- that Ron and I still owe them money.
Q.

That amount that it states is owed, that is arising

under the amended 2015 individual return; is that correct?
A.

That’s correct.
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1

Q.

So the amount here that’s shown as $7,174.98, to your

2

understanding that that is the amount that the IRS is claiming

3

was owed?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

The date that is shown on here, the date of the notice,

6

October 10 th, 2016 is -- do you have any reason to believe that

7

that’s not the correct date when this notice would have been

8

prepared and sent?

9
10

A.

No, I have no reason to believe it’s not the correct

date.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

Very surprised.

13

Q.

Why were you surprised?

14

A.

Because I thought I was getting a refund.

15

Q.

Generally, why did you believe that you were getting a

16
17

Were you surprised to receive this notice?

refund?
A.

Because Ron told me I was getting a refund.

I got a

18

text message from Ron that was from Derrick telling me I was

19

getting a refund.

20

MR. SPENCER:

Okay.

Mr. Beckstrom asked me to take a

21

moment to redact Social Security numbers on the face of No. 4.

22

My apologies, because my understanding is that these are not

23

public received.

24

think his request is appropriate.

25

I didn’t perceive there being an issue, but I

THE COURT:

Okay.

I’ve crossed it off six times on
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1

Exhibit 4.

2
3

MR. BECKSTROM:
Honor.

I also just noticed Exhibit 1 has the same --

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BECKSTROM:

6

THE COURT:

7

Exhibit 1.

8
9
10

I’ll do that -- I’ll go back.
The same issue.

Yeah, I’ll go back.

Where is it on Exhibit 1?

MR. BECKSTROM:

Exhibit 1, here’s --

It’s all over again?

Yeah, it’s in the top right hand corner,

your Honor, and then also same thing down in the painted coupon
area, it says it again.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BECKSTROM:

13

THE COURT:

Then at the top of page 2.
Yeah, top of page 3.

Okay.

14

and we’ll cross it off.

15

MR. BECKSTROM:

16

MR. SPENCER:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BECKSTROM:

19

MR. SPENCER:

20

That seems to be my number, too, your

If it’s found anywhere else, tell me

Thank you, your Honor.
I’d move to admit Exhibit 4.

Any objection?
Exhibit 4 or Exhibit 5?
Exhibit 4.

I have not yet moved to admit

Exhibit 4.

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

22

THE COURT:

23

(Exhibit No. 4 received into evidence)

24
25

Q.

With the redactions, no objection.

It’s admitted.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Holly, I’m showing you now what’s been

marked Petitioner’s Exhibit 5.

Do you recognize that document?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

How do you recognize it?

3

A.

As the amended tax return for 2015.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

Now on the final page of this, it appears that it

does not bear your signature or Ron’s signature; is that correct?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

But do you have personal knowledge of whether you later

8

signed it?

9

A.

I did.

10

Q.

Do you know what time or about what time?

11

A.

I don’t remember what time.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

What -- well, do you have personal knowledge as

to whether Ron signed it?

14

A.

He did sign it.

15

Q.

How do you know that Ron signed it?

16

A.

Because we finally both met up in Page and we signed it

17
18
19

together.
Q.

Okay.

So just for clarity, you’re saying that you and

Ron signed it on the same date?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

No, I mailed them.

23

Q.

Okay.

Then did you return it to Derrick Clark?

On the -- and so for clarity, this is the amended

24

return under which the obligation shown in Exhibit 4 arises; is

25

that correct?
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

Looking here at the amended return, on line 17 where it

3

says total payments on the first page, do you see that?

4

A.

Line 17, total payments made, yes.

5

Q.

Yes.

6

Is that the figure that was owed at the time the

divorce action was filed; if you know?

7

A.

I believe so, yes.

8

Q.

Looking at line 6 under the column A titled original

9

amount or as previously adjusted, do you see that figure there?

10

A.

Line 6?

11

Q.

Line 6, column A.

12

A.

I see that figure.

13

Q.

That -- is the figure you’re looking at $50,634?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Is it your understanding that that would have been the

16

tax obligation under the original return that was filed?

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

18

MR. SPENCER:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BECKSTROM:

21

know?

22

asking?

23
ahead.

25

Q.

I’ll -What more foundation do you want?
Well, the issue here is how does she

Does she have personal knowledge of that -- what he’s

THE COURT:

24

Objection, lack of foundation.

I’ll let you cross examine on that.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Go

Do you know what that figure
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1

represents, the 50,634?

2

A.

It says tax liability.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Do you know if that would have been the liability

under the original return or the amended return?

5

A.

The original return.

6

Q.

Okay.

Then there was an adjustment -- and adjustment

7

downward in the amended return.

8

informed at some point following the mediation that the amended

9

return would result in a refund; is that your testimony?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

You testified that you were

So the amount that you anticipated would be

refunded, is that shown here on the face of Exhibit 5?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Where do you see that?

15

A.

That’s on line 22.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

It’s $7,900.

18

Q.

In fact, did you receive a refund of $7,900?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

What is your understanding of the reason that you did

21
22
23
24
25

What is that amount?

not receive the refund shown on line 22?
A.

Well, when I got the tax bill from the IRS, it shows --

it showed that there was still out -- outstanding taxes owed.
Q.

Okay.

You’re talking about -- you’re referring to

Exhibit 4 when you say the tax bill from the IRS?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Look at line 11, column C, the amount there

$47,017.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Do you know what that figure represents?

6

A.

I think -- is that the amended tax part?

My -- it’s --

7

it says the original tax was 54,917, and then minus the 79, comes

8

to $47,017.

9
10

Q.

Okay.

If you know, would that have been the amount of

prepaid tax that the return assumes?

11

A.

Tax that I had already paid in?

12

Q.

Tax that would have already been paid in, yes.

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

So is that your understanding?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

I don’t understand.

So then the difference -- is it your

17

understanding that the difference there shown in column B is the

18

same amount shown on line 21 and 22?

19

A.

Yes.

20

MR. SPENCER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

23

Move to admit Petitioner’s 5.
Any objection?
No objection, subject to redacting the

two Social Security numbers on the first page.

24

THE COURT:

25

(Exhibit No. 5 received into evidence)

Okay.

It’s admitted.
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1

Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Now for clarity, as far as a time line,

2

you said that the date shown in the mediation agreement of June

3

16 th, 2016 is a correct date.

Is that your testimony?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

So following the time of the mediation, the mediation

6

and settlement agreement, was there a time within a limited time

7

afterwards where you had communication with Ron Rosser about his

8

intention to pay any of the outstanding tax obligation for 2015?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

How did that occur?

11

Was it in person or via text

message?

12

A.

Through text messaging.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

Could you describe for the Court -- well, first

of all when you received that communication.

15

A.

On June 18 th right after mediation, I --

16

Q.

When you say right after, was mediation the 18 th or 16 th?

17

A.

The 16 th was mediation, and I sent him a text on June

18
19
20

18 th.
Q.

Okay.

Did he express an intention with regard to the

outstanding tax obligation at that time?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Could you summarize that for the Court?

23
24
25

What was his

statement of intention?
A.

I asked him about the taxes, that they needed to be

paid, and he said he understood it needed to be paid ASAP, and
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1
2

that was on June 18 th.
Q.

So following that time on June 18 th, was there a time

3

that you became aware of Ron’s intention to seek or pursue an

4

amended return for 2015?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

When did that occur?

7

MR. BECKSTROM:

Your Honor, it appears she’s reviewing

8

those, the -- I don’t know if she’s refreshing her recollection

9

or what she’s doing there, but I think I’m entitled to see what

10

she’s looking at, if she’s --

11

MR. SPENCER:

12

MR. BECKSTROM:

13

MR. SPENCER:

14

THE COURT:

16

THE WITNESS:

18
19
20
21
22

-- going to use it to testify.
-- it to him.

I don’t have an extra copy,

but I --

15

17

I have no problem showing --

Well, what is it you’re looking at?
I’m just looking over the text messages

between Ron and I.
THE COURT:

Yes, you can certainly get a copy of those.

Do you want to run a copy right now?
MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, are we going to introduce it as an

exhibit or -MR. SPENCER:

You know, I hadn’t intended to, unless

23

there’s a big issue about -- on cross examination, but I’m fine

24

with taking a recess and getting copies of those things.

25

MR. BECKSTROM:

Maybe if I can approach, your Honor, I
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1

can just take a look at what she has.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SPENCER:

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

5

here.

6

are not.

Go ahead.
I’ll get them for you.

THE COURT:

8

MR. BECKSTROM:

10

There’s a stack of them

I have no idea if they’re going to go through all of these

7

9

I don’t know.

Neither do I.

What do you want to do?

Well, I -- I think she ought to be able

to try to testify without using aids, and if she can’t, then -then we get to this stuff.

11

MR. SPENCER:

What the law is, she can -- I believe it’s

12

an accurate statement of the law is she can bring any records

13

that she wants to to the stand without being -- laying foundation

14

for refreshing recollection.

15

her recollection, as long as she’s not reading from the documents

16

and testifying about matters that she has no personal knowledge

17

of, that that’s appropriate, but I’m happy to give Mr. Beckstrom

18

a copy if the Court would like to take a recess long enough to do

19

that.

20
21

THE COURT:

Okay.

She can refer to them to refresh

Let’s take a recess long enough to

get him a copy.

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

23

THE COURT:

24

(Short recess taken)

25

MR. SPENCER:

Thank you, your Honor.

The Court will be in recess.

Have you gone back on the record?
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SPENCER:

We’re on the record.

Go ahead.

For the record, I’ve given respondent’s

3

attorney, Mr. Beckstrom, a copy of the papers that petitioner has

4

for use in refreshing her recollection.

5

Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

I can’t remember exactly where I left

6

off, but Holly, calling your attention to Exhibit 5, a portion of

7

the amended return, it appears that --

8

A.

I’m sorry, which one is No. 5?

9

Q.

The amended return portion of it.

10

A.

This one?

11

Q.

Yes.

12

Clark?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

Do you feel you recognize the signature of Derrick

Do you see the signature of Derrick Clark there

15

on the final page and the date of July 16, 2016?

16

that?

Do you see

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

My question is, do you recall whether you first saw the

19

amended return before or after that date?

20

A.

After.

21

Q.

Okay.

22
23
24
25

When did you first see a copy of the amended

return?
A.

I believe it had to be late July.

I don’t recollect the

date exactly, but late July.
Q.

Okay.

Why do you believe it was late July?
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1

A.

Well, I had gotten a couple emails that had the returns

2

on them, but you had to open a file, and I could never open the

3

files on them.

4

Q.

Who are the emails from?

5

A.

They were either from Ron or from Derrick.

6

Q.

Do you know when you received those?

7

A.

The first one -- the Eagle Solutions one, I don’t

8

believe I saw until very late July because I could never open it.

9

I saw the Utah and the Arizona --

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

-- maybe around --

12

Q.

And so -- I didn’t mean to interrupt.

13

A.

Sorry, maybe around the 21 st, 22 nd.

14

Q.

Okay.

Finish.

When you say you first saw them, is that when

15

they were sent to you, or is that when you were able to

16

successfully open it?

17
18

A.

I’m -- probably because I was able to open it, but Eagle

Solutions was never on there.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

This one right here, this amended --

21

Q.

Exhibit 5?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

It was not the attachments that were sent to you?

24

A.

It was not in the attachments.

25

Q.

What were the attachments?

Could you --
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1

A.

Utah and Arizona.

2

Q.

Okay.

So you believe that you first saw Exhibit 5 late

3

in July.

4

You’re able to read it and look at the figures?

Why do you -- do you mean that you actually saw it?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

When did that happen?

7

A.

I’m going to say it’s -- I’m going to say the 28 th, 29 th

8
9

before I actually saw Eagle Solutions taxes.
Q.

Okay.

Before you actually saw the document that is

10

Petitioner’s Exhibit 5, did you hear a report that there would be

11

a refund under the amended return?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Who was it that told you that?

14

A.

Ron.

15

Q.

When did that happen?

16

A.

July 20 th.

17

I got a text from Ron that was forwarded from

Derrick, and it just says that -- just states the refunds.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

A.

IRS, 7900, Arizona 767 and Utah 202.

20

Q.

Okay.

What were the refunds stated?

Did -- what happened to those state refunds?

21

they come to fruition?

22

Arizona and Utah?

Did

Was there actually a state refund from

23

A.

There was -- there was refunds from them, yes.

24

Q.

What happened to the money?

25

A.

The money was mailed to me in a check.
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1
2

Q.

But you didn’t get the federal refund shown in the email

that you received about that time?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Do your recall if you signed the amended return before

5

or after you signed a stipulation to enter a divorce?

6

A.

I don’t recall.

7

Q.

In making the decision -- let me back up.

Okay.

8

you pay for the services of Derrick Clark for preparing the

9

amended return?

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

Why did you do that?

12

A.

Because I thought I was getting a refund.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

Did

So did you pay that fee in reliance upon the

expectation that you would get a refund?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

If you knew that you were going to have an obligation of

17

approximately $7100, would you have agreed to pay for those

18

services under those circumstances?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

In signing the amended return, were you operating with

21

the understanding that the amounts shown on line 11 had been

22

paid?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Following the time of the mediation on June 16 th, or at

25

any other time, did you ever have a conversation through any
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1

medium with Ron Rosser in which he said to you, “Hey, I did not

2

pay any taxes under the mediation agreement toward the 2015

3

obligation.”

4

A.

He never said that to me.

5

Q.

Did you ever say to him, “I excuse you from any

6

obligation to pay any portion of the 2015 tax obligation for any

7

reason”?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Did you ever agree with him either verbally or in

10

writing that you were waiving your right to have him contribute

11

to that obligation?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Did you in fact believe that you would -- excuse me, let

14

me back up.

15

Exhibit 5, were you in fact aware that you were going to have the

16

obligation of $7174 shown in Exhibit 4, but that you signed the

17

return in Exhibit 5 anyway?

18
19
20

A.

No.

At the time that -- about the time that you signed

No, I was always positive I was going to get a

refund.
Q.

Now in your emails there, a copy of which I’ve given to

21

Mr. Beckstrom, you’re aware -- excuse me, I said emails.

22

should have said text messages.

23

text message sent by you on July 29 th that is in the pleadings.

24

I’ll represent it says, “Send me an email on what taxes come back

25

to me and where the refund will go.

I

You’re aware that there was a

I want the refund to go back

-36-

001302

1

to Eagle Solutions, Arizona and Utah, and how you’ll be paying me

2

the difference.

3

pressuring me until I know all the facts, and I have from you in

4

writing.

5

So you sent that text message; is that correct?

Out of the IPC check works for me.

Stop

I’m working and can’t get upset every day with you.”

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

And you sent it to Ron Rosser?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You sent it on July 29 th, 2016; is that correct?

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

Do you recall the time that you sent that text message

12
13
14

if you had actually seen the amended return shown in Exhibit 5?
A.

I don’t believe I had actually seen the amended return

for Eagle Solutions yet.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

Because I couldn’t open the file.

17

Q.

Okay.

Why do you believe that?

That’s why you hadn’t actually seen it, but as

18

you were here today, what is it about your recollection that

19

makes you to believe that you sent that text message before you

20

actually saw the amended return?

21
22

A.

Because Ron kept pressuring me to get the divorce signed

and to get everything signed.

23

Q.

24

elaborate?

25

A.

Okay.

When you say he kept pressuring you, could you

Could you be more specific?

I -- that’s what Ron does.

What was he doing?

He pressures and he bullies.
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1

Q.

But specifically without going into generalizations, we

2

want to avoid that, can you tell the Court what happened here

3

when you say so -- my correct understanding, he was encouraging

4

you to hurry and -- to hurry up and approve the final divorce

5

papers?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Was he doing that prior to the time that you had

8

actually seen Exhibit 5?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Was he doing that prior to the time that you actually

11

signed it?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

Prior to the time that you say he was encouraging

14

you to hurry up, he had represented to you that you would in fact

15

receive a refund?

16

A.

Oh, definitely.

17

Q.

Calling your attention back to the email of July 29 th

18

that’s in the respondent’s pleadings, do you recall what you were

19

referring to, what you’re describing in that text message?

20

said email again, but it’s actually a text message.

21

A.

Text message.

22

Q.

What were you talking about?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SPENCER:

25

THE COURT:

I

Excuse me.

What day?
Pardon?
What date?
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1

MR. SPENCER:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

July 29 th, 2016.
Okay.
Well, I was referring to -- I didn’t want

any checks -- paper checks coming back to me.

5

Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

6

A.

Because I wanted them rolled over into the next year.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

There was several -- there was several conversations Ron

9
10
11

Is there a reason for that?

and I had had through the months on other bills that he owed me,
so it could have been anything like that.
Q.

Okay.

Specifically there’s a sentence in that text

12

message, “And how will you be paying me the difference?

13

the IPC check works for me.”

14

referring to?

Out of

Do you recall what you were

15

A.

I don’t.

16

Q.

Now before the time that you participated in signing the

17

amended return, you had actually reviewed the original return; is

18

that correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

So you knew at the time that the divorce was filed that

21

you had an outstanding tax obligation?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Did you have a reason to know at that time that Ron

24
25

Rosser was also aware of the outstanding tax obligation?
A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

Is it your understanding that if Ron Rosser would have

2

paid 50 percent of the outstanding obligation under the original

3

2015 return, he would have paid half that obligation under the

4

mediation agreement, that the balance owing would have then been

5

zero?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Do you recall seeing emails from me that were forwarded

8

to you that contained discussions between Mr. Beckstrom and I

9

about a tax refund?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Was your expectation to receive the $7900 shown on line

12

22 in Exhibit 5 based, at least in part, upon your review of

13

those emails?

14

A.

15

Yes.
MR. SPENCER:

Your Honor, in the interest of time, I’m

16

going to just propose that I hold in abeyance about any evidence

17

or testimony about what attorney’s fees or costs that she’s

18

incurred.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SPENCER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.

That’s fine.

That’s all I have.
Want to ask her any questions?
Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, before I

23

get going, I had some exhibit binders that I’d like to circulate

24

to the Court and the witness.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
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1

MR. BECKSTROM:

Petitioner’s Counsel.

Just for the

2

record, I’ve previously marked these exhibits in the bottom 1

3

through I think 10 or 11, and they have Respondent 1 on them, 1

4

through 9.

5
6

THE COURT:

It’s not how I like to do it, but that’s

what you did.

7

MR. BECKSTROM:

8

THE COURT:

9

We can redo it if you want.

What I’d prefer you to do is start with No.

10.

10

MR. BECKSTROM:

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

And just -- his exhibits are No. 1 through

12

9, and yours are No. 10 through whatever.

13

one of those to add a zero, we’re fine.

14

MR. BECKSTROM:

15

THE COURT:

16

(Counsel confers with court clerk)

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

18

THE COURT:

19

14, 15.

Yeah.

So just change each

Yeah.

Or whatever, you know.

So you want me to start at No. 10?

Yeah.

So it would be No. 10, 11, 12, 13,

How many you got?

20

MR. SPENCER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BECKSTROM:

25

THE COURT:

There should be five there.
It looks like you’ve got -Yeah, they’re just I think 10 or 11.

You’ve got 10, so that would be No. 20.
Yeah.

Or whatever.
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1
2

MR. BECKSTROM:

THE COURT:

4

MR. BECKSTROM:
read.

Okay.
If my sloppy handwriting can even be

I’ll pass (inaudible) exhibit binder.

6
7

So it should be No. 10

through 19.

3

5

Yeah, it’s 10.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BECKSTROM:

8

Q.

9

you Holly?

Good afternoon, Ms. Rosser.

Is it all right if I call

10

A.

That’s fine.

11

Q.

Can you turn to Respondent’s Exhibit 10, please, which

12

would be in your binder of will be -- the tab will say Respondent

13

1.

14

A.

Okay.

15

Q.

Yes.

Of No. 1?
Do you see that there?

There will be a tab on --

16

a sticker at the bottom that says Respondent’s 10.

17

that?

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

Do you see that?

Okay.

Do you see

This would be the stipulated

20

motion for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law and

21

final decree of divorce, correct?

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

You -- if you’ll turn to the very last page of this

24
25

exhibit, is that your signature on the last page?
A.

Yes.
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1
2

Q.

Now it says dated the blank day of June, 2016.

Do you

know when you actually signed this document?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

It wasn’t in June, was it?

5

A.

Huh?

6

Q.

It wasn’t in June, right?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

If I told you August 5 th, would that be accurate?

9

If it

helps you to look at the next -- the page before the last one.

10

A.

Okay.

11

Q.

I’ll represent that it appears that Ron Rosser signed

12

this on August 4 th, correct?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

Does that help refresh your recollection as to when you

15

might have signed?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Do you remember signing before or after Ron?

18

A.

Probably after, I guess.

19

Q.

Sure.

20

It doesn’t give a date here.

It’s your understanding you signed after Ron,

correct?

21

A.

Well, it doesn’t give a date, so --

22

Q.

So do you believe you signed before or after Ron?

23

A.

And Ron says August 4 th?

24

Q.

Correct.

25

A.

Correct.
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1

Q.

Do you believe you signed before or after Ron?

2

A.

I don’t remember.

3

Q.

You don’t remember, okay.

4

In either event, you signed

this document, correct?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

Draw your attention to page No. 14 of this exhibit,

7

which is paragraph 32-R towards the middle -- the latter half of

8

the page 14.

9

A.

Okay.

10

Q.

Let me know when you’re there.

11

A.

I’m there.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Did you read this stipulation before you signed it?

15

A.

I may have read it.

16

Q.

Do you recall reading paragraph 32-R?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

You would agree with me that this paragraph indicates

19

Are you familiar with this paragraph?

that an amended tax return will be prepared and filed, correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

It also says that after the return is filed, you will

22

ben entitled to receive any refund resulting from the amended

23

returns, and shall also be responsible to pay any taxes liability

24

resulting to any of the parties for the year 2015, correct?

25

A.

Correct.
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1

Q.

Did I quote that correctly?

2

A.

Yeah.

3

Q.

You read that before you signed it, right?

4

A.

Right.

5

Q.

Is there anything in this stipulation that requires Ron

6

to pay one half of any tax obligation?

7

A.

Not in this one.

8

Q.

Okay.

You’re taking the position that -- in this case

9

that at the time you signed this stipulation, you didn’t know

10

that the amended return would not result in a refund from the

11

IRS, correct?

12
13

A.

would be a refund.

14
15

I always believed the refund would -- Ron told me there

Q.

You reviewed the amended returns with your accountant,

correct?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

You did not?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

I was not with him, and he reviewed them, but --

21

Q.

And did he give you advice on the proposed amended

22

return?

23

A.

24
25

My accountant reviewed them.

He told me there would be a refund.
MR. BECKSTROM:

I’ll move to admit Respondent’s Exhibit

1.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SPENCER:

Any objection?
Your Honor, it’s a record.

I feel it’s

3

probably cumulative to admit as an exhibit, that there’s evidence

4

that she’s authenticated her signature in other testimony.

5

THE COURT:

6

(Exhibit No. 10 received into evidence)

7

MR. BECKSTROM:

8
9
10
11

Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

A.

Okay.
MR. BECKSTROM:

If I may approach, your Honor, just to

make sure she -THE COURT:

15

MR. BECKSTROM:

17

I want to draw your attention now to

the tabs.

14

16

Thank you, your Honor.

Respondent’s Exhibit 18, I believe, which would be Exhibit 9 on

12
13

It’s admitted.

Q.
correct?

Go right ahead.
It should be Kohler & Eyre.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

In front of you you have Exhibit 18,

Respondent’s Exhibit 18?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Can you tell me, do you use the email address

20

hollysubway1@gmail.com?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Do you recall sending this email to -- it looks like

23

Debra Kohler or debra@kohlerandeyre?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

This appears to be an email that you sent dated July
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1

20 th, 2016, correct?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

In this email, would you agree with me that you say, “I

4

don’t understand how we can go from owing 60 to getting another

5

refund, and was my 40-K that I paid in towards these taxes?”

6

that there?

Do you agree with me that’s your statement?

7

A.

Yeah.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

So as of July 20 th, you were already asking your

When you say 60, you’re saying 60,000, correct?

11

accountant to tell you how you could go from such a huge

12

liability to a refund, right?

13
14
15

A.
refund.
Q.

See

Because in Ron’s email he told me I was getting a
I still couldn’t open the taxes to look at them myself.
Okay.

In direct testimony that you just gave, you

16

indicated that you had not seen the Eagle Solutions tax return

17

because you couldn’t open it prior to the July 29 text, correct?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

But you would agree with me that we’re not talking about

20

I’m -- correct.

the Eagle Solutions tax return as far as the refund, right?

21

A.

We are talking about the Eagle Solutions.

22

Q.

But what is Exhibit 5?

23
24
25

Is that an Eagle Solutions tax

return, or is that an individual tax return?
A.

Your -- all of your corporate goes right into your

personal, so --
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

-- it Eagle Solutions is --

3

Q.

Look at Exhibit 5.

4

A.

-- me and Ron.

5

Q.

If you can look at Exhibit 5, please.

6

A.

Okay.

7

Q.

Is it your understanding that that’s the -- your

8

Well, look --

personal -- amended personal tax return?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

That’s not your Eagle Solutions tax return, correct?

11

A.

From my understanding, all corporate taxes flow into

12
13

your -Q.

14

It’s a yes or no question, ma’am.
MR. SPENCER:

15

witness.

16

question necessarily.

17

Objection, your Honor.

She should be allowed to answer.

THE COURT:

He’s badgering the

It’s not a yes or no

Well, the problem is if she answers yes or

18

no, you’ll have to ask some more questions, okay, because I’m not

19

clear what’s going on with just a yes or no.

20

insist that she answer just yes or no, that’s fine, but then I

21

won’t have a clue what you’re talking about.

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

All right.

So if you want to

Well --

But you’re welcome to right ahead and answer

the question and insist -MR. BECKSTROM:

If she wants to clarify, she can.
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1

THE COURT:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

Ask it again.
All of our corporate taxes flow right into

our personal taxes.

4

Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

5

A.

I view them as one in the same.

6
7

MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.

Your Honor, I’d move to admit

Respondent’s Exhibit 18.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SPENCER:

Any objection?
No objection.

10

THE COURT:

11

(Exhibit No. 18 received into evidence)

12

Q.

It’s admitted.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Now Holly, if you will turn to

13

Respondent’s Exhibit 12, which will be exhibit -- tab exhibit of

14

Exhibit 3.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

Is this the July 29 th tax -- or excuse me, July 29 th text

17

message that you were referring to in your direct examination

18

with Ron?

19

A.

Say that again.

20

Q.

Is this -- does this text message represent your -- the

21

text message that you were referring to that -- on July 29 th

22

between yourself and Ron Rosser?

23

A.

I sent this to him, yeah.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

If that’s what you’re asking.

That’s your --
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1
2

Q.

That -- the number -- the phone number at the top of

this exhibit is your phone number, correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

435-690-9039, right?

5

A.

Right.

6

Q.

So the lighter colored text on this page are your texts,

7
8
9
10
11

correct?
A.

Well, I guess the ones that are on the left hand side

are mine?
Q.

That’s fine, if you want to identify it that way.

ones are the right are Mr. Rosser’s, correct?

12

A.

Right.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

The

It looks like you’ve sent this text on -- at

10:52 a.m. on July 29 th, right?

15

A.

Right.

16

Q.

Now the first part of this text message you say, “Send

17

me an email on what taxes come back to me and where the refund

18

will go.”

19

talking about taxes coming back to you and refunds, correct?

So in that phrase, you would agree with me that you’re

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

At that point in time, it was your understanding that

22

you were getting a refund from Arizona and Utah, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

In fact, you say that, that you want the refund to go

25

back to Eagle Solutions, Arizona and Utah, right?
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1

A.

Right.

2

Q.

Okay.

Then you go on to say, “How will you be paying me

3

the difference?”

4

what you meant by that, right?

5
6
7
8

A.

Right.

On direct testimony you said you don’t recall
Isn’t that your testimony?

I hadn’t seen Eagle Solutions yet because I

can’t open it.
Q.

But according to your testimony, you were told by Ron

that there was a refund?

9

A.

Yes, he told me there was a refund.

10

Q.

And at least as of August -- excuse me, July 20 th,

11

2016, you were interacting with your accountant to figure out the

12

state -- true state of the refund, the returns, correct -- the

13

amended returns?

14

A.

Right.

15

Q.

Right.

16

A.

I still couldn’t open the Eagle Solutions.

17
18

MR. BECKSTROM:

Your Honor, I’d move to admit

Respondent’s Exhibit 12.

19

MR. SPENCER:

No objection.

20

THE WITNESS:

I also asked Ron --

21

THE COURT:

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SPENCER:

25

THE COURT:

Just a minute.
Oh, I’m sorry.
Wait a second.

No objection?

No objection.
It’s admitted.
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1

(Exhibit No. 12 received into evidence)

2

THE WITNESS:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

5

Q.

Okay.
Wait until a question is asked, ma’am.
I’m sorry.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

You’ve testified that you had lots of

6

taxes going on at that point in time, right?

7

testified on direct?

Isn’t that what you

8

A.

That I had what?

9

Q.

You had lots of tax issues that you were talking with

10

with Ron at that -- at the point in time this text was sent,

11

right?

12

A.

Bills, a lot of bills.

13

Q.

A lot of bills?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

A lot of bills, okay.

16

A.

Uh-huh.

17

Q.

And so --

18

A.

That he was going to pay me for.

19

Q.

So does this text message refer any other bills other

20

than tax returns?

21

A.

Trash bills, dumpster bills.

22

Q.

Does it say anything about dumpster bills or trash bills

23

in this text message?

24

A.

Not in this one, no.

25

Q.

Okay.
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1
2
3

A.

It does in previous ones.

We had been arguing about the

dumpsters, so -- and paying bills.
Q.

You would agree with me that Ron responded to your text

4

message on Exhibit -- Exhibit 12 to say, “See you in court,”

5

right?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

So at that point in time, you had an understanding that

That’s what he said.

8

he did not agree that he had to pay you the difference of

9

anything, right?

10

A.

11

court.

12

Q.

No, I didn’t understand that at all.

He said see you in

Now if you’ll turn to Respondent’s Exhibit 14, which

13

would be Exhibit 5 in the book.

14

you’re to that page.

If you’ll let me know when

15

A.

I’m to that page.

16

Q.

This appears to be an email from yourself to Derrick

17

Clark, correct?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

And it’s dated August 17 th, 2016 at 1:30 p.m., correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

In the last paragraph of this email, you say, “What

22

happens to the penalties and interest accruing?

23

those until the amended returns are filed?”

24

are filed,” to quote it exactly.

25

A.

Correct.

Do we still pay

Excuse me, “amended

Is that correct?

It says that.
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1
2
3

Q.

Why would you be asking about penalties and interest if

you thought you were getting a refund?
A.

Because we hadn’t filed the amended taxes yet, and we

4

still owed taxes from the original taxes that were accruing

5

interest and penalties every day, and I was paying them, and I

6

wanted to know if once we filed the amended taxes, would all

7

those go away, or would I -- Ron and I still have to keep paying.

8

Q.

But would you agree with me that if --

9

A.

Would we have to keep paying those.

10

Q.

-- you -- I’m sorry.

I didn’t mean to interrupt you.

11

Would you agree with me that if you were to get -- file an

12

amended return that gave you a refund that there would be no

13

penalties and interest accruing?

14

MR. SPENCER:

15

THE COURT:

Objection, calls for a legal conclusion.
Okay.

Well, I know the answer to the

16

question, but I don’t know what she was going to say.

17

to let her go ahead and answer the question, if you know the

18

answer.

19
20

THE WITNESS:
Q.

Okay.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

I’m going

Ask me the question again.
You would agree with me that if you

21

file an amended tax return that provides you a refund, there

22

would be no penalties and interest accruing, would there?

23

A.

No, I don’t agree with you.

24

Q.

So you’re not sure?

25

A.

I know we owed taxes, and I didn’t know by amending them

I don’t know that question.
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1

if it wiped the slate clean from April to when we filed the

2

amended.

3

MR. BECKSTROM:

If you’ll turn to the next exhibit,

4

which will be I think Respondent’s Exhibit 14, right, labeled as

5

Exhibit 5.

6

Sorry, your Honor.

I’m sorry, Exhibit 15.

First of all, let me back up.

I’ll move to admit Exhibit 14.

7

MR. SPENCER:

8

THE COURT:

9

(Exhibit No. 14 received into evidence)

10
11

Q.

No objection.
Admitted.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Now move to Exhibit 15, which is

Exhibit 6 in your binder.

12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

Have you got that page, ma’am?

14

A.

Uh-huh.

15

Q.

This appears to be an email from you dated August 22 nd,

16

2016 to Derrick Clark, correct?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

It looks like in this email you indicate that both you

19

and Ron have signed the four taxes, correct?

20

A.

It looks like it, yeah.

21

Q.

And you mailed them today, right?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

So when you say mailed them, you mailed them to the IRS?

24

A.

It looks like it, yes.

25

Q.

So does that help refresh your recollection as to when
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1

you signed and sent the returns in?

2

A.

It looks like it, yes.

3

Q.

Prior to sending those returns in, you had gotten all

4

the advice you wanted from Kohler & Eyres, your accountant,

5

right?

6

A.

7
8
9

There wasn’t much advice from Kohler & Eyre.

looked at the taxes.
Q.

They just

They said I was getting a refund.

But you were -- but you got the advice that you were

looking for, right?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Had all your questions answered?

12

A.

That I was getting a refund, yes.

13

Q.

Because you were -- back on July 20 th, you were asking

14

them how you could go from a $60,000 liability to a refund,

15

right?

16

A.

17

back then.

18

I asked them that.

MR. BECKSTROM:

They did not give me the full answer

If you’ll turn to Respondent’s Exhibit

19

16, which would be your tab Exhibit 7 -- and I’ll move to admit

20

Exhibit 15, your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SPENCER:

23

THE COURT:

24

(Exhibit No. 15 received into evidence)

25

Q.

Any objection?
No objection.
They’re admitted.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Without getting into any specific
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1

conversations that you had with your attorney, because I don’t

2

want to get into any attorney/client privilege, but did you and

3

your attorney have a relationship where he would regularly

4

forward you emails that he either sent or received in this case?

5

A.

He -- yes, he sent me some emails.

6

Q.

Some, but not all?

7

A.

Not -- I couldn’t guarantee that he didn’t send me all

8
9

of them.
Q.

If you’ll count the pages because these num -- these

10

pages are not numbered, if you’ll go to -- count to page 16.

11

top -- just to make sure we’re on the top page, it should be an

12

email from Stephen Spencer to myself dated Tuesday, July 12 th, at

13

3:57 p.m.

Are you on the right page there?

14

A.

I don’t think so.

15

Q.

July 12 th.

16

A.

The 12 th.
THE COURT:

18

MR. BECKSTROM:

July 12 th?
Yeah.

If I may approach, your Honor, it

may be helpful.

20

THE WITNESS:

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

22

THE WITNESS:

23

MR. BECKSTROM:

24

MR. SPENCER:

25

July what?

No, I’m on a different one.

17

19

The

This one?
Yeah.
Okay.

I was on page 16.

This one.
Your Honor, in the interest of efficiency,

it may be premature, I’m going to object to reading -- reading
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1

from this or having her read from it on the grounds that it

2

hasn’t been received, it hasn’t been admitted, and there’s no

3

foundation anyway to show that she may have personal knowledge

4

for any of the matters contained in it.

5

THE COURT:

So are you saying this is communication

6

between two attorneys try to work something out, not necessarily

7

testimony of anybody.

8
9

MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, your Honor, this has already been

filed with the Court relative to the recent motions that were

10

filed, and so what I’m asking is I may not even move to enter --

11

admit this.

12

this email and what knowledge do you have.

I may just be talking about, you know, did you get

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SPENCER:

But -Well, if that’s the question, I suppose I

15

have -- you know, I -- I wouldn’t object to it, but I’m concerned

16

that, you know, he would argue with her about facts that are

17

stated in the email where she otherwise would have no personal

18

knowledge of it.

19

So we can proceed that way.

THE COURT:

If you want to ask if she received it -- and

20

I agree with him.

21

want these two people’s testimony.

22

or that, I don’t know that that’s really your testimony -- or

23

their testimony.

24

because he didn’t object to that.

25

I don’t want you two’s testimony, okay?

I

If one of you says well, this

You can ask her if she received it, I guess,

MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.

Thanks, your Honor.
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1

Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Ms. Rosser, with respect to the

2

document we’re looking at here, Exhibit 7, page 16, the first

3

email there is an email from Stephen Spencer to myself dated

4

Tuesday, July 12 th, 2016.

Do you see that?

5

A.

Yeah.

6

Q.

Do you recall that email being forwarded to you?

7

A.

I don’t.

8

Q.

Do you recall being forwarded the next email down, which

9
10

is an email from myself to Stephen Spencer, again dated July 12 th,
2016.

Do you recall receiving that from your attorney.

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

In the discussions between the mediation and the time

13

that the stipulation was signed, do you ever recall having a

14

discussion regarding an equalization payment being made between

15

Ron -- by Ron to you?

16

A.

Say that again.

17

Q.

Do you ever recall between the time of the mediation and

18

the time the stipulation was signed having a discussion or

19

negotiation regarding the possibility of Ron paying you an

20

equalization payment after the amended return was filed?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

You don’t recall that?

23

A.

Not that I recall.

24

Q.

You don’t recall the term equalization being used in the

25

An equalization as meaning what?

discussions?
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1

A.

Meaning what?

2

Q.

Well, do you ever recall there being a circumstance

I guess I don’t understand what you mean.

3

where an amended return was going to be filed, but you had

4

already paid your tax and Ron had not, so the amended return

5

would reduce your liability, and thus require Ron to pay you some

6

money that you had already paid to the IRS.

7

circumstance coming up in the negotiations?

Do you recall that

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Now if you’ll turn to the next exhibit, which would be

10

Respondent’s Exhibit 17, Exhibit 8 is your tab.

11

A.

Okay.

12

Q.

This appears to be the final decree of divorce that was

13

entered in this case, correct?

14

A.

Okay, yes.

15

Q.

On the last page of this document it looks like your

16

attorney electronically signed this document, right?

17

A.

On the last page?

18

Q.

Yes.

19

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

You see that there?

21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

Did you authorize your attorney --

23

A.

-- this one?

So --

24

MR. BECKSTROM:

25

THE WITNESS:

If I may approach?
This page right here?
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1

MR. BECKSTROM:

2

THE WITNESS:

3

Q.

Yeah.
Okay.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Do you see the -- do you see the line

4

there that said Spencer Law Office, and then it says SS, Stephen

5

Spencer?

6

A.

I do.

7

Q.

Do you understand that to be an electronic signature?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Did you authorize Mr. Spencer to sign this document?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Did you read this document before you authorized him to

12

sign it?

13

A.

I believe so, yes.

14

Q.

Did you disagree with any of the terms that were

15
16
17

contained in the document?
A.

No.
MR. BECKSTROM:

Your Honor, I don’t know how you want me

18

to handle this.

19

Ron’s order to show cause.

I have just a few questions that are related to

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

22
23
24
25

I mean literally --

Let’s do them right now.
Because I’ve got -- it’s probably five

minutes or less.
THE COURT:

Let’s do it right now.

Okay.

I’ll hold you

to the five minutes.
MR. BECKSTROM:

All right.

Is that --
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1
2

THE COURT:
if he --

3

MR. SPENCER:

4

THE COURT:

5

Yeah, that’s -- you don’t mind, Mr. Spencer,

Q.

No.
Okay.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Go ahead.

Ask your questions.

If you’ll turn back in the exhibit

6

binder now to what is Exhibit 4, which would be Exhibit 13 --

7

labeled as Exhibit 13, but the tab is Exhibit 4, let me know when

8

you’re there.

9

A.

Okay.

10

Q.

It should be a Dr. Pepper check is the first page.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

You don’t dispute the fact that the stipulation in the

13

decree award the Dr. Pepper and IPC rebates to Ron from the years

14

2016 through 2020, correct?

15

A.

Correct.

16

Q.

You also don’t dispute the fact that you were required

17

to pay over any rebate checks that you received from IPC or Dr.

18

Pepper within 10 days of your receipt of those funds, correct?

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

Okay.

Looking at -- looking at the first page of this

21

exhibit, this appears to be a check from Dr. Pepper made payable

22

to you, correct?

23

A.

Correct.

24

Q.

In the amount of $766.68.

25

A.

Uh-huh.

Yes.
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1

Q.

It’s dated September 1 st, 2016, right?

2

A.

Yes.

3

I did not receive this check.

It was lost in the

mail and a new one came months later.

4

Q.

Okay, for the same amount?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

When do you -- when did you receive it?

7

A.

I don’t know.

It was months later.

I finally got a

8

letter from them stating that the check had never been cashed or

9

something, and they were going to issue a new one.

10
11

Q.

When you say months, are you saying you got it sometime

later in 2016?

12

A.

Maybe.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

I’m guessing, yes.
So the second page, then, is a check from

Independent Purchasing Cooperative, which is IPC, right?

15

MR. SPENCER:

16

MR. BECKSTROM:

17

Q.

Forgive me, Counsel.

What tab is this?

It is tab 4, Exhibit 13.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

On the second page there then it’s an

18

IPC check made payable to Eagle Solutions, and it’s dated

19

December 1 st, 2016, correct?

20

A.

Correct.

21

Q.

And it’s payable in the amount of $3,394.29?

22

A.

Correct.

23

Q.

Did you receive this check?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Okay.

Turning to the third page, this appears to be
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1

for -- in abbreviation terms a check from IPC to Eagle Solutions,

2

correct?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Dated December 1 st, 2016?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

In the amount of $4,618.31?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Right.

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

Do you recall when you received this check?

11

A.

I don’t think I received these checks until sometime

12

You received this check, correct?

maybe -- you know, it was probably January or February.

13

Q.

Of ‘17?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

That would have included the second page of this

16

exhibit?

17

A.

The second page?

18

Q.

Yeah, the check from IPC to Eagle Solutions for

19

$3,394.29?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

Did you get all of them at the same time?

22

A.

I believe so.

23

Q.

Okay.

Then last check here on page 4 of this exhibit is

24

another check from IPC to Eagle Solutions again dated December

25

1 st, 2016, correct?
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

It’s payable in the amount of $4,055.98?

3

A.

Correct.

4

Q.

Again, you received this check?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

You haven’t paid any of these monies over to Mr. Rosser,

7
8

have you?
A.

No.

9

MR. BECKSTROM:

10

can look over my notes.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BECKSTROM:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BECKSTROM:

15

THE COURT:

20

Okay.
Was that five minutes?

Close enough.
Subject to any rebuttal on our portion

Okay.

Thank you.

Any questions you want to

ask her?

18
19

I think I’m pretty close to being done.

of the order to show cause, we’ll pass the witness, your Honor.

16
17

Your Honor, just give me one moment so I

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SPENCER:
Q.

Holly, calling your attention to the Respondent’s

21

Exhibit 12, which is at tab 3 of the binder, now you testified I

22

believe like twice that that’s your text message that you sent to

23

Ron on that date?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Okay.

About that time did you also send Ron a text
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1

message to the effect that you were concerned that there was some

2

sort of a trick or deception involved with the amended return?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

On July 27 th.

6

Q.

Okay.

When did you do that?

So part of the obvious question, so two days

7

before you sent this text message, you sent him another text

8

message that said what?

9

A.

Can I read it, the text?

10

Q.

You can tell us what it said, yeah.

11

A.

It said, “I’m so scared you’re tricking me.

I need to

12

make sure the taxes don’t fall in my lap after this is done.

13

just can’t trust you.

14

something you are hiding or going to do to me.

15

making sure that that -- making sure that part was taken care of

16

was your -- I was your worker, bill payer.

17

something up your sleeve.”

18

Q.

Okay.

I

Wish I could, but I keep thinking there is
The taxes and

I’m scared you have

So the text message that you just described, was

19

it part of the same conversation as the message that you sent

20

that’s shown in Respondent’s Exhibit 12?

21

A.

Yes, they were all together.

22

Q.

Okay.

At the time that you sent the text message that

23

you just described, do you recall if you had yet actually seen

24

the amended return shown in Exhibit 5?

25

A.

I don’t think I had seen the -- sorry, say that again.
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1
2

Q.

Yeah.

Had you actually seen the amended return at the

time that you sent that text message?

3

A.

4

No, I don’t believe so.
MR. BECKSTROM:

Your Honor, the text message she just

5

read, Mr. Beckstrom has a copy of it.

6

Petitioner’s Exhibit 6.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SPENCER:

9

It is marked as

I’m going to move to admit it.

Any objection?
Your Honor, I don’t know -- I guess I

maybe have a voir dire for the witness.

I don’t really know what

10

the context of this -- this does not appear to be a -- what you

11

would typically see in the form of a text, unless she’s done

12

something to blow it up.

13
14

THE COURT:
now.

15
16
17
18

You’re welcome to ask her about that right

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. BECKSTROM:
Q.

How did you generate this document, Mr. Hol --

Mr. Ros -- Mrs. Rosser?

19

A.

How did I copy it?

20

Q.

Yes.

21

A.

Every text that Ron has ever sent me, I’ve saved it, and

22

I -- my daughter showed me how to screen shot it, and I screen

23

shotted it and emailed it to myself, and that’s how it printed.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. BECKSTROM:

Any objection to the admission of it?
I still don’t think there’s a foundation
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1

for this.

2

that --

3
4

I mean there’s nothing on here that would indicate

THE COURT:

Okay.

If that’s your objection then it’s --

I’m going to go ahead and take it in.

5

MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, my -- your Honor, my objection is

6

that there’s nothing on here that shows that this is a text from

7

Ron.

8
9

THE COURT:

MR. SPENCER:

For clarity, she testified that it’s a

text message that she --

12

THE WITNESS:

I sent to Ron.

13

MR. SPENCER:

-- sent to Ron.

14

MR. BECKSTROM:

15

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

16

MR. SPENCER:

Calling your attention to --

17

THE COURT:

18

(Exhibit No. 6 received into evidence)

19

MR. SPENCER:

20
21
22

Do you want to

ask any additional questions?

10
11

She’s testified that it was.

That she sent to Ron.

So it’s admitted.

Thank you, sir.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Resumed)
BY MR. SPENCER:
Q.

Call your attention to Respondent’s Exhibit 14, which is

23

at tab 5 of your binder.

24

forwarded the amended return shown in Exhibit 5 to Derrick Clark

25

before you were able to successfully open it?

Briefly I just want to clarify that you
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1

A.

What part am I looking at in No. 5?

2

Q.

I’m sorry, this is at tab 5, and this is at tab 5 of

3

your binder as Respondent’s Exhibit 14.

4

A.

This one?

5

Q.

Yes.

6

A.

Okay.

7

Q.

Yes.

What was your question?
I want to clarify, did you forward the individual

8

amended return shown in Exhibit 5 to Derrick Clark before you

9

were able to actually open it yourself?

10
11

A.

I guess I still don’t under -- I don’t understand your

question.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Okay.

14

Q.

You did forward the individual amended return shown in

I’m actually -- I’ll withdraw the question.

15

Exhibit 5 to -- excuse me, to LaDell Eyre to have him review it;

16

is that correct?

I’m no longer looking at tab 5.

17

A.

I --

18

Q.

I’m just asking a question.

19

A.

I forwarded -- yes, the email that I could never get the

20
21
22

tabs to open.
Q.

You did that because you were concerned that there might

be something wrong?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

I forwarded it to them -- to LaDell.

Did you have any idea of the type of thing that

might be wrong or anything specific about your concern?
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1
2
3
4

A.

I was just making sure that, you know, the deductions

were right and -Q.

When you say they were right, what do you mean?

Were

you concerned the IRS may not accept some of them?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

That Ron was lying.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

That he was tricking me to get me to sign everything,

10
11
12

What else were you concerned about?

What was your principal concern in all of it?

sign over the divorce and sign the taxes.
Q.

So after having LaDell Eyre review it, you were

satisfied that there wasn’t a trick?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

He verified that based upon -- at least based upon the

15

return that you would be getting a refund?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

He verified that.

I want to clarify something.

You

18

talked about an Eagle Solutions return, and Mr. Beckstrom pointed

19

out that Exhibit 5 is an individual return, and you said -- I

20

believe you said -- correct me if I’m wrong -- that you think of

21

them as one in the same?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Why -- Eagle Solutions actually files its own tax

24
25

return; is that correct?
A.

But the corporations never owe any money.

It all flows

-70-

001336

1

back into your personal.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

I believe it’s an S Corp.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

I think.

Do you know if it’s an S Corporation?

So your understanding is that all of the

6

profits flow through to the -- or at least the relevant time flow

7

through to the individual return for you and Ron Rosser?

8
9

A.

That’s my true belief, yes.

explained it.

10

Q.

Okay.

So Eagle Solutions didn’t retain money and pay

11

income tax on that money.

12

you?

13

A.

MR. SPENCER:

15

THE COURT:

That’s all I have.
Based on those questions, anything else you

want to ask?

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

18
19

It just passed through to the two of

Correct.

14

16

That’s the way they’ve

Just a couple, your Honor.

One moment.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BECKSTROM:

20

Q.

Holly, if you would turn to Exhibit 6.

21

A.

Okay.

22

Q.

So from this text message it appears that you -- you had

23

no trust in what Ron was saying, correct?

24

A.

Back in July?

25

Q.

Right.
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And --

3

A.

I said I didn’t trust him.

4

Q.

At least seven days prior to that you had already sent

5

an email to Kohler & Eyre asking them to check -- get to the

6

bottom of it, right?

How could you be going from --

7

A.

To look over the taxes.

8

Q.

-- a $60,000 liability to a refund, right?

9

A.

Right.

10

Q.

Did you provide LaDell Eyre a copy of the tax payments

11

you had previously made as part of this review he did?

12

A.

I don’t believe so.

13

Q.

Up to that point in time, you were the only party as

14

between you and Ron who had paid tax for 2015, right?

15

A.

Say that again.

16

Q.

Up to that point in time, meaning the July 29 th time

17

frame, up to that point in time you were the only person between

18

you and Ron who had paid tax to the IRS, correct?

19

A.

20

me he did.

21

Q.

When did he tell you he did?

22

A.

Or he assured me that he knew that they had to be paid.

23

Q.

But he never told you he did, did he?

24

A.

No.

25

I didn’t know if Ron had paid his taxes or not.

He told

The only way that I know that he did is that --

when I looked at -- when I finally got to look at the taxes, they
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1
2
3
4

said they had been paid, and that’s when I was -Q.

So circling back to my question, Ron never told you that

he paid any portion of the tax, right?
A.

No.

5

MR. BECKSTROM:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SPENCER:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

Thank you.

Anything else you want to ask?
No, sir.
Okay.

witnesses, Mr. Spencer?

Planning on calling any other

Are you going to call any other

witnesses?

11

MR. SPENCER:

12

THE COURT:

No, sir.
We’re going to take a five minute break.

13

We’ll come back, and this is an honest five minute break because

14

we’ve been going two hours, and I generally go longer than two

15

hours without a five minute break, and then we’ll be onto you,

16

Mr. Beckstrom.

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

18

THE WITNESS:

19

THE COURT:

20

(Short recess taken)

21

COURT BAILIFF:

22

Is it okay if -Yes.

All please rise.

District Court is now

back in session.

23

THE COURT:

24

your first witness.

25

Thank you, your Honor.

Be seated.

MR. BECKSTROM:

Go ahead, Mr. Beckstrom, call

Your Honor, this may be a little bit out
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1

of order, but Mr. Clark has been sitting here for awhile, and I’d

2

like to get him out of here, if we can, so if you don’t mind --

3
4

THE COURT:

If you want to

call whoever you want to call, you can.

5
6

It’s your first witness.

MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.

All right.

I’ll call Derrick

Clark, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

8

your right hand to be sworn.

9

COURT CLERK:

Mr. Clark, come stand in front of her, raise

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you

10

are prepared to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

11

but the truth, so help you God?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

Yes.
Have a seat over there.

14

DERRICK CLARK

15

having been first duly sworn,

16

testifies as follows:

17

DIRECT EXAMINATION

18

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

19

Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Clark.

20

A.

Good afternoon.

21

Q.

Can you please state and spell your name for the record?

22

A.

Derrick Clayton Clark.

23

Q.

Yes, please.

24

A.

D-e-r-r-i-c-k, C-l-a-y-t-o-n, C-l-a-r-k.

25

Q.

Just for the record, what is your profession?

You need the spelling, too?
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1

A.

CPA.

2

Q.

How long have you been a CPA?

3

A.

Almost five years.

4

Q.

Are you familiar with Ron and Holly Rosser?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

In 2016 did you perform accounting and tax services for

7

them?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Did you prepare the original returns for Holly and Ron

10

Rosser for the year 2015?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

You also filed several business returns for them as

13

well, correct?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Do you know which entities you filed business returns

A.

There’s Eagle Solutions, Inc. and Eagle Corp. and 595

16
17
18

for?

and one -- maybe one or two others.

19

Q.

20

work with?

21

A.

Holly.

22

Q.

Do you know why you were working with Holly at that

23
24
25

Okay.

In preparing those returns, who did you primarily

point in time?
A.

Holly was the one that was running the businesses and so

that was where the communication needed to take place.
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1

Q.

If you can turn to Exhibit 5 that should be there.

2

A.

I don’t have any exhibits.

3

THE COURT:

4

THE WITNESS:

Oh, up here.

No, it’s -Okay.

5

Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

What is it?

8

A.

It’s the amended numbers for an amended tax return.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

No, it’s just the first two pages of -- just basically

Are you familiar with this document?

This is not the complete return, right?

11

states what the original amounts were, what changed, and then

12

what the correct amounts are.

13
14

Q.

At some point in July were you contacted by someone

asking for an amended return to be prepared?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Who contacted you?

17

A.

Ron.

18

Q.

Okay.

19
20

Did he tell you why he wanted an amended return

prepared?
A.

We discussed just that there was some additional

21

depreciation that could be taken that would lower the tax

22

liability.

23

Q.

So just to quickly summarize here, if you’ll look at

24

line 22 on the first page of this exhibit, what does that -- what

25

does that $7900 represent?
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1

A.

It’s supposed to -- after the additional depreciation

2

was taken into account, that should have been the amount of the

3

refund had all tax liabilities been paid before then.

4

Q.

Okay.

If you’ll look at Exhibit -- or excuse me, line

5

17, the figure $54,7 -- or 917, can you tell me what that figure

6

represents?

7

A.

Yeah, that was the original tax liability, and the

8

amount of the payments that would have been due on the original

9

return.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Q.

So in preparing this return, your -- you inserted that

figure, correct?
A.

Yes, assuming -- yeah, assuming all the payments had

been made, that would have been the full payoff.
Q.

Why -- did you have an assumption that you made that the

payments had been made?
A.

Not really.

I mean Holly come and pick up the tax at my

17

office, and then I prepare payment coupons for the amounts that

18

are due to any of the states and the federal, and I provided her

19

those payment coupons with the amounts that were due.

20
21

Q.

So when you refer to the -- she picked up the taxes,

you’re referring to the original returns?

22

A.

Uh-huh.

23

Q.

Is that a yes?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Okay.

Thank you.

So do you know when she picked up
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1

those payment coupons from your office?

2

A.

I believe it was -- it was right around April 8 th.

3

Q.

Around the tax filing deadline?

4

A.

About a week before.

5

Q.

So was it your belief then that Holly had paid the taxes

6

since she --

7
8

MR. SPENCER:

Objection, foundation.

Objection,

speculation.

9

THE COURT:

10

Do you want to respond to his objections?

MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, I’m just asking him for what his

11

belief was at that time, at the time he prepared this return,

12

so --

13
14

MR. SPENCER:

the witness to read my client’s mind and nothing more.

15
16

But based on what he’s asking, he’s asking

MR. BECKSTROM:

No, I’m asking for what he believed when

he put this figure in the form.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

I hope he believed he was doing what

18

was truthful, okay, but if he’s saying well -- I’ll let him

19

answer the question, but I hope what he’s believing is that he’s

20

doing what honestly has been done, okay.

21

he’s simply somebody’s agent in doing this.

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

23

THE WITNESS:

24
25

Q.

Sure.

I’ll -- he’s just --

Sure.

Can you repeat the question?

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

So at the -- you believed at the time

you filed this amended return that Holly had paid all of the tax
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1

based on the original return, correct?

2

MR. SPENCER:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

5

8
9
10

Okay.

It is leading.

I’m just trying to get to the point,

your Honor.

6
7

Objection, leading.

THE COURT:

Well, ask it a way that he can get what he’s

believing, not just what you tell him he’s supposed to say.
Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

What was your belief with respect to

the amounts you put into line 17 of the return?
A.

Well, I prepared the original return, and on about April

11

8 th is when I give those returns to Holly and with -- along with

12

payment coupons.

13

communication with anybody about any payments that were being

14

made, so when I prepared the amended return, I didn’t ask, I just

15

assumed that all payments had been made at that point.

16
17

Q.

Okay.

When I -- after that, I didn’t have any

Thank you.

In preparing this return, you didn’t

ask Ron to verify if payments were made, right?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Ron never told you that $54,917 had been paid, correct?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

At some point in time did you learn that the Rossers had

22

not paid the entire $54,917?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

When did you first learn of that fact?

25

A.

I think it was the end of the July.
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1
2
3

Q.

Okay.

How did -- how did you come to learn of that

fact?
A.

Ron had called me indicating that they still owed money,

4

and that he wasn’t sure of the amount, and so called the IRS and

5

found out the amount that was due.

6

Q.

Then did you provide Ron the amounts?

7

A.

Yeah.

I told him the amount was due -- the amount that

8

was due, and that they would have to minus off the $7900, and

9

there would be no refund, you’d actually make a payment for the

10
11
12

difference between that 15,000, less the 7900.
Q.

Did Ron indicate how he learned there might not be a

refund?

13

A.

I don’t recall how.

14

Q.

Now draw your attention to Exhibit -- so it will be tab

15

No. 5 in the binder now.

16

there, which would be Exhibit 14, which has been previously

17

admitted.

Mr. Clark, if you’ll turn to the binder

Is this an email that you received from Holly Rosser?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Did you receive it on August 17, 2016?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Did you review this email when you received it?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

At the time you received this email, did you know why

24
25

she was asking about penalties and interest?
A.

No.

I didn’t really understand it because it was about
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1

three weeks after we had already done everything, so I assumed

2

that when -- so I filed the -- or I signed the taxes in -- around

3

the middle of July, and then we had the communication about there

4

being more money owed at the end of the July, and this was about

5

three weeks after that.

6

already been made, so I didn’t -- I wasn’t sure what penalties

7

and interest would be accruing.

8
9

Q.

So I assumed that that payment had

When you say the payment, the payment that was due under

the amended return, right?

10

A.

Uh-huh.

11

Q.

Did you respond to this email?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

As an accountant, what is your understanding about what

I wasn’t sure how to respond.

14

would happen if someone filed an amended tax return when they

15

original owed a debt, but then showed a refund for -- through an

16

amended return?

17

accrue?

Would there be penalties and interest that would

18

A.

Can you say that again?

19

Q.

Yeah.

If someone were to file an amended return, and

20

under the original return they owed money to the IRS, and the

21

amended return changed that liability to a refund, would there be

22

any penalties and interest accruing?

23
24
25

A.

If the full liability would have been wiped away, there

wouldn’t be any penalties and interest on it.
Q.

You were here in the courtroom when Holly testified a
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1

few minutes ago, correct?

2

A.

Uh-huh.

3

Q.

Did you hear all of her testimony?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Did you hear her testify that she had difficulty opening

6

the tax returns that were -- the amended tax returns that were

7

prepared by your office and sent to her?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Do you believe that testimony to be true?

10
11

MR. SPENCER:

THE COURT:

13

MR. SPENCER:

Um -Objection usurps the role of fact finder

to the Court.

15

THE COURT:

I’m not going to let him answer that

16

question.

17

saying do you think she’s a liar.

You can ask other questions, but what you’re doing is

18

MR. BECKSTROM:

19

THE COURT:

20

Objection,

speculation.

12

14

Objection, foundation.

Q.

Well --

And I’m going to have to decide that.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.

Do you have anything in your

21

possession presently that -- which would show that Holly opened

22

the tax returns, the amended tax returns prior to July 29 th, 2016?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

What do you have?

25

A.

Well, when I send tax returns they’re sent through a
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1

secure file exchange, and it notifies me once someone views those

2

files or downloads them.

3
4

Q.

Okay.

when those are opened by your clients?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

Then do you get some sort of a report that shows

Do you have a report relative to these amended

returns?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

What does that report show with respect to whether Holly

10
11
12

opened these files?
A.

It just shows that she previewed them and downloaded

them on July 26 th.

13

Q.

Would that be the amended return?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

As well as the corporate returns?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

You said that was open on July 26 th?

18

A.

Yes.

19

MR. BECKSTROM:

20

THE COURT:

21
22
23

Thank you.

Go ahead, do your cross.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. SPENCER:
Q.

Mr. Clark, am I correct understanding your testimony

24

that you had conversation with Ron Rosser near the end of July

25

of 2016 in which you informed him that taxes were going to be
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1

owed --

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

-- on the individual return?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

I don’t recall what you said, so forgive me if

6

this is asked and answered.

7

what time or what range in time did that occur?

8
9

A.

To the best of your recollection,

I believe it’s July -- it was July 29 th when I had that

conversation.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

That’s when I called the IRS and found out the exact

12
13
14

dollar amount that was still owed at that -- on that date.
Q.

Is there a reason you believe it was the 29 th?

Did you

make some record, or do you have just a vivid recollection?

15

A.

Just a text message, yeah.

16

Q.

A text message from?

17

A.

Me.

18

Q.

Oh, from you to Ron Rosser?

19

A.

Uh-huh.

20

Q.

Okay.

So the communication that you had in which you

21

informed him that he was going to have a liability, did that

22

occur via text message or in person or on the phone?

23

A.

Text message.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

That was a text message that you sent to Ron

Rosser?
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Do you remember if you told him on that date what

the amount of the liability would be?

4

A.

Yes, it was 15,000 something.

5

Q.

Did he respond?

6

A.

I’d have to go back and --

7

Q.

You don’t recall whether he responded?

8

A.

I don’t.

9

Q.

Okay.

So like for example, he didn’t respond and say

10

“Oh, yeah, that’s right, we’re going to pay that,” or nothing

11

like that that you recall?

12

A.

I can’t recall.

13

Q.

You did not make that communication to Holly Rosser?

14

A.

Not that I can recall.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

Does it seem like something that you would be

likely to forget?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Okay.

So did you -- following July 29 th, did you

19

subsequently become aware that both Rossers had signed the

20

amended return that you prepared on about July 16 th of 2016?

21

A.

That’s when I signed it.

It was on July 16 th.

I believe

22

it was August 22 nd when Holly sent me the email saying that they

23

had finally signed the returns and was going to mail them.

24
25

Q.

So that’s how you learned that they had signed them is

Holly emailed you and told you?
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1

A.

Yeah, because I was efiling the business return, and so

2

I told her to notify me when those were signed so that I could

3

efile them.

The personal returns had to be -- they -- you can’t

4

efile them.

They have to be mailed.

5

Q.

Okay.

I think you just answered this, but for clarity

6

on Exhibit 5, it -- where it appears to show your signature, that

7

is in fact your signature and the date, the July 16 th is the

8

correct date of your preparation?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

So it was after the time that you prepared the

amended return that you learned there was an obligation?

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

You informed Ron Rosser of that?

14

A.

He informed me.

15

That’s why I called the IRS to find out

what the liability was.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

The $15,000 plus?

19

A.

It would have been 15,000 plus, less the amount of the

You texted him about that to verify the amount?

20

refund is what -- what collectively would have been owed at that

21

time.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

You have no reason to think that Ron Rosser did?

25

A.

I don’t know.

You didn’t communicate that to Holly Rosser?
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1

Q.

Okay.

Then after you had that communication with Ron

2

Rosser about an obligation, it was after that time that the

3

amended return was signed to the best of your understanding?

4

A.

Yeah.

5

Q.

Now you never had a conversation with Holly Rosser in

6

which she said, “Yeah, the outstanding liability shown on the

7

amended return, I paid all that myself.”

8

like that to you?

She never said anything

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Were you aware at this time end of July there had been a

11

mediation and a written agreement to pay any remaining unpaid

12

portion for the 2015 liability.

13

aware of that at that time?

14

A.

No.

15

MR. SPENCER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BECKSTROM:

18

THE COURT:

19

Nothing further.
Want to ask anything?
Nothing, your Honor.

Okay.

I may.

Let me see the tax return,

Exhibit 5.

20

MR. SPENCER:

21

THE COURT:

22

Did you have any -- were you

Q.

Oh, forgive me.

One additional question.

Go ahead.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Now the depreciation deductions that

23

were not included in the original 2015 individual return were

24

related to a motor home and a Dodge automobile?

25

A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

Is that your understanding?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

So at least much of the deduction that was added was

4

related to taking a deduction for those items for use in the

5

business as ordinary and necessary business expenses?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

That fact that those deductions were included would in

8

fact have adverse tax consequences to Holly Rosser the following

9

year?

10

MR. BECKSTROM:

11

THE COURT:

12
13

Objection, beyond the scope of direct.

It is way beyond the scope of direct, but is

it relevant to anything we’re doing here?
MR. SPENCER:

Well, I think it’s relevant on the

14

issue -- so the respondent’s claim is there’s accord and

15

satisfaction.

16

testify that yes, the recapture basis resulting to Holly in the

17

following year would have adverse tax consequences to her, a

18

substantial one.

19
20
21
22

My offer is proof, I believe Mr. Clark would

MR. BECKSTROM:

and satisfaction, your Honor.
THE COURT:
question go in.

Okay.

All right.

I’m not going to let the

Thank you.

23

MR. SPENCER:

24

THE COURT:

25

We’re not making the argument of accord

looking at Exhibit 5.

Thank you.

That’s all I have.

Hang on just a second.

Don’t leave.

I’m

How can I tell or not tell, or can I not
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1

tell whether or not Mr. Rosser had paid his $14,500 he agreed to

2

pay earlier towards the -- towards the tax?

3

(Witness moves away from microphone and is inaudible)

4

THE WITNESS:

This would have been the total amount due

5

on the original return, and so it just says okay, these are --

6

these are the payments that were made towards it, which

7

(inaudible) the full tax liability was all paid.

8

this is the new tax liability, so it’s saying this is the new --

9

this is the new tax liability.

10

That was the amount that was

paid, so (inaudible) the difference.

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

Based on that,

So -So there’s not --- after the amended return --- different separate amounts in here.
After the amended return there’s $7900

that’s supposed to be paid to her.

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. WALL:

Yeah, that’s -- this is -The refund.

Right.

This is -- if all the tax liabilities

20

were paid under the original return, then the refund on this

21

amended return would have been $7900.

22

THE COURT:

Then what happened was they all filed it --

23

they filed it and discovered that 14,000 plus had not been paid,

24

that -- you say was paid; is that correct?

25

THE WITNESS:

After I prepared this as -- yeah, then it
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1

was discovered that there was still liability that --

2

THE COURT:

3

THE WITNESS:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE WITNESS:

6

THE COURT:

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:

9

THE WITNESS:

10
11

THE COURT:

Or did you send this in?
This -This is what you sent in?
Well, they have to sign it and send it in.
Did they sign it and send it in?
That was on August 22 nd that -Did they sign it and send it in?
Yes.
So on August 22 nd, this document still

assumed that he had paid the $14,000 towards taxes?

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

Correct.
Based on those questions, anything else

14

either one of you want to ask?

15

MR. SPENCER:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

No, sir.
Thank you.

You’re excused.

So am I excused to go, or do you -Yes, you -- well, unless one of these two

wants you to hang around.

20

MR. SPENCER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BECKSTROM:

23

THE COURT:

24

much for being here.

25

Mr. Beckstrom?

No, I have no more questions.
Do you want him to hang around?
No, your Honor.

You’re free to go, sir.
Okay.

Thank you very

Are you going to call any witnesses,
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1
2

MR. BECKSTROM:

Your Honor, we -- I would call Ron

Rosser.

3

THE COURT:

4

COURT CLERK:

Okay.

Mr. Rosser, if you’ll come forward.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you

5

are prepared to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing

6

but the truth, so help you God?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:

I do.
Have a seat over there.

9

RONALD ROSSER

10

having been first duly sworn,

11

testifies as follows:

12

DIRECT EXAMINATION

13
14
15

BY MR. BECKSTROM:
Q.

Good afternoon, Mr. Rosser.

Can you state and spell

your name for the record?

16

A.

My name is Ron Rosser, R-o-n, R-o-s-s-e-r.

17

Q.

Do you recall signing a stipulation in this case to

18

resolve this divorce -- these divorce proceedings?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

If you’ll grab the exhibit binder there.

21

at the first tab.

22

A.

Okay.

23

Q.

Which would be Exhibit 10.

24
25

If you’ll look

Does your signature appear

on the second to last page of this document?
A.

Yes.
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1
2

Q.

It looks like you signed this on August 4, 2016,

correct?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

Then looking at the last page, do you recognize the

5

signature on that page?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

Whose signature is that?

8

A.

That’s Holly’s.

9

Q.

Do you know about when she signed?

10

A.

After me.

11

Q.

What leads you to believe that she signed after you?

12

A.

I think -- I think you either emailed me -- I think you

13

emailed me and told me it was signed.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

And that was -- that was either a day or two days after.

16
17
18

I’m not really -Q.

Fair enough.

paragraph 32-R.

19

MR. SPENCER:

20

MR. BECKSTROM:

21

THE WITNESS:

22
23

If you’ll turn to page 14 of this exhibit,

Q.

Counsel, what tab is this?
The first tab.
Okay.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

I got it.
You reviewed this document before you

signed it, right?

24

A.

Is it 14 -- Exhibit 14 right here?

25

Q.

No, exhibit -- it should be page 14 of Exhibit 10.
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1

A.

Oh, No. 10.

2

Q.

Which is tab 1 in your book.

3

A.

Sorry.

4

Q.

Do you know why paragraph 32-R was proposed in this

5
6

Okay.

matter?
A.

7

Yes.
MR. SPENCER:

Objection, foundation, your Honor.

He can

8

testify as to why he proposed it, but what anybody else’s purpose

9

was, there’s no foundation.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BECKSTROM:

12

THE COURT:

13

16

No.

That’s fine.

You can ask the question, but

it’s just for that reason.

14
15

Any response to that?

MR. BECKSTROM:

Let me ask probably a better question,

your Honor.
Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Mr. Rosser, did you -- were you the

17

one responsible for proposing this language that’s found in

18

paragraph 32-R?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

Holly agreed to pay the taxes that were due, and so we

22
23

What was your purpose in proposing this language?

put this language in there.
Q.

Okay.

You sent it over and they signed it.

The first part of this paragraph discusses an

24

amended return that would be prepared by Derrick Clark -- or had

25

been prepared by Derrick Clark, correct?
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

What was the purpose of that amended return?

3

A.

It was to use the depreciated items to regain savings

4

from the taxes.

5

there was a refund, and I believed that up until I got the text

6

from Holly explaining that there was a tax liability, and that’s

7

the same day I text Derrick and called Derrick.

8
9
10

Q.

Okay.

So originally when I got it back, I thought that

Well, we’ll get -- we’ll get to that in just a

minute, but -- so the purpose of filing the return -- the amended
return was then to capture depreciation, correct?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

That depreciation would then lower the tax liability,

13

Savings -- tax savings.

correct?

14

A.

Significantly.

15

Q.

Okay.

16
17
18
19

What items did you -- if you recall did -- were

depreciated?
A.

On an RV that we used for work, a car, truck.

sure, but I think that’s it.
Q.

Okay.

I’m not

There might be something else.

Now the latter part of paragraph 32-R reads,

20

“Thereafter, petitioner shall be solely entitled,” and carries on

21

there.

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Do you know why that language was proposed?

24

A.

It’s on what page?

25

Q.

On paragraph 32-R on page 14.

You see that language there?
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1

A.

14.

2

Q.

Correct.

3

A.

I’m not seeing it.

In the stipulation, right?

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BECKSTROM:

7

THE WITNESS:

8
9

Q.

May I approach, your Honor?

Yes.
Sorry, right there.
Right there.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.

It’s not highlighted.

So that -- that language that I just

pointed you to --

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

-- purports to indicate that Holly would be entitled to

12

receive any refund from the amended returns?

13

A.

Right.

14

Q.

And that she -- that there would be -- she would be

15

responsible to pay any tax liability to either or you for 2015,

16

right?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

Fairly summarize that paragraph?

19

A.

Yeah.

20

Q.

Why was it that you proposed that she receive any

21

Right.

refunds that came from the amended returns?

22

A.

Why was she receiving the refunds?

23

Q.

Right.

24

A.

She paid the taxes.

25

She paid to have the taxes amended,

so --
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Q.

Right.

So you were aware that -- did you have an

understanding -A.

It was about equal amounts.

I think it was 900 to amend

the taxes and 900 in refunds.
Q.

And you were -- did you have an understanding that there

would be a refund from the state filing authorities?
A.

Yeah, from the two states, 700 from I think Utah and 200

from Arizona.

I could be -- I could be wrong.

9

Q.

Those are approximate amounts --

10

A.

Approximate.

11

Q.

-- of refunds that you anticipated to get from those

12

states?

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

That roughly equated to the amount that was paid to

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Yes.

Derrick?
A.

To Derrick to do the amended tax savings part, so when

he amended the tax.
Q.

Yep.

Do you know, why did you include the language that she

would also pay any tax liabilities?
A.

Because we knew there was going to be a tax liability.

She woke me up to it.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

She sent me a text on July 29 th telling me that there

How did she wake you up to it?

24

were refunds in the State of Arizona, Utah and a tax liability,

25

and how would I be paying her for that.

Up until that moment, I

-96-

001362

1
2

believed that we were getting a refund.
Q.

What was your -- you’re aware that you signed the

3

mediation agreement on or about Aug -- Ju -- excuse me, June 16,

4

2016, right?

5

A.

Right.

6

Q.

You’re aware that that agreement required each of you to

7

pay 50 percent of the IRS tax liability, right?

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

Why was it that you felt something different should be

10
11

Yeah.

done under the stipulation?
A.

Well, you know, I hadn’t had any control of the

12

businesses or the tax people.

13

with them.

14

mediation, that loosened up, and so I called Derrick and I asked

15

him about the taxes, and we talked about, you know, I -- the tax

16

liability was so high.

17

the items to make sure all the depreciation was getting entered

18

in, and there were things just left out.

19

like every tax year.

20

own, and if you own lots of stuff and if you have lots of

21

businesses, it’s -- it can be a challenge.

22

Q.

I hadn’t had any conversations

I was ordered not to talk to them.

So after

We brought up the -- we went through all

So it was -- it’s just

You go through every single thing that you

With respect to the June 16 th, mediation agreement, were

23

there items that you found out after the fact after the mediation

24

that were not covered by the mediation agreement?

25

A.

Were there items -- yes.
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1

Q.

What items were not covered by the mediation agreement?

2

A.

Well, the income, for one, between the mediation

3

agreement, which was on June 16 th, all the way clear until the --

4

August, it was the incomes from the businesses.

5

money.

6

The rest of year we just get by.

That was our peak season.

She kept all the

That’s when we make money.

7

Q.

And what --

8

A.

But those months --

9

Q.

-- was your understanding about how quickly the divorce

10

would be finalized?

11

A.

Oh, it was supposed to be immediate, of course, to her.

12

Q.

Immediate --

13

A.

She told --

14

Q.

-- after the mediation?

15

A.

Yeah, right after the mediation.

16
17

We were going to

finalize it and be done with it.
Q.

Okay.

So you felt like during this interim period from

18

when the stipulation was signed and the mediation happened,

19

roughly one to two month period, that you felt like you should be

20

entitled to income from the businesses, right?

21

A.

Yeah.

Yeah, of course.

22

Q.

Okay.

Was there anything else that you didn’t believe

23

was covered by the mediation agreement that came up that you

24

didn’t know about prior to mediation?

25

A.

The property that I received in the mediation agreement,
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1

there was a tax liability on that, and the taxes weren’t paid for

2

that year, so I got a $10,000 tax bill.

3

Q.

When you say tax bill, are you talking about --

4

A.

Property tax.

5

Q.

Okay.

6
7

awarded?
A.

8
9

What property are you referring to that you were

The raw ground over in Page, Arizona.
MR. SPENCER:

of relevance.

Your Honor, I’m going to object on grounds

I -- Counsel may be entitled to some leeway, but

10

this is getting pretty far afield in regard to what we’re here to

11

decide.

12
13

THE COURT:

anything we’re talking about?

14
15

MR. BECKSTROM:

18
19

THE COURT:

And because why?

MR. BECKSTROM:

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

22

THE COURT:

25

Well, to deal with their issue of this

alleged latent ambiguity that they say happened, you know -THE COURT:

24

How does this fit into

that?

20

23

Well, it sets up why -- why there was a

change from the mediation agreement to the stipulation.

16
17

What relevance does this have to do with

Nothing to do with the property taxes.
What do you mean?

Was that the latent ambiguity was the

property taxes?
MR. BECKSTROM:

Well, no.

What it does is it sets up

the defense that, you know, the reason why there’s a difference
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1

between what the mediation agreement said and what the

2

stipulation said was that things came up afterwards.

3

happens at mediation, your Honor.

4

addressed sometimes.

5

but things -- things pop up, and those items were addressed.

6

That’s what it sets up.

7

THE COURT:

You can go ahead and ask whatever questions,

but I think you’re way far afield.

9

go ahead.

11
12

MR. BECKSTROM:
move on.
Q.

I mean not everything gets

We try to address as many things as we can,

8

10

That’s what

If you think it’s relevant,

Well, my questioning is done, so we’ll

Thank you, your Honor.
BY MR. BECKSTROM:

At any time after the mediation, did

13

you ever tell Holly that you paid any portion of the 2015 IRS tax

14

liability?

15

A.

16
17
18

No.

No.

That’s the problem, we weren’t talking.

Therein lies the problem.
Q.

Draw your attention to tab 3 of the book, which would be

already admitted Exhibit 12.

19

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

Do you know what this exhibit represents?

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

What is it?

23

A.

Text message from Holly.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

Is that her phone number at the top of the

screen?

-100-

001366

1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

This is a picture of your phone, correct?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

It looks like there’s a text there on July 29 th at 10:52

5

a.m., correct?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Is that text from Holly?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

How did you interpret this text?

10

A.

Well, just exactly how it reads.

Send me an email on

11

what taxes come back to me and where the refund will go.

12

the refund to back to Eagle Solutions, and -- Eagle Solutions

13

Arizona and Utah, and how will you be paying me the difference.

14

It talks about the state taxes in Arizona, the state taxes in

15

Utah, and the federal tax liability.

16

clearly.

17

thought we were getting a refund.

18

refund.

19

I want

It explains it pretty

So it was a shocker to me, because at this point I
I believed we were getting a

I called Derrick, text Derrick right after this.

He

20

told me to call the IRS and ask them directly, gave me their

21

number and I tried calling them.

22

I called him back and said I can’t get through.

23

proprietary number that accountants use, and he called them, and

24

then he got the information and text it back to me.

25

So this was at 1:40, and I think I talked to Derrick -- I finally

I was on hold for 45 minutes.
He said he had a

Same night.
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1
2
3

got an answer around 4 -- 3:30 or something.
Q.

Okay.

Let’s go to that.

I don’t remember.

Let’s turn to tab 10 of the

binder, which would be Exhibit 19.

4

A.

Okay.

5

Q.

Can you -- do you know what this page represents?

6

A.

Yeah.

7

Q.

What is it?

8

A.

It’s the texts back from Derrick telling me what’s due

9

on the taxes.

10

Q.

Is this a screen shot of your phone?

11

A.

Yes, it is.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

The text on the left hand side, the lighter

colored text, is that Derrick’s text to you?

14

A.

It is.

15

Q.

It looks like he sent you a text on July 29, 2016 at

16

3:04 p.m., right?

17

A.

Yeah.

18

Q.

Now is that 3:04 a Utah time, or some other time?

19

A.

That would be 3:04 Arizona time.

20

Yeah.

o’clock in Utah here.

That would be 4 p.m. here.

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SPENCER:

24
25

sure.

Okay.

I was in Page.

I’d move to admit Exhibit 19.

Any objection?
Is this what’s at tab 10?

Is that at tab 10?
THE COURT:

That would be 4

I want to make

No objection.

It’s admitted.
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1

(Exhibit No. 19 received into evidence)

2

MR. BECKSTROM:

3

Q.

Thank you, your Honor.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Do you know when the final

4

stipulation was provided to Holly and/or her counselor --

5

Counsel?

6

A.

7

talking --

8

Q.

9

Right after I signed, wasn’t it?

What exactly are you

Do you know when a draft of the stipulation was sent to

Holly’s Counsel for the first time?

10

A.

Oh, okay.

11

Q.

Was it -- was it before or after July 29 th?

12

A.

It was after.

13

Q.

How do you know that?

14

A.

Well, because I remember it.

15

after.

16

Q.

Well, we’ll get to that.

17

A.

Okay.

18

Q.

How is it that you know that it was -- that the final

19

Gosh, it was early August 2 nd, 3 rd, 1 st.

Yeah, it was -- it was

Do we have those emails to show them?

stipulation was sent to her after July 29 th?

20

A.

How do I know?

21

Q.

Yeah.

22

A.

Because after we -- after I figured out that there was a

23

tax liability, her and I bumped into each other out in front of

24

Subway and U-Swirl.

25

about the money that she had profited and she’s going to have to

We had a little screaming match.

I told her
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1

split that with me.

2

I have some texts to that effect.

The taxes -- the property taxes were due.

She agreed to

3

pay these taxes that were due.

4

close to 100,000 in profits from the business over those two

5

months, plus 10,000 in property taxes.

6

Judge.

7

deal, and now here I sit.

8
9

Q.

It was $7,000.

But I accepted that deal.

It’s not equitable,

I took that deal.

I took that

So Mr. Rosser, when you say the $7100 in tax that she

agreed to pay during --

10

A.

7900.

11

Q.

7900, call your attention to Exhibit 4.

12

A.

Okay.

13

Q.

Which is not in the binder.

14

She’s -- she has

It’s just going to be up

there on the counter there.

15

A.

Right here?

16

Q.

Yeah.

17

A.

These pages right here?

18

Q.

Right.

19

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

So let me step back and make sure we have a clear

21

record.

22

had a conversation with Holly in Page, Arizona, correct?

So after this text message is exchanged, okay, then you

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

During that conversation, she told you she would pay the

25

Yes.

IRS tax liability?
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1

A.

She did, yes.

2

Q.

So would that be the liability that’s reflected on

3

Exhibit 4?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

To your understanding?

6

A.

Yep.

7

Q.

Now prior to the time Holly signed the stipulation, was

8

there a point in time after the mediation where you were still

9

willing to pay one half of the tax obligation?

10

A.

Ask that again.

11

Q.

Be -- sometime be -- at any point in time between the

12

mediation and the time Holly signed the stipulation, was there

13

any point in time when you were still willing to pay one half of

14

the IRS tax liability?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

How did you propose that that -- you would do

17

that in light of the fact that this amended return was going to

18

be filed and saved tax money?

19

A.

Ask that again.

20

Q.

So how were you proposing that you would still pay one

I’m not sure I understand.

21

half of the tax in light of the fact that -- well, strike that.

22

Were you aware of the fact that after the mediation Holly paid

23

approximately $15,000 to the IRS?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Okay.
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1

A.

She told me that.

2

Q.

So did you ever make any proposal to her that you would

3

still pay half of the tax at any time after she paid her portion

4

of the tax?

5

A.

I don’t think so.

6

Q.

So do you recall every proposing to her that you make an

7

equalization payment to her?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

You don’t recall that?

10

A.

No.

11

No.

No.

I think there was some discussion between

the attorneys there, and you and I did have some talks on that --

12

Q.

Right.

13

A.

-- but I didn’t talk to her directly about it.

14

Q.

Okay, right, but you’re aware of the fact that you

15

authorized a proposal to be sent --

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

-- to Holly saying --

18

A.

Yes

19

Q.

-- that let’s file the amended return, let’s see what

20
21
22

the final liability was.
A.

Oh, yeah, definitely.

Before the amended tax return,

definitely.

23

Q.

Explain to me what --

24

A.

Definitely.

25

Q.

Explain to me what you were proposing.
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1

A.

Well, you know, before the amended tax return, it’s

2

impossible to know what the tax liability might be.

So I told

3

her whatever the difference is, I’ll gladly pay it.

I’ll

4

definitely pay it.

5

know what the liability is and I’ll pay it.

6

back from the accountant was that we were getting a refund.

7

texted it to me.

8
9
10

Q.

Let’s just do the amended tax return.

Let me

The only thing I got
He

So when -- when you pro -- through me proposed an

equalization payment, the concept would be hey, Holly, I know
you’ve paid your 15 --

11

A.

Yeah, we’re going to equal the amount.

12

Q.

-- we’re going to lower the tax liability --

13

A.

Yeah.

14

Q.

-- and everybody is going to pay half, whatever that

15

would be?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Right?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Because you wanted to get the divorce finalized --

20

A.

I did.

21

Q.

-- before the amended return was filed?

22

A.

Yeah, because my hands were tied.

23
24
25

I -- she was making

lots of money, and I was making nothing.
Q.

Okay.

What is your understanding of why that

equalization payment would have been required by you?
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1

A.

Well, if there was any kind of liability left over, I

2

was willing to pay for it.

3

pay my portion in a second.

4

liability, I would have paid it.

5
6

Q.

I would

If I had known there was a

Because at that point in time, you knew you hadn’t any

portion of the tax?

7
8

I was glad to pay for it.

A.

Yeah.

If she had wanted me to pay it, I would have paid

it at the time.

9

Q.

All right.

Because of these other things we talked

10

about, you didn’t feel like -- later on you didn’t feel like you

11

should have to pay it?

12

A.

Right.

13

Q.

Now if I can call your attention to paragraph -- turn to

14

Exhibit 10, which is the first tab in your binder.

15

A.

Okay.

16

Q.

Why don’t you -- are you familiar with this paragraph

17

49?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BECKSTROM:

20

Honor.

21

So where are you now?
It’s page 19 of the stipulation, your

That would be Exhibit 10, first tab in your book.
THE WITNESS:

First tab, okay.

22

Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

Are you there?

23

A.

Exhibit 10, yeah.

Exhibit 1.

24

Q.

Yeah, go to page 19.

25

A.

Page 19, okay.
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1

Q.

Are you familiar with this paragraph 49?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

What’s your understanding of what this paragraph was

4

presented for?

5

A.

Let me read it.

6

Q.

Okay.

So it talks about the rebates and where they --

7

where we agreed to share them.

8

and Dr. Pepper rebate checks, and she took the much larger ones,

9

Coke.

10
11

Q.

So she kept the -- I took the IPC

So you were awarded the IPC and Dr. Pepper rebate

checks?

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

From 2016 through 2020?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

Sitting here today, have you been paid any money

16

relative to those rebates?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Do you have any knowledge about whether she has received

19

any rebate monies?

20

A.

21

somewhere.

22

Q.

23
24
25

Yeah.

Yeah.

We got a copy of the checks here

Are those checks attached as Exhibit 13, which would be

tab 4 of the exhibit binder?
A.

Yes.

Yep, that sounds -- I think it’s them.

You know,

they’re -- you know, I’d have to get a better accounting on IPC
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1

rebate checks, so I know that this -- this is the IPC rebate

2

checks, but I don’t know if they’re biannual or annual, because I

3

know they changed the system there.

4

of these in the same year.

So there may be another set

5

Q.

But you know you have -- you were never paid --

6

A.

Nothing.

7

Q.

-- any of these monies that are reflected in these four

8
9
10
11
12

checks, right?
A.

Yeah, nothing.

So IPC could give us a full accounting

of this if we wanted to.
Q.

Now turning to Exhibit 12, which is tab 3 -- Exhibit 3

to tab --

13

A.

Okay.

14

Q.

This is the July 29 th text.

15

A.

Exhibit 3?

16

Q.

Yes.

17

A.

Okay.

18

Q.

The texts on the right hand side are -- are your texts,

19

correct?

20

A.

Right.

21

Q.

So you get this text from Holly indicating that she

22

wants to know how you’re going to be paying the difference, and

23

you responded see you in court, right?

24

A.

Yeah.

25

Q.

Why did you say that?
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1
2

A.

Because at that point I realized that I was being

tricked.

Something wasn’t right.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

So something wasn’t right with the accountants.

Things

5

weren’t -- things didn’t add up right there, and so then I knew

6

that she was up to something.

7

MR. BECKSTROM:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

Thank you.

Go ahead.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. SPENCER:

11

Q.

12

find that.

13

A.

Exhibit 5.

14

Q.

It will have a sticker on it that says --

15

A.

Is it on the -- okay.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

Mr. Rosser, calling your attention to Exhibit 5, you can
It’s the pages from the amended tax return of 2015.

Number 5.

I see it here.

Calling your attention to the second page of

that --

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

-- you see Derrick Clark’s signature there?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

The copy that we have here does not bear your

signature; is that correct?

23

A.

Right.

24

Q.

You’ve heard the testimony of Holly and also Mr. Clark,

25

they believed that you signed it around August 22 nd, 2016.

Is
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1
2
3

that consistent with your recollection?
A.

Yeah.

Holly gave me the signature page at the bank and

I signed it.

4

Q.

So you -- your recollection is that you --

5

A.

On August 22 nd.

6

Q.

I didn’t mean to interrupt.

7

A.

No, that’s it.

8

Q.

So you signed it the same day that Holly did?

9

A.

I don’t know when she signed it.

Go ahead, finish.

I guess so.

I guess

10

she signed it on the same day.

11

just -- there was several documents.

12

signed it because we understood that it was different than this,

13

so --

I have no idea.

There was

I didn’t see -- you know, I

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

-- everybody had a clear understanding at that point.

16

Q.

You heard Mr. Clark’s testimony that sometime late in

17

July that you informed him that there would be a tax liability.

18

Do you recall if that’s what he said?

19

A.

Yeah.

So on the same day that Holly text me, which was

20

July 29 th, she text me at 1 o’clock in the afternoon at around --

21

I’d have to look through my phone to know exactly, but it was

22

around -- it was in the afternoon.

23

he -- he -- well, we exchanged phone calls back and forth.

24

he went on the -- he ended up calling the Internal Revenue

25

Service on my behalf.

I kept calling Derrick, and
Then

I tried, but I was on hold for 45 minutes,
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1

two different times even.

2

priority.

3

come up with the answers that I needed, which you know, he

4

answered -- matched the texts perfectly.

5
6

Q.

I don’t know why it’s like that, but he was able to

Okay.

So calling your attention to your binder tab 10,

that is Respondent’s 19 --

7

A.

Tab 10?

8

Q.

Yes.

9
10

He got through because accountants get

So this is the text message that Derrick Clark

sent to you on July 29 th at 3:04 p.m.?

This may have been asked,

but I just want to make sure that the record is clear on it.

11

A.

Tab 10.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

And that’s when I found out we weren’t getting a refund.

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

So the amount 15,198, you have to deduct the depreciated

Yes.
Now --

Calling your attention again --

16

items off of that to get to the tax liability, which is around

17

$7,900, or something.

18

Q.

Um --

19

A.

And he says that here, too.

He goes on to say, “So you

20

can minus off the amended refund from that, and that would be the

21

balance due after the process the amended tax return.”

22

Q.

Okay.

Call your attention again to Exhibit 5, which is

23

two pages from the amended return.

24

down the second page where it says sign here --

25

A.

Do you see about 75 percent

Page 5?
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1

Q.

Yes.

2

A.

In this binder?

3

Q.

No, it’s not in the binder.

4

A.

Oh, over here.

5

Q.

It’s one of the loose exhibits that’s Exhibit 5.

6

A.

Okay.

7
8
9

okay, No. 5.
Q.

Three, four -- I just had it, didn’t I?
Got it.

Okay.

Do you see where it says sign here, remember to

keep a copy of this form for your records near the signature

10

lines.

11

A.

Do you see that?
Huh-uh.

Where does it say that?

12

MR. SPENCER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SPENCER:

It’s right there.

15

THE WITNESS:

Oh, okay.

16
17

One --

May I approach the witness?
Yes.

Where I didn’t sign.

Okay.

Yeah, I see it.
Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Doesn’t it say, “Under penalties of

18

perjury, I declare that I have filed an original return, and that

19

I have examined this amended return, including accompanying

20

schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and

21

belief, this amended return is true, correct and complete.

22

Declaration of preparer other than tax payer is based on all

23

information about which the preparer has any knowledge.”

24

that -- that’s what it says, correct?

25

A.

Is

Yeah, I think so.
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

Yeah, I did -- I did sign it to finalize the taxes so

3
4
5

You did sign that about August 22 nd, 2016?

she can make the payment.
Q.

Realizing you’re not a lawyer, you do understand

generally what perjury means?

6

A.

Sure.

I’ve seen it all morning.

7

Q.

Okay.

When it says to the best of a person’s

8
9
10

knowledge -A.

That was to the best of my knowledge.

I don’t have an

accounting degree.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

I have to rely on the accountants.

13

Q.

So are you -- so I just want to make sure that I

14

understand for clarity, so your Exhibit 19 is a text message from

15

Derrick Clark, and you say that the date and time are correct.

16

A.

Exhibit 19 is in this book?

17

Q.

Yes, which is at your tab -- your tab 10.

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

Yet at the time that you signed this about August 22 nd,

20

Okay, No. 10.

Okay.

Got you.

Okay.

Yeah.

okay --

21

A.

You know --

22

Q.

-- you understood that on the face of the return it

23
24
25

showed a refund -A.

Yeah, but everybody knew there wasn’t a refund, my

friend, clearly.

-115-

001381

1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

But to regenerate the paperwork is --

3

Q.

-- there was --

4

A.

-- ridiculous.

5

Q.

Excuse me.

6

A.

Okay.

7

Q.

My question -- my question is you -- it’s true you

8

That’s what you’re saying, everybody knew --

I didn’t mean to talk over you.

understood that there was not going to be a refund?

9

A.

Sure, of course.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

I did after July 29 th.

I sure did.

So what you’re saying to the Court is that Holly

also understood there was not going to be a refund?

12

A.

Yeah, she did.

13

Q.

And here’s what you’re saying to the Court is that she

14

signed it anyway?

15

A.

Apparently so.

16

Q.

Well, did you see her signature or did you see her

17

signed it?

18

A.

She said she did, and I’m going off that.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Did she not sign it?

21

Q.

What you’re saying to the Court is that she did that as

22

an elaborate scheme to have a reason to come and sue you here and

23

profit from it?

24
25

MR. BECKSTROM:

Objection, mischaracterizes his

testimony.
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1

MR. SPENCER:

2

THE COURT:

3

testimony is.

4

there a scheme?

5
6
7
8

Well, it’s a question, your Honor.
I don’t know that -- I heard what her

I’m going to let him answer it.

THE WITNESS:

It’s the -- was

I -- I think yes -- I’m going to have to

say yes, based on the rebate checks and her wanting to keep them.
Q.

BY MR. SPENCER:

Calling your attention to Respondent’s

18, which is at tab 9 of your binder --

9

A.

Okay.

10

Q.

-- can you find that?

11

A.

Yeah.

12

Q.

Now you heard the testimony that Holly sent this seeking

13

advice or commentary about the amended return?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

So what you’re saying to the Court is that she really

16

didn’t need that advice because she knew that there was going to

17

be an obligation and not a refund?

18

A.

Yeah.

19

Q.

So this email would also be part of that scheme that you

20
21

She knew it.

mentioned a moment ago?
A.

You know, I don’t -- I can’t say that.

I mean obviously

22

it looks like she’s searching for answers herself here, to me,

23

early in July, and that’s all I can get out of that.

24

when you send an email to an accountant, you want an answer, you

25

usually get it.

That’s what you pay them for.

You know,

They usually
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1

don’t side step and not answer your tax questions, especially the

2

amount of money that Kohler & Eyre is getting.

3
4

Q.

Okay.

Calling your attention to your Exhibit 12, tab 3

of your binder.

5

A.

Number 12?

6

Q.

Have you found that?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

It’s at tab 3.

9

I have -- what is it?

What’s on the page?

It’s Exhibit 12.

It’s a picture of your

phone with the email from Holly to you --

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

-- dated July 29 th.

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

It looks like at 10:52 a.m.

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

So am I correct in understanding your testimony that

My eyes are going.

I see it.

16

this text means that Holly realizes that you didn’t pay anything

17

toward the 2015 obligation under the mediation agreement?

18
19

A.

Holly is making me aware that there’s a tax liability

and that she wants to keep the rebate checks to pay it.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

That’s exactly what it was.

22
23

That prompted me to go back

after Derrick and find out what’s going on.
Q.

Okay.

So you’re saying that after you got that, that

24

prompted you to contact Mr. Clark, and then the communication in

25

your Exhibit 19 about a balance due of $15,198.64, that’s
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1

information that he then provided to you?

2

A.

Yeah, then minus the depreciation items.

3

Q.

Do you have any writings authored either by you or Holly

4

in which you inform her about the amount of that obligation or in

5

which she acknowledges --

6

A.

No, she informed me.

7

Q.

Let me finish the question.

8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

Or in which she acknowledges that she’s aware of it?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

And so --

13

Q.

-- this text message, you’re talking about your Exhibit

A.

-- the same as me, you know.

14
15

Sorry.

You know, she informed me in this text message.
When you say --

12?
She’s got two accountants,

16

actually.

17

accountants working on taxes at the same time.

18

Q.

She’s got Derrick and Kohler & Eyre.

Okay.

So she has two

Do you have any writings, text message or email

19

or otherwise from Holly Rosser that say something to the effect

20

it’s okay if you don’t pay any back taxes under the mediation

21

agreement?

22

A.

23
24
25

No, I don’t think so.

I mean there might be.

I’d have

to go through every single thing.
Q.

Do you have any writings from Holly Rosser that say

something to the effect that I have paid more than -- more than
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1

my obligation for the 2015 individual return under the mediation

2

agreement, that I have paid that and more than that?

3
4

A.

I don’t -- I’m not sure.

You -- I’m not sure.

Is that

the whole (inaudible) here or from the mediation?

5

Q.

That’s the med -- under the mediation agreement.

6

A.

Okay.

7

Q.

Do you have any writings where --

8

A.

The first of the year I made the first tax payment,

9

8,000.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

I am, too.

12

Q.

You -- you were aware that following the mediation that

Because it --

I’m talking about in 2015.

13

she paid just less than $15,000 toward the outstanding 2015 bill

14

under the mediation agreement.

You knew that, correct?

15

A.

Yeah.

Yeah.

16

Q.

Okay.

Do you have --

17

A.

I don’t know how I knew that.

Yeah, I did know that.

I think maybe she -- she

18

may have texted me, or we may have talked about it.

19

sure.

20
21
22
23

Q.

Okay.

I’m not

Do you have any writing from Holly Rosser, text,

email, otherwise saying, “Hey, I paid more than that?”
A.

I paid more than that?

I’m not sure.

I don’t know.

I

haven’t focused on that, so I can’t answer that.

24

Q.

So she didn’t say that to you in writing at any time?

25

A.

I’m not sure.

I’m just not sure from memory.

I -- I
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1
2

don’t know.
Q.

Calling your attention again to Exhibit 5, why would you

3

sign that amended return showing a refund of $7900 if you knew

4

there was going to be no refund?

5

A.

Well, you know, that happens in a lot of tax years.

6

This ain’t the only one.

7

accountant and you know what’s the liability, then you pay it not

8

based on what the tax -- what these tax documents said that were

9

generated early in the year, because there would still be an

If you have the information from your

10

amended tax return, and it doesn’t matter which one you submit to

11

the IRS, as long as you pay the taxes.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

So I signed what she brought to me in good faith, August

14
15

22 nd.
Q.

I signed it because she wanted me to.
Okay, but you didn’t make any payment toward the

16

obligation that existed at the time of the mediation following

17

the mediation?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Is that correct?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

So she agreed verbally to pay it is what you’re saying?

22

A.

She did.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

She didn’t -- she agreed to pay it.

She sure did.

Then did you ever re -- do you have any writing

that verifies that she made the entire payment?
A.

No, I don’t.

She did agree to it out in front of Subway
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1

in U-Swirl in one of her times when we bumped into each other,

2

and she was screaming at me out there, and she agreed to pay for

3

it based on the income and the taxes -- the property taxes that

4

were left over.

5

Q.

And that’s the U-Swirl in Page?

6

A.

Yeah, U-Swirl and Subway are right next door to each

7

other.

8

Q.

And what point in time was that; do you recall?

9

A.

It was before the stipulation was signed, right before.

10

That’s what prompted the language change and excepted the

11

language.

12

Q.

Who else was present besides you and Holly, if anyone?

13

A.

Just her and I, I think.

I think maybe one of my

14

employees was standing at the door because it was -- she was

15

getting pretty loud and they were getting concerned about it, but

16

yeah, that was it.

17

MR. SPENCER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BECKSTROM:

21

23

Any questions additional you want to ask him

or not?

20

22

That’s all I have.

Just a few follow ups, your Honor.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BECKSTROM:
Q.

Mr. Rosser, in -- on cross examination, Mr. Spencer

24

asked you why you signed the Exhibit 5 knowing that there was not

25

an amended return.

Do you recall that testimony?
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1

A.

Yeah.

2

Q.

Did Derrick Clark ever tell you that it wasn’t okay to

3
4
5

sign the amended return?
A.

No, he didn’t.

He said go ahead and sign it, it doesn’t

matter.

6

Q.

So at the time you signed --

7

A.

He said that you’ll get your tax coupons, you pay those.

8

Q.

So at the time you signed around August 22 nd, did you

9
10

have any reason to believe that there was anything improper that
would pro -- would stop you from signing this return?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

So it was just your understanding as I -- just to

No.

13

clarify your testimony that even though both parties knew that

14

there was no refund coming, it was okay because the IRS would

15

calculate that and then send a payment --

16

A.

Additional payment --

17

Q.

-- coupon?

18

A.

-- coupons to us.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

You bet they would.

Again, Derrick didn’t give you any advice saying

we better change that?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

At any time prior to the July 29 th text from Holly, did

No, he didn’t.

23

you have any understanding that the amended return would not

24

result in a refund from the IRS?

25

A.

Say that again.
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1
2

Q.

At the time that -- prior to July 29 th when Holly sent

you the text message --

3

A.

Right.

4

Q.

-- did you have any understanding that the IRS amended

5
6

return would be anything but a true refund?
A.

I thought it was a true refund.

I thought the amended

7

return would get us a refund, and then you guys -- you two

8

started negotiating over that, the split on that, and around I

9

don’t know, I think it was August -- the end of July.

10
11
12

It was a

Monday when I finally got a hold of you, all that stopped.
Q.

So Holly was the first person to tell you that there

would not be a refund?

13

A.

Holly made me aware of it.

14

Q.

Now Mr. Spencer also asked you about whether you have

15

any writings that say that you don’t have to pay half of the tax.

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Do you recall that?

18

A.

Yeah, I do.

19

Q.

What does the stipulation say?

20

A.

In the divorce decree?

21
22

MR. SPENCER:

Objection, best evidence.

Speaks for

itself, your Honor.

23

THE WITNESS:

The stipulation says --

24

MR. SPENCER:

It’s of record.

25

THE COURT:

It does.

Go and ask another question.
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1
2

Q.

BY MR. BECKSTROM:

You’re aware that the stipulation was

signed, correct?

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

And those terms speaks for themselves, right?

5

A.

Yes.

Yes.

Yeah.

6

MR. BECKSTROM:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SPENCER:

9

THE COURT:

Anything else you want to ask him?
No, sir.
You can have a seat.

10

THE WITNESS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BECKSTROM:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SPENCER:

15

THE COURT:

17

MR. SPENCER:

Thank you, Judge.

Appreciate it.

Any other witnesses or evidence?
No, your Honor.

Any rebuttal?
Yes, sir.

Call Holly Rosser again to the

Okay.
You’re still under oath, so just take the

stand.

19

THE COURT:

20
21

Okay.

stand.

16

18

I have no more questions, your Honor.

He’s right.

Just have a seat right here.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SPENCER:

22

Q.

Now Holly, you understand that you’re still under oath?

23

A.

I do.

24

Q.

You’ve been present during the testimony of Ronald

25

Rosser a moment ago in which he testified that there was a
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1

conversation between you and he near the U-Swirl in Page

2

regarding a verbal agreement to pay more -- for you to pay more

3

taxes than you had agreed to pay under the mediation agreement.

4

A.

I heard him say that.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

You heard his testimony that he doesn’t have any writing

8

Did anything like that happen?

by which you acknowledge an obligation to make such a payment.

9

A.

No, he -- there’s no writing.

10

Q.

That’s because there’s no writing.

You heard his

11

testimony that he doesn’t have any writing by which you excuse or

12

waive his obligation to make a payment for the back taxes under

13

paragraph 15 of the mediation agreement.

14

testimony?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

That’s because there is no writing; is that correct?

17

A.

There’s no writing.

18

Q.

For clarity, are you telling the Court that at all times

You recall that

19

until you received the bill in October that you believed that you

20

would be getting a refund?

21

A.

Correct.

22

MR. SPENCER:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Nothing further.
Based on those questions, anything you want

to ask her or not?
MR. BECKSTROM:

No, your Honor.
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1
2

THE COURT:

Thank you, ma’am.

MR. BECKSTROM:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SPENCER:

6

THE COURT:

8
9

Any

additional evidence, Mr. Beckstrom?

3

7

Have a seat.

No, your Honor.

Mr. Spencer?
No, sir.
Okay.

I’ll hear both of you briefly.

Go

ahead.
MR. SPENCER:

Your Honor, Counsel, if it please the

Court, I submit that what we have here is undisputed evidence in

10

the agreement, that is the Exhibit 2, Exhibit 2 in paragraph 15

11

says that the parties agree that they will each pay half of the

12

outstanding IRS debt for the tax year 2015.

13

evidence of what the amount of that obligation was for the

14

relevant time.

15

We also have

That is shown in Exhibit 1, $29,902.21.

We also have evidence that petitioner has testified that

16

two days following mediation on October -- excuse me, June 18 th,

17

2016 -- pardon me.

18

expressed to Holly Rosser a need to make that payment and also

19

the urgency of it.

20

The day is getting long -- that Ronald Rosser

So I submit that all parties are acknowledging that that

21

was an agreement, and it would be a valid and binding agreement

22

and identified with sufficient specificity, a course of

23

performance which both parties were obligated, but for the fact

24

that there’s a claim that there’s a subsequent agreement that is

25

contained in the stipulation and the decree that was filed with
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1

the Court that would supercede or negate that agreement.

2

what it says.

3

It says

The Court has record of that, but of course, my argument

4

is that this is a latent ambiguity or evidence -- there is

5

evidence that should show a condition precedent, some

6

circumstance that would act as additional terms or a condition

7

precedent to performance under that, or that would remain binding

8

because it is not inconsistent with the subsequent agreement

9

under the circumstances.

10

We have Exhibit 5 which is relevant portions of the

11

amended return that show on line 22 and -- or 23 the amount of

12

the refund, $7900.

13

Rosser -- or excuse me, that Derrick Clark prepared it on July

14

16 th, and -- 2016, and that both Ron and Holly Rosser signed it

15

about August 22 nd.

16

The evidence is that both Ron and Holly

Now the argument is made by Ron Rosser that, you know,

17

Holly Rosser knew that there was going to be this obligation all

18

along, but yet she went along and was complicit in preparing and

19

filing this return knowing full well that there would be an

20

obligation because it was part of a scheme that she had to sue

21

Ron Rosser here, and profit from it.

22

The other evidence that we have is contained in emails

23

from Holly Rosser, both to Derrick Clark accountant and to LaDell

24

Eyre accountant saying, “Please look at this for me and, you

25

know, tell me about, you know, concerns that perhaps I should
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1

have.

2

entitled to a refund?”

3

Is this legit?

Are the deductions legit, and am I really

Now Ron Rosser’s theory is that was all part of a

4

scheme, but in fact, all the evidence here points to the

5

conclusion that the reason that Holly Rosser did this is that

6

she was going to get a refund.

7

mediation agreement to pay for the services of Derrick Clark in

8

preparing an amended return, but she did that because of a

9

promise of a refund that was contingent upon Ron Rosser’s

10

She was not obligated under the

performance to pay some taxes under the mediation agreement.

11

Now Ron Rosser says that there’s a verbal agreement that

12

supercedes that.

13

Swirl in Page where Holly said, “No, I’ll pay the rest of it,

14

too.”

15

especially if her scheme is to come here and sue Ron Rosser to

16

profit by it.

17

problem with that anyway, because this involves rights and duties

18

pertaining to a marital relationship.

19

agreement that’s signed and in writing.

20

There’s this conversation in front of the U-

It doesn’t really make sense why she would do that,

I would submit that there’s a statute of frauds

We have a mediation

We -- his claim is that there’s intervening verbal

21

agreements that would relieve him of that obligation, and at

22

the same time the importance of these factual claims, the fact

23

that they might be facts is -- is so great that it’s highly

24

implausible that someone would fail to reduce those to writing or

25

attempt to.
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1

At the same time in reviewing emails between Counsel,

2

which are not received as evidence here, but are in the file, and

3

so maybe properly considered, there’s no indication of any of

4

those types of what’s going -- of goings on whatsoever.

5

the importance of that is the fact that anything like that

6

happened, it’s more than unlikely that it would fail to find its

7

way into the discussions between the attorneys.

8
9

Given

Exhibit 4 shows the amount of the bill that Holly
received.

She got that on October -- after October 10 th, shortly

10

after that, so we can determine that amount.

11

and so her damages -- her principal damages, at least, are the

12

amount of the refund that she expected to receive shown on line

13

22 of Exhibit 5, plus the amount of bill that she got in Exhibit

14

4 that she -- that she also paid.

15

She paid that bill,

So what other evidence we have is basically that Ron

16

Rosser first agreed that he would pay half the outstanding

17

obligation, and then right away if you take a big step back and

18

look at the situation and look at the emails that are in the

19

files, there’s this -- first there’s this idea well, what we need

20

to do is we need to save money and file an amended return.

21

Okay.

So Holly says, “I would like to see it before I agree to

22

be ordered to sign it.

I would like to see it first,” which I

23

think is only prudent.

Don’t sign something you haven’t read.

24

Especially don’t be ordered to sign it if you haven’t seen it.

25

Right away there’s all this push, hurry up, hurry up, hurry up.
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1

Ron Rosser says there’s all these legitimate reasons for

2

the hurry up.

3

agreement, he had -- he was awarded $366,000 in cash that he had

4

immediate access to.

5

to hurry up, hurry up, and at the same time there’s evidence that

6

well, Holly Rosser had seen the amended return earlier than she

7

said that she did, that’s neither here nor there.

8

prepared until July 16 th.

9

June 16 th.

If you look at the mediation and settlement

That’s in evidence.

There’s all this push

It wasn’t

The date of the mediation agreement is

It wasn’t even prepared until July 16 th, so she takes

10

roughly two weeks to try to get a hold of her accountants and get

11

some advice, verify that she has a refund before she agrees to

12

the language of the final terms of the divorce.

13

Meanwhile, Ron Rosser has a discussion with Derrick

14

Clark by the end of July.

15

there’s a big liability, okay.

16

anyway.

17

least Ron Rosser does.

18

clear Ron Rosser knows what’s going on there.

19

not.

He knows there’s no refund.

He knows

He signs the amended return

Everybody is in -- knows what’s going on there, or at
Let me retract that last statement.

It’s

Holly Rosser does

Based on that, renew our request for the relief prayed for.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BECKSTROM:

Thank you.

Go ahead.

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor,

22

before the Court today we have two items.

23

Holly’s order to show cause where she’s asking to have Ron pay

24

one half of the IRS tax liability.

25

to show cause where he’s asking to have Holly ordered to pay a

Number 1, we have

Second, you have Ron’s order
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1

sum of $12,835.26 for IPC and Dr. Pepper rebate checks that she

2

received and did not pay to him.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BECKSTROM:

5

What was that total amount?
It’s $12,835.26 should be the total of

the four checks that were admitted into evidence.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BECKSTROM:

Okay.
With respect to Holly’s order to show

8

cause, the inquiry starts and ends with the language contained in

9

both the final decree of divorce and the stipulation.

32-R of

10

the stipulation and 39-R of the decree very clearly say that an

11

amended tax return is going to be filed, and that Holly would be

12

able to recover any of the refunds from that amended return, and

13

that she would pay any of the parties’ liability for the year

14

2015.

15

that language.

16

ambiguity.

17

That language is crystal clear.

There is no ambiguity to

For that reason, your Honor, there is no facial

That is the language that is before the Court, okay.

Also, the divorce decree very clear terminates and

18

reverses anything that was in the mediation agreement.

19

all, paragraph 2 of the degree specifically says -- this is a

20

finding from the Court -- the stipulation constitutes the

21

parties’ entire agreement regarding their respective rights and

22

obligations in the property, and more importantly here, the debts

23

of the marital estate.

24

here, your Honor.

25

documents that control, not the mediation agreement.

After

That’s exactly what we’re talking about

So the decree and the stipulation are the
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1

Now Holly tries to argue for a latent ambiguity.

In

2

essence, she’s asking this Court to say paragraphs 32-R and 9-R

3

don’t really say that she has to pay any of the tax liability.

4

Instead, she wants to argue that it says that Ron should pay half

5

of the tax liability.

6

stipulation or decree for that interpretation.

7

There is simply no support anywhere in the

Now while the Court made the ruling to allow the

8

mediation agreement to come in on the issue of whether there was

9

a latent ambiguity, there’s some important case law that has to

10

be considered when deciding whether a latent ambiguity exists.

11

Indeed, the case law is clear that a latent ambiguity is only one

12

that exists that arises from a collateral matter when the

13

contract terms are applied or executed.

14

any relevant evidence is permitted to consider a latent ambiguity

15

issue, but courts are clear that a party cannot use latent

16

ambiguity to advocate for an interpretation that is not supported

17

by the terms of the underlying contract.

18

the stipulation and the decree.

19

Honor, are Watkins vs. Ford and -- I may be slaughtering this --

20

Sayo (phonetic) vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange.

21

Courts have held that

So in this case it’s

The cases I’m citing there, your

Furthermore, courts have found that a court can only

22

find a latent ambiguity if the position taken is reasonably

23

supported by the language of the contract.

24

all for their position of the -- that Ron has to pay one half of

25

the tax in either the stipulation or the decree, let alone there

There’s no support at
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1

being a reasonable support.

2

Honor, they should -- their order to show cause should be

3

dismissed without any relief taken.

4

any cannot equal one half as they’re arguing.

5

So for that reason alone, your

In other words, your Honor,

Now even if the Court entertains this latent ambiguity

6

argument, Holly’s order to show cause starts from the flawed

7

premise that No. 1, she didn’t know that Ron hadn’t paid his

8

portion of the tax, and No. 2, that she did not know that the

9

amended return would not result in a refund.

10

The time line of events make clear that Holly was both

11

aware of the fact that Ron had not paid, and that the IRS amended

12

return would not result in a refund.

13

clear that she is asking to know No. 1 -- the first lines of her

14

text say, “I want to know what taxes come back to me.”

15

argues that that -- well, I’m talking about liability, but read

16

the entire sentence.

17

go.”

18

The July 29 text is crystal

Now she

Then she says, “And where the refund will

Then she talks about Arizona and Utah.
So she knows that there are taxes that could come back

19

to her in the form of a liability, and that she wants to know

20

where the Arizona and Utah refunds are going to go.

21

death nail for her is she says, “And how will you pay me the

22

difference?

23

says.

24

refund coming.

25

Out of the IPC checks?

Then the

It’s fine with me,” she

So she knows as of July 29 that there is absolutely no

Now what’s important, your Honor, is to go back and look
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1

and see what she did, okay.

2

have access to these and they couldn’t open the amended tax

3

returns prior to this July 29 th text.

4

is very clear that she opened those files on July 26 th.

5

her to say that she hadn’t reviewed the tax returns prior to

6

that -- to the July 29 th text is simply a lie, your Honor.

7

knew very well.

8

text.

9

Now she argues that she didn’t even

Derrick Clark’s testimony
So for

She

There is no other rational explanation for that

Now originally on direct examination she testified that

10

well, I don’t know what I meant by -- and how are you going to

11

reimburse me.

Then in cross she came up with excuses of trash

12

and dumpster.

Well, your Honor, trash and dumpster, why would

13

she want to wait for IPC checks to come?

14

Remember, this check -- this text is sent in July, yet

15

she knows IPC checks -- IPC rebate and Dr. Pepper rebates aren’t

16

coming until the end of the year.

17

want to wait five months to get a simple bill like a tax or --

18

excuse me, a trash or a dumpster bill paid?

19

absolutely no sense, your Honor, when you look at it from rat --

20

from a rational standpoint.

21

She knows that.

Why would she

That makes

She absolutely knew as of July 29 th that there would be

22

no refund.

23

also knew that Ron had not paid his portion of the tax from the

24

very get go.

25

sharing the liability, both parties -- both parties knew that Ron

The only way there would be no refund is because she

While there were discussions early on about still
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1

hadn’t paid.

2

concept was discussed.

3

would be talking about well, hey, if we’re going to share a

4

refund because there would be no liability at that point in time.

5

That was the whole reason why the equalization
Had Ron paid his portion of the tax, we

It goes a step further, your Honor.

You know, July --

6

on July 20 th she’s talking to her own accountants.

7

questions.

8

liability to all of sudden getting a refund?

9

absolutely got the answers to her questions sometime between July

10

She’s asking

She wants to know, hey, how do we go from a $60,000
I think she

20 th and the 29 th when she sent the text.

11

Now on July 29 th, that’s also the first time that Ron was

12

informed through Holly’s text that there might not be a refund,

13

and he found out and -- from Mr. Clark.

14

draft of the stipulation and final decree was prepared and sent

15

to Holly through her Counsel.

16

Mr. Rosser have a discussion about what’s going to happen, and

17

she agrees to sign.

18

Now August 1 st, the final

She looked it over.

Her and

That’s what happened.

Now Mr. Spencer is asking, you know, on cross

19

examination of my client well, is this part of some scheme?

20

I don’t know if it’s some part of a scheme, but certainly --

21

certainly Holly was aware.

22

supposed to be coming back to Ron through the IPC and Dr. Pepper

23

rebates, she doesn’t want to pay.

24

paying.

25

Now when it comes to money that’s

So this is her excuse for not

So whether it’s a scheme or not, that’s not for us to
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1

decide, but clearly she knew No. 1, that Ron hadn’t paid, and No.

2

2, that there was no amended -- the amended return would not

3

result in an IRS refund.

4

The mediation agreement simply has no relevance to the

5

argument, your Honor.

6

things to get left out, and that’s exactly what happened here,

7

your Honor.

8

Arizona property were left out, and Ron, justifiably so, wanted

9

this divorce finalized quickly.

It’s common that after a mediation for

You know, the tax -- the property taxes on the

10

The way the mediation agreement was structured was such

11

that he was getting -- he was getting non-liquid assets, and she

12

was getting businesses that had going concern and generated

13

income.

14

didn’t happen, he was justifiably desiring some of those profits

15

that Holly got.

16

over in the Page area because of the traffic coming to the lake.

17

So Ron wanted this divorce finalized quickly.

When that

After all, June, July, that’s the peak season

So you know, No. 1, we have the property taxes that

18

weren’t paid, and No. 2, we have the delay, okay, that cost Ron

19

income.

20

1, Ron was supposed to pay a whole bunch of obligations that

21

Holly was paying previous to that point in time, and he did that.

22

So now he’s paying obligations and has liq -- non-liquid assets

23

and not a ton of money to pay it, okay.

24
25

Not only that, under the mediation agreement as of July

In light of that, your Honor, the -- Holly’s order to
show cause must be denied.

Finally, your Honor, I think it’s
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1

pretty clear that Holly has breached her obligation owed under

2

the divorce decree by failing to pay -- pay over the IPC and Dr.

3

Pepper rebate checks.

4

here today that she received those checks sometime in January of

5

2007 is what she testified.

6

days.

7

as pay over any other monies that might be forthcoming.

We’ve established

She did not pay those over in 10

So she should be ordered to pay over those monies, as well

8
9

That amount is $12,835.

There’s going to be more rebate checks that may have
already come up or will be coming up in the future.

10

an ongoing issue.

11

Holly be ordered to pay over those amounts.

12

THE COURT:

So this is

So for that reason, your Honor, we’d ask that
Thank you.

I’ll issue a ruling within the next couple

13

of weeks and we’ll go from there.

14

excused.

15

MR. BECKSTROM:

16

(Hearing concluded)

Thanks, folks.

You’re

Thank you, your Honor.
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